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ABSTRACT
On Verbs and Time
February 1985
B.A., Tel Aviv University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Barbara Partee
This work is intended to contribute to the study of
aspect. It is claimed that, just as change and causation
can be viewed conceptually as either instantaneous or
continuous, inchoatives and process verbs, whose meaning
involve such notions, appear in natural language as either
event or process type verbs.
We adopts Dowty's hypothesis that the difference
between classes of aspectual verbs may be captured by the
presence of abstract operator such as Become, CAUSE and DO
in the logical structure of verbs, where these notions from
generative semantics are formalized in a Montague Grammar.
We argue that the presence of the abstract operators does
not always yield the classification of aspectual verbs
predicted by Dowty, due to the interaction of the meaning of
these operators with other factors. While achievement and
accomplishment verbs, which are analyzed as including Become
and CAUSE respectively in their meaning, are event type
verbs for Dowty, inchoative and causative verbs which are
process verbs may be found in natural language. Their
semantic analysis involves notions such as comparison, scope
vii
relations, conditions on the relationship between the time
at which the two sentences underlying a causative sentence
are true and the time adverbial modifying it, as well as
other relatied topics concerning the interaction of the
properties of partitivity and additivity and process
causative verbs, and the gap problem in the case of process
verbs vs. that in the case of process inchoative verbs.
It is shown that Hebrew verb morphology system called
"binyanim" reflects some of the subtler distinctions among
verbs involving change and causation. The relations between
the aspectual property of being an inchoative and change and
that between being an accomplishment and causation is
examined via the Hebrew binyanim, which are traditionally
claimed to carry the semantic features of inchoation and
causation
.
Several issues concerning the semantics of the English
progressive, which is an overt aspectual marker, are
discussed. Following Dowty and Kratzer a proposal is given
analyzing it as an expression of necessity whose meaning
contains a free variable over sets of worlds, which is fixed
by the context of utterance.
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CHAPTER I
VERBS, CHANGE AND TIME
1 . Introduction
1.1. The Classification of Aspectual Verbs
In English and in many other languages it is the verb
which carries the tense system discriminations of past,
present and future. The role of what is called in grammar
"tense" is to relate the time of the situation described in
the sentence to the time of speaking. A situation described
in the past tense is located prior to the moment of speaking
and a situation described in the present tense is located
temporally as simultaneous with the moment of speaking. It
was observed long ago that verbs carry other discriminations
involving the notion of time, for example, whether the event
referred to by the verb begins, ends or is still occurring,
whether it is complete or incomplete, single or iterative,
protracted or momentaneous . Temporal discriminations of
this kind are known in the literature as aspectual ones and
the phenomenon is called "aspect".
Aristotle is often referred to as the first to mention
in his writing certain aspectual differences among group of
1
2verbs, although he did not employ the term "aspect". He
discussed the subject within the framework of his
metaphysical system, which we will not discuss here.^ The
philosophers Ryle (1947), Kenny (1963) and Vendler (1967)
were the first to discuss at length the different properties
of classes of verbs. Ryle described as "achievement verbs"
resultative verbs which express the success or failure of
the activity denoted by them ( win , prove , find ) and
distinguished them from irresultative activities ( run , swim )
making further refined distinctions within the class of
achievements. Kenny provided strict grammatical and logical
criteria to sort different classes of verbs and Vendler
extended those criteria ("time schemata" in his terminology)
to yield four different categories of verbs: states,
2
activities, accomplishments and achievements. Vendler 's
verb classification and the tests which determine it were
widely adopted by linguists and philosophers interested in
the theory of aspect.
The major criteria considered for the classification of
aspectual verbs may be divided into three categories:
(a) tenses.
(b) logical entailments.
(c) time adverbials.
We will give one example to illustrate the way each of the
3three categories interacts with inherent properties of verbs
and how it affects their classification. A complete table
of classifying criteria accompanied by examples is given in
the end of this section.
Stative verbs ( love , know , live in Northampton ) may be
used in the simple present tense to report certain
situations. Consider:
(1) John loves Mary.
(2) Alison lives in Northampton.
Activities, accomplishments and achievements in the simple
present tense can not be used as reportive and have only the
habitual reading:
(3) John runs.
(4) Mary plays the piano.
(5) John catches butterflies.
Sentences (3)-(5) can be used to report a happening only in
restricted contexts, as when uttered by an actor on a stage
or a radio announcer. The occurence in the simple present
tense with a non-habitual reading distinguishes stative
verbs from other kind of verbs. This is an example where
the use of tenses interacts with the inherent temporal
features of verbs to yield different readings.
4A second kind of test suggested for classifying verbs
is that of logical entailments
. Kenny noticed that
entailments from the progressive to the non~progressive
distinguish activities from accomplishments. If is an
activity verb, then x is (now) ^-ing entails that x has j^-ed
if
^
is an accomplishment verb, then x is now ()2l^-ing)
entails that x has not (yet) ^-ed. The following example
illustrates this principle (where —> stands for the
entailment relation):
(6) John is running ^ John has run.
(7) John is drawing a circle ^ John has not
drawn that circle.
The third test is that of time adverbials which occur with
certain kinds of verbs but not with others. Accomplishments
take in-phrase time adverbs (and in marginal cases take
for-phrases ) and activity verbs allow only for - phrases time
3
adverbials. Consider :
(8) ?John wrote this poem for an hour.
(9) John wrote this poem in an hour.
(10) John ran for an hour.
(11) *John ran in an hour.
Other classifying criteria have been suggested in the
literature in addition to tenses, logical entailments and
time adverbials. It has been observed that some verbs but
5not others may appear as complements of certain verbs, that
some adverbs can not occur with all verbs and that certain
verbs can not take the progressive.
The classifying criteria set up by philosophers and
linguists were not picked up arbitrarily- all of them
involve certain assumptions or entailments about temporal
properties which verbs in natural languages maintain or
lack. Since the criteria chosen were meant to reveal the
inherent temporal properties of kind of verbs, and assuming
some claims about language universals are true, we expect
some criteria to be similar in different languages. When
two languages react differently toward the classifying
criteria, their verb classification must be affected by it.
Certain criteria used to detect aspectual features of
English verbs may be absent in other languages, i.e the
grammar may fail to express them (Hebrew, for example, lacks
the progressive, which in English can not occur with stative
verbs and serves to distinguish them from activities and
accomplishments), but we expect grammars of all languages to
exhibit some criteria (not necessarily the same for all
languages) in common.
The number of chosen criteria and the importance
assigned to some of them but not to others will affect the
refinement of the classification. Categories others than
these suggested by Vendler can be found in the literature.
6L. Carlson (1981), for instance, adds two additional
categories to these suggested by Vendler- that of
momentaneous verbs and that of dynamic verbs. He
distinguishes between achievements which take the
progressive and those which do not, and calls the latter
momentaneous verbs. The verbs hit
,
notice
,
and blink are
momentaneous while win
, attack , and take off are
achievements. Dynamic verbs are placed between Vendler 's
class of stative and that of activities and they share
properties with both. The difference between activity and
dynamic verbs is that the latter take momentaneous adverbs
while the former do not. Carlson gives the following
example of a dynamic verb with a momentaneous time
adverbials
;
(12) At seven o'clock the caravan was standing in
its old place.
Bach's (1983) verb classification also differs slightly from
that of Vendler 's. He distinguishes between states,
processes (non-states) and events, where the latter are
sub-divided into momentaneous and protracted events
(accomplishments in Vendler 's terminology). He sub-divides
states into dynamic ( sit , stand ) and static ( love x , be
drunk ) and momentaneous events into happenings ( recognize ,
notice
)
and culminations ( die , reach the top )
.
7Other verb classifications have been suggested in the
literature, all of them more or less based on that of
Vendler and differing only in the degree of refinement of
the chosen criteria which determines how subtle the
classification will be. In this work we will adopt
Vendler 's classical classification and, like him,
distinguish among statives, process, achievement and
accomplishment verbs. Our terminology differs slightly from
his. We will replace the term "activity verb" with "process
verb", since the former denotes actions in general instead
of temporal properties, which are relevant for the
classification of this class of verbs.
Linguists have observed (Dowty 1979; L. Carlson 1981)
that the choice of subject and certain other NP-complements
affects the aspect of the verb. Consider;
(13) John ate the bag of popcorn in an hour.
(14) *John ate popcorn in an hour.
(15) John ate a chicken.
(16) John ate chickens.
(17) All guests arrived.
(18) Guests arrived.
The verb eat is an accomplishment but when it takes the
indefinite plural direct object (as in (16)) or a mass noun
(as in (14)) it turns into a process verb. Eating chickens
8denotes a process while eat a chicken denotes an event.
Sentence (14) is ungrammatical since eat popcorn is a
process verb and as such can not take the in- phrase time
adverb. Sentence (18) has an accomplishment verb arrive but
when its subject is an indefinite plural it turns into a
process
.
Process verbs describing movement which occur with a
specified destination or with an indefinite NP behave like
accomplishments. Consider;
(19) John walked to the park.
(20) John ran a mile.
Dowty (1979) observed that almost all process verbs can have
an accomplishment sense when a proper context is provided;
if we know that John is in the habit of swimming a mile
every day we can say that in the previous day John swam in
an hour or that he finished swimming.
All those facts raise a serious difficulty for
Vendler's classification which applies to surface verbs
only. The example given suggests that VP's and whole
sentences are involved in determining the aspectual
properties of verbs.
David Dowty (1979) adopted Vendler's verb
classification in his attempt to show that the difference
among Vendler's aspectual classes can be explained, to a
9remarkable degree, by the appearance of abstract operators
like Become, CAUSE in the logical structure, of verbs of
each class. All verbs which belong to one aspectual class
share the same logical structure, which differs from that of
verbs of other classes. Dowty presents a lexical
decomposition analysis of classes of verbs in English which
is based on word meaning analysis in generative semantics.
His decomposition analysis is treated as fragment of a
"natural logic", for which an explicit model theoretic
interpretation is given. The detail of this theory will be
discussed at length in the following chapters.
Dowty ' s main idea is that different aspectual
properties of verbs can be explained by introducing a class
of predicates which he calls stative predicates in addition
to a few sentential operators and connectives. The
aspectual operators and connectives are treated as logical
constants and the stative predicates as non-logical
constants. Statives, which Dowty assumes to be understood
clearly, hold or do not hold of an individual by reference
to a state of the world in a single moment. Dowty refers to
events and processes in his exposition, but these plays no
formal role in his theory. The only notion his theory
employs is that of truth with respect to an interval of time
(see the discussion of this in chapter III). The notion of
an interval is taken as basic in his semantics.
10
Truth-conditions of accomplishment, process and achievement
sentences are derived from the semantics of the aspectual
operators and the stative predicates.
Bach and Kamp take an opposite approach. Bach (1977;
1980; 1981) has introduced the generic term "eventualities"
which stands for events, process and states. Unlike Dowty,
he does not take the notion of interval or that of moments
of time as primitive, but goes in the other direction and
analyzes the notion of time in terms of eventualities and
the relation of precedence and overlap between them.
Processes, events and states are analyzed as primitive in
the model and unlike in Dowty 's analysis, they have a role
in the formal theory. Dowty does not adress the status of
events, processes and states in the world, but only provides
truth conditions for event sentences, process sentences,
etc. Bach introduces the notion of a possible history which
consists of a set of individuals
,
a set of eventualities
and their relations. He uses the English words before and
while as technical terms which refer to the relations of
strict precedence and overlapping, and he defines other
relations between eventualities- as, for example, that of
4
simultaneity. Meaning postulates guarantee that different
5
verbs receive their appropriate aspectual meaning.
Kamp (1981b) has also argued for taking eventualities
rather than moments of time as basic and has shown how
11
moments and intervals can be constructed from them by a
technique that traces back to Russell and Wiener. Various
linguists and philosophers dealing with aspect have adopted
the framework that takes eventualities as basic (Parsons
1983; Hinrichs 1981; Partee 1984). We would like to keep in
mind the difference between Dowty ' s and Bach's approaches.
There follows the classifying table of aspectual verbs
taken from Dowty. The application of each of the criteria is
demonstrated by an example given below. The notation + and
- indicate that the class of verbs satisfies or fails to
satisfy the given criterion. The notation 0 indicates that
the criterion does not apply to verbs of this class. The
words "o.k" and "bad" specify correspondingly whether the
sentence is grammatical and semantically normal, or not.
12
Table 1. Criteria for Verbs Classification
Criterion states processes accompli
shments
- achie-
vements
1. Meets non-stative
tests
.
- + + P?6
2. Reportive reading
in the simple
present tense.
+ - - -
3. X is ^-ing entails
X has ^-ed.
0 + - 0
4. X ^ for an hour
entails x at all
times in the hour.
+ + 0 0
5 . X ^^-ed in an hour
entails x was 0-ing
during that hour.
0 0 + —
6. ^ for an hour o.k o.k bad bad
7 . in an hour bad bad o.k o . k
8 . complement of stop o.k o . k o.k bad
9 . complement of
finish
bad bad o . k bad
10. occurs with
studiously,
carefully, etc
bad o.k o . k bad
11. ambiguity with
almost
+
The following examples demonstrate the application of each
criterion to different classes of verbs and the results they
yield
:
13
cr‘it0irion coinbinss diffsirsnt non~stativ©
tests. Stative can not occur in the progressive (example
21), in pseudo-cleft constructions (example 23), they can
the imperative (example 22), they can not appear
with adverbs such as deliberately or carefully (example 24).
They also can not occur as complements of force and persuade
(example 25). These restrictions do not hold in the case of
other aspectual verbs. The sentences below show that
statives fail to occur in these constructions:
(21) a. *John is loving Mary.
b. John is running.
(22) a. *Love Mary!
b. Draw a circle!
(23) a. *What John did was live in Boston.
b. What John did was win the race.
(24) a. *John deliberately loved Mary.
b. John deliberately built a cabin.
(25) a. *John forced Bill to know French.
b. John forced Bill to learn French.
The criteria listed above differ from Dowty's only in the
results of the i for an hour test (criterion 6). In Dowty '
s
table accomplishments take for adverbials. However, in
chapter II of his book he provides contradictory judgements
with respect to this point. At one point (pg. 56) he
maintains that accomplishments only very marginally take
for-phrases, while at another point (pg. 58) accomplishments
are said to allow both for-phrases and in-phrases . English
14
native speakers have informed me that accomplishments with
for adverbs are generally bad. Given their judgements, in
addition to Dowty's contradictory judgements on that point,
I have changed the results of criterion (6) in Dowty's table
so that accomplishments do not take for adverbials, and as a
consequence criterion (4) is no longer applicable to
accomplishment verbs. Only process and stative verbs now
satisfy criterion (4). If
^
is a process verb like walk then
John walked for an hour entails that at any time during that
hour John walked is true.
We have already given examples of the application of
the second and third criteria. The fifth criterion
distinguishes accomplishments from achievements: if John
wrote a sonata in a month it is true that he wrote the
sonata during that month but if he discovered a treasure in
a week it is not true that he discovered the treasure
throughout a period one week in length.
Criteria (8) and (9) distinguish achievements from
accomplishments. Unlike accomplishments, achievements are
unacceptable as complements of finish , and also unlike
accomplishments and processes, they can not occur as
complements of stop . Consider:
(26) *John finished discovering the treasure.
(27) John finished building the cabin.
(28) *John stopped reaching the top of the mountain.
15
(29) John stopped building a house.
(30) John stopped running.
The tenth criterion was observed by Ryle (1947), who
suggested that certain adverbs are anomalous with
achievements
:
carefully recognized his mother.
(31) ?John attentively reached the top of the hill.
conscientiously discovered the treasure,
etc
.
Others adverbs which belong to this class are studiously
,
vigilantly and obediently .
The last criterion which Dowty gives is that of the
effect of the adverb almost on different verbs. Consider:
(32) John almost drew a circle.
(33) John almost ran.
Sentences (33) entails that John did not run while (32) has
two "readings”: that in which John intended to draw a circle
but did not do so and that in which John began to draw a
circle but did not finish it. Process verbs lack the second
reading when used with almost .
Later in the book Dowty revised his verb classification
and made further distinctions relevant to the various topics
he discussed: as, for instance, interval semantics,
subinterval predicates, agentivity etc. We will stick to
16
Dowty's "classical" verb classification described in table 1
and will discuss later in our work some of the issues he
raised which may lead to a subtler aspectual verb
classification
.
1 • 2 . Analogies between Temporal and Nominal Reference
In various places in the literature (Taylor 1977;
Mourelatos 1978; L. Carlson 1981; Bach (to appear)) claims
have been made about certain correlations and analogies
between reference in the object and temporal domains. L.
Carlson (1981) mentions the property of partitivity
(discussed by Quine and the Swedish grammarian Adolf Noreen)
which in nominal reference constitutes the semantic
distinction corresponding to the syntactic distinction of
countability. Informally, partitivity is a notion connected
with divisibility. A portion of some substance like gold
can be further divided into parts each of which is also
gold. (This condition is too strong since there are parts
of gold too small to count as gold. ) The inverse property
of partitivity, i.e additivity, seems to hold
unconditionally of mass terms- the sum of a number of
portions of gold is always gold. Additivity and a weaker
version of partitivity do not hold in case of count terms.
An individual in the extension of a count term such as
"chair" is not divisible into further members in the
17
extension of "chair". Reference in the temporal domain is
similar. Additivity and a weaker partitivity hold of
process verbs like push a cart , run and walk . This has led
to their characterization as subinterval verbs; if a
sentence with a process verb is true of some interval of
time I, then the sentence is true of every subinterval of I
including every moment of time in I.^ Event type verbs
(accomplishments and achievements) like recognize and build
a cabin don't exhibit this property.
One of the contrasts between count and non-count nouns
is in their quantifying systems. Numerals, singular
quantifiers, words like a, each
,
every come only with count
nouns while only mass nouns and plurals come with measure
phrases
.
Mourelatos (1978) observed that there is a
nominalization equivalent to an event predication in which
the original verb appears as a gerund or deverbal noun with
suffixes like -ion
,
-ment
,
-al
,
-ure . The nominalization
appears with numerals, indefinite articles and other count
features as in the following example; there were three
eruptions of Vesuvius . The nominalization equivalent to a
process predication never appears with an indefinite article
or cardinal numbers.
Taylor (1977) made a distinction between process verbs
(E-verbs in his terminology) and event verbs (K-verbs) which
18
can be either instantaneous or protracted, and drew
analogies with spatial dimensions. He observed that E-verbs
are homogeneous while K-verbs are heterogeneous. Fall is an
example of an homogeneous E-verb since every period within a
period of falling is itself a period of falling. Stab is a
heterogeneous verb since no period within a period of
stabbing is itself such a period. He draws analogies with
spatial dimensions : every three-dimensional area within a
homogeneous stuff, like a lump of gold, is occupied by a
lump of gold but no space within a table (which is
heterogeneous) is occupied by a table. Later on in this
chapter I will return to the observations made by Taylor and
Mourelatos
.
Bach (to appear), following Carlson, dealt with the
aspectual shift of verbs from one class to another. He
adopted Link's analysis (1983) of nominals and extended it
to the temporal domain. His treatment reflects a similar
asymmetry in the relation between count and non-count
meaning that runs in the same direction in the nominal and
temporal domain. Link has adopted models with a richer
structure than those found in Montague by giving more
structure to the domain of individuals. In Link's semantics
there are plural individuals like the children and John and
Mary and also quantities of 'stuff' or matter that
correspond to individuals of both kinds. There is stuff
that makes up the plural individual John and Mary and the
that makes up the plural individual children.
19
One starts with a set of individuals and extends
this domain by a join operation to define a superset E.
(AiO Ei where every i-join of individuals exists). A
P^^tial ordering is then defined on the members of E. such
1
that oL . is "less than or equal to" just in case the
i-join of <7<. and y? is oC itself. Among the elements of
A^ there is a subset which forms a special subsystem.
Each of its members is the "stuff" which makes up some
individual. This subsystem has its own join and partial
ordering. What are the relationships between the system
and the rest of the domain? There is a mapping h^ from
individuals (atomic or plural) to the stuff which composes
them. The ordering among individuals is preserved in the
ordering among the quantities in the mapping (h^ is an
homomorphism)
. The same quantity of stuff may correspond to
many different individuals. The same individual may be both
in the extension of man and the extension of cells since the
value of hj^
,
given the two arguments, is identical.
Bach shows how one may extend the structure of the
model just described to the domain of events and processes,
which are new kinds of elements. The analogies are between
events and singular/plural individuals, on the one hand, and
bits of process or portions of matter which compose events
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and individuals on the other hand. As before, one starts
with a set of events A^ and extends this domain to by
means of join-operation and partial ordering. is a
subset of and its elements are bits of process of which
the events are composed. This subsystem has its own join
and partial ordering. The homomorphism h delivers the
bounded bits of process corresponding to instances of each
of these event types.
Bach claims that any count term can be used as a mass
term and vice versa. As an example he gives the sentence
there was dog splattered all over the road and the
expressions portions of ice cream and kinds of mud . The
same phenomenon occurs in the domain of verbs. Process
verbs can be used as events and events as processes. Bach
mentions Dowty ' s example I finished looking for a book ,
uttered in the context of a library with a well defined
search procedure.
Bach noticed an asymmetry in the relation
count/non-count in the nominal and temporal domain. When
one starts with a count meaning and derives the non-count
meaning, a particular meaning seems to be involved. The
mass noun apple seems to mean the stuff such that there is
at least one apple that is constituted from that stuff. (He
argues later that a more indirect relation between the
denotation of a mass predicative term and the corresponding
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count predicate is in need). But in the other direction, it
IS not clear how the meaning of a count noun is to be
constituted from that of a mass noun. A beer may be a
serving of beer or a kind of beer. The same asymmetry holds
in the verbal domain. When we use a process expression in
the count meaning in a certain context we must come up with
some kind of corresponding event, but it is not determined
what event it is- the beginning of the process in question,
some bounded portion of it or its end. Bach argues that
this asymmetry is predicted by the many to one function from
the count elements to the non-count ones (as illustrated
before with the NP ' s cells and man which correspond to the
same stuff )
.
1 • 3 Von Wright's Logic of Change and Inchoatives
Achievement verbs like cool
,
reach and die denote a
change from one state to another. This observation may be
found in various places in the literature. Von Wright
(1963) developed a formal calculus to represent change. An
event is a change of state where one state is the negation
of the other. His calculus of change of state consists of
classic propositional logic plus an operator T ("And Next")
by which four basic types of formulas can be represented:
~pTp - the state p comes about.
pT rv p- the state p ends.
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pTp - the state p remains
.
'^pT'^p- the state p remains.
Generative semanticists suggested that an operator such as
Become is involved in the underlying representation of
sentences like John died. Various proposals were made about
the stages of lexical insertion and the syntactic nodes
which govern different constituents. I will ignore these
questions here and represent John died by the general tree;
(34) S
John become not alive
Dowty (1979) analyzed sentences involving the operator
Become in terms of Von Wright's logic of change. His
analysis can represent the beginning and the ending of
states and activities as in John got drunk and John stopped
running . He suggested that one regard Become as a sentence
operator, and define its truth condition with respect to a
model
.
Dowty ' s claim that all achievements have a logical
structure consisting of Become plus an embedded clause leads
him to distinguish between three types of achievement verbs
which he represents by different formulas. He uses a
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convention whereby oL stands for arbitrary predicates and
for arbitrary formulas either atomic or complex.
The first type are simple achievements represented by
^ X ( Become [ o<l '( X )]) . Simple achievements are sub-categorized
into several groups: locatives like reach
, leave which are
transitive, and also two place predicate like arrive at ;
absolute changes of physical state like freeze
, melt , die
which are intransitive, and one-place predicates like
become-ad;]-er
; aspectual complement verbs like begin
, start,
verbs of possession change like lose
, acquire ; cognitive
verbs like notice
, see ; and change of state of consciousness
like awaken .
The second type of verbs of change are those which
indicate inchoation of activity. Sentences embedded under
Become do not always contain a stative predicate, and may
instead contain an activity. The only English lexical
example Dowty provided is germinate (Become plus grow )
.
Complex sentences like John begin to walk also fall under
this category. Dowty represents inchoation of activity as
follows, where oC stands for arbitrary individuals terms,
‘V for n-place stative predicates and DO is a semantic
operator which changes statives into activities;
(35) Become [D0(o4j^[ ( oL
The third type of verb is that of an inchoation of
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accomplishment. Where j/ is an accomplishment sentence.
Become j represents this group.
The linguistic tests which single out achievements were
discussed in 1.1. Achievements are event type verbs. There
are many cases in which they represent an absolute change of
state. Consider:
(36) The cube of ice melted at midnight.
(37) The puddle of water froze at three o'clock.
(38) John reached the top of the mountain at one
O'clock in the afternoon.
There are physical states which determine the time at which
the subject entered the absolute states implied by sentences
(36)- (38). While the adjectives frozen
, melted desribe these
absolute states there is no English adjective which
describes the absolute state of being on the top of the
mountain or being a winner of a race. Since stative
predicates underlying VP's like win the race and reach the
top of the mountain do not exist in English, Dowty suggests
giving these VP's a more complex representation.
Inchoative verbs form a sub-class of achievements and
usually denote a change of physical state, melt
,
freeze
,
die
,
for example. In English there are inchoatives
morphologically related to adjectives which denote the state
which undergoes the transformation described by the verb.
Cool
^
is morphologically related to cool
^^ ^
as redden
^,
is
25
related to red^^_ English has a quite productive lexical
rule for deriving inchoatives by adding the suffix en to the
corresponding adjective. In Chapter IV we will discuss
lexical rules in general and the deriviation of inchoatives
in Hebrew, which is more productive than in English.
Dowty offers the following syntactic and semantic
lexical rule for deriving inchoatives;
S^; If then
^ ^ ^ ^^ere
ends in a non-nasal obstruent,
otherwise.
"^l* translates into; ^ x [ Become ^ '( x
)
]
The clay hardened is represented in the intensional logic as
(I ignore the past tense in the representation and represent
clay ' by c )
;
The above translation rule seems to capture our intuition
about absolute change of states. Let us call inchoatives
which denote an absolute change of states simple
inchoatives . It seems that the above rule involves an
instantaneous change usually associated with event type
verbs. Any discussion of the kind of change involved here
is directly related to the semantics proposed for the Become
(39) a. (c)
by ^b. Become hard' (c) -conversion
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operator introduced in the translation rule. This issue
will be postponed to a later section.
2. Comparison Classes and Change
2 • 1 • On Ad;]ectives and Comparatives
One class of verbs occurs with durative adverbs and
usually does not allow the punctual time adverbial at t.
Consider
:
(40) The soup warmed for three hours.
(41) The tree grew for three years.
(42) The face reddened for two minutes.
The verbs in (40)- (42), which denote change, share some
properties with process verbs. Like run
,
they extend
through a period of time and possess the sub-interval
property characteristic of process verbs- when the soup
warms for three hours it warms at each sub-interval within
the three hours. Unlike run
,
which denotes a process, the
verbs in (40)-(42) contain a sense of completion which
processes lack. They may occur with time adverbials like in
an hour or It took x y time , which process verbs can not
take
:
(43) The soup warmed in two hours.
(44) It took the soup two hours to warm.
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(45) The tree grew in three years.
(46) It took the tree three years to grow.
(47) His face reddened in two minutes.
(48)
It took his face two minutes to redden.
Inchoatives like cool
, redden and warm are related to
adjectives whose extension is hard to determine since it is
relative to a comparison scale, or context. Linguists and
philosophers have pointed out that vague adjectives can form
the comparative with no semantic anomaly. Adjectives like
coo^, warm
,
red can be used for comparison as follows:
Adjectives like dead related to verbs like die which involve
instantaneous change can not be used for comparison:
(50) *John is deader than Bill.
Kamp (1975) and Klein (1980) have made suggestions regarding
the interaction of positives and comparatives. Hoepelmann's
(1982) theory of comparison and change is an extension of
these works- his semantics for verbs of change is related to
Klein's and Aqvist's. I will discuss briefly the approaches
they have taken. Kamp deals with the problem of vagueness
and contextual disambiguation. He treats positive
adjectives as one place predicates and claims that
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comparative forms which are two place relations are derived
semantically as well as morphologically from the positives.
To show the primacy of positives over comparative adjectives
he evaluates predicates in a multi-valued model theory. in
a two valued logic a predicate can be identified with a
characteristic function which is a function from a set onto
the set 0,1 . The extension of the predicate man is defined
as the set of elements in the universe which give the truth
value 1 when the characteristic function is applied to
them. Tall is a vague predicate since its extension varies
from context to context. For any group of men some of them
are definitely tall, some definitely not tall and for some
of them it is not determined whether they are tall or not.
Before proceeding with our exposition we will mention
some distinctions made by Kamp (1975) and others to single
out different dimensions involved in determining the
extension of an adjective. Some adjectives are vague but
linear, i.e there is a single relevant scale which
determines their extension when the context is given. Tall
,
old
,
wide
,
long
,
belong to this category. These adjectives
are also partial functions, i.e they are not defined for all
the individuals in the universe of the model. Another group
of adjectives are those which are vague and nonlinear
(Klein's terminology for these adjectives), i.e there is
more than one relevant "dimension" or "scale" which
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determines their extension. ^ is a non linear vague
adjective whose relevant extension can either be its volume,
height, surface area etc. A can be bigger than B in a
certain context where the scale is A's and B's heights, and
B can be bigger than A in a different context where the
scale is their volumes. An adjective like prime
, on the
other hand, is not vague but a partial function. The tomato
i_s
—
prime is nothing but a case of sortal incorrectness-
prime is not defined for tomatoes.
Kamp argued that to deal with the vagueness of tall one
can let the characteristic function be a partial
function on the set of men rather than a total one. For
some men the function will give the value 1, for others 0,
and for some it will be undefined. John is tall and John is
not tall may lack truth values, as may tautologies and
contradictions of classical logic. The positive extension
of a predicate in a context c is a set of things of which it
is definitely true, its negative extension is the set of
things of which it is definitely false, and individuals who
fail to belong either to the positive or negative extension
are said to belong to an extension gap. Kamp introduced a
set of new valuations which close up the extension gap in a
consistent way. This is done by a completion of the partial
model determined by partial characteristic functions. Each
complete characteristic function that extends the first one
30
in a consistent way assigns the truth value 1 to tautologies
and 0 to contradictions. Given a context c and a predicate
A we can define the set of consistent c+ (set of new
contexts) which include a consistent total extension of the
meaning of A in c, i.e the set of all c+ such that Ac^Ac+
and Act is total. This is the supervaluation idea of Van
Fraassen (1969) . Suppose we have a partial model where some
tautologies are undefined. We can make them true by
introducing supervaluations: something is true if it is true
in all the total extensions.
Kamp ' s analysis allows the comparative to be defined in
terms of the positives- if A is in the positive extension
and B is in the extension gap, then A is taller than B is
true if there is a completion of the original
function such that F'tall^^^"^ ^'tall^^^"°*
the case where both are in the extension gap,
supervaluations are not enough. The reason is that if A and
B are both in the extension gap, there will be some
consistent total extensions in which A is tall, and some
consistent total extensions in which B is tall and A not
tall.
Klein introduced the notion of a comparison class. A
comparison class is a subset of the universe of discourse
which is established by a context of use. When Mary and
John are both in the positive extension of tall relative to
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a universe, a subset of it may serve as a new comparison
class on which a new partial or total function can be
defined. Klein introduced the following example. One
starts with a set X and partitions it by means of the
function F^(c[x]) where x is the comparison class for the
predicate A in the context c. Y is the extension gap which
remains, i.e Y is X- dom[F^(c[x] ) ]
.
Y is a new comparison
class which is partitioned again by means of the function
F^(c[Y]). Then again, one takes the remaining extension gap,
and partitions it. Klein provides the following figure to
illustrate this;
( 51 )
X
The comparative is derived from the positive in a similar
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way to that offered by Kamp. Both Kamp and Klein treat
adjectives as one place predicates and Klein treats
prenominal adjectives as a special case and introduces an
ad-hoc device to take care of them.
Hoepelman (1982) presents a semantics for adjectives,
comparatives and change in which he treats adjectives as
common noun modifiers. His theory is influenced by Aqvist
(1981) who tried to account for the relationships between
adjectives in order to preserve the validity of arguments in
which they occur. For example. Bill is a good violinist.
Bill is a violinist and Bill is good is an invalid
argument; Aquist would like this to follow from his theory
since traditional propositional and predicate logic can not
handle such cases.
Hoepelmann claims that an advantage of his theory over
Klein's is that it handles all adjectives in a uniform way
and is simultaneously able to account for relationships
between comparatives and superlatives. He also deals with
opposite pairs of degree adjectives like tall -short
,
big-small
,
etc.
The area of the really not tall man will be the area of
the short man and the area of the really not short man the
area of the tall man. He gives the following diagram:
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( 52 )
undefined
Pt3ll(U)=0
If Mary is in the undefined area, Mary is tall does not have
a truth value and neither does Mary is short . Mary is short
and tall and Mary is neither short nor tall are
^*^^tradictions in classical logic, but do not have a truth
value here. However, he claims, we can answer questions
like: How tall is Mary? by Mary is neither tall nor short,
she is something in between . This is not a contradiction
unlike Mary is tall and short
. His semantics is intended to
reflect this fact.
Hoepelmann presents a theory of polar adjectives by
means of comparison classes. He treats common nouns as well
as adjectives (except for such adjectives as fourlegged) as
a special case. The set of men, for example, is carved up
into the set of tall men and the set of short men. Between
these two sets there is the set of men which are neither
tall nor short.
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( 53 )
I VlllWIWi/i//7Wh Ftall (U)=l
W////////////m,/
\j
) Ftall (U)=0
The same carving up can be done on this set. The idea is
the same as in Klein except that adjectives are common-noun
modifiers and contexts are no longer parts of the model.
The traditional view of adjectives as function from CN to CN
of which Kamp and Montague are representative, is kept here,
since degree adjectives like tall are functions taking as
arguments subsets of the universe and giving as values
subsets of the universe. Hoepelman suggests CN's should be
treated in the same way, which may account for their
intensionality
,
i.e with respect to the universe the set of
philosophers may be the same as the set of logicians, but
the function corresponding to both may be different since
F ( F ( u ) ) Flogicians logicians T philosophers
(
Fpj^^ ( u ) ) . Thus when N is an arbitrary CN and A an
arbitrary adjective.
9 (N)
(?(N)
9 (N)
(P(N)
(P (N)
and F(A) e (P(N)F(N) €
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i.e, adjectives are total or partial functions f
denotations of CN's to possible denotation of CN's. I will
rom possible
not enter into the details of Hoepelman's semantics or the
conditions on the interpretation of adjectives he offers.
2*2. A Certain Case of Ambiguity
Consider the following sentences:
(54) The sky darkened.
(55) The soup warmed.
(56) Bill's face reddened.
In sentences (54)- (56) the meaning of the verbs darken,
waxm, redden depends on the context and in that sense these
verbs are considered to be vague. The vagueness of these
inchoatives derives from the vagueness of the adjectives
from which they are formed. I assume that the meaning of a
vague adjective like cool contains a context parameter c
(which I write as a subscript). The lexical rule T^ will
derive the following meaning for the verb cool
;
The absolute simple inchoatives can be regarded as a special
case; since their meaning does not depend on context, we can
suppress the context parameter in their representations.
(57)
There is some evidence which suggests that inchoative
verbs are ambiguous between a "become adj" and "become
3dj er reading. Consider the following examples:
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(58) a. The Atlantic ocean is wide and is widening.
b. *The Atlantic ocean is wide and becoming wide.
c. The Atlantic ocean is wide and becoming wider.
(59) a. John is tall and is growing.
b. *John is tall and becoming tall.
c. John is tall and becoming taller.
I used the progressive tense in examples (58) and (59) since
widen
, grow can not appear in the simple present tense. The
switch of tenses should not affect my argument. I used the
verb grow in example (59), which morphologically is not
related to tall, although semantically it is analyzed in
terms of the vague inchoative tall . Sentences (58b) and
(59b) sound odd since when the Atlantic ocean and John are
wide and tall
_
relative to some fixed context c, they can
not become wide_ and tall_ again. Sentences (58c) and (59c)
are perfect. The Atlantic ocean can be wide^ and still
become wider since in the semantic analysis of the
comparative, its width is evaluated with respect to contexts
(i.e. comparison classes) distinct from c. In the context
c, wide oceans are distinguished from non-wide oceans. In
the evaluation of the comparative, the comparison class may
be much smaller (for instance, temporal stages of the
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Atlantic ocean). One can compare two wide objects which are
in the positive extension of a predicate, i.e you can say "a
is a wide skirt" and ”b is a wide skirt" and "a is wider
than b". This suggests that widening in (58a) and (59a)
means "becoming wider" and not "becoming wide". Sentences
(54) (56) appear to involve an ambiguity between a vague and
a comparative reading. Sentence (54) may imply either that
the sky became dark
_
or that it became darker.
Partee has suggested (personal communication) the
interesting fact that some degree modifiers that
comparatives allow are the same as those that go with
inchoatives
:
(60)
Adjectives Comparatives Inchoatives
very cool
quite cool
so cool
pretty cool
rather cool
*a lot cool
*quite a bit
cool
*ten degrees
cool
*very cooler
*quite cooler
*so cooler
pretty cooler
rather cooler
a lot cooler
quite a bit
cooler
ten degrees
cooler
has very cooled
has cooled quite
has so cooled
has pretty cooled
has rather cooled
has cooled a lot
has cooled quite a bit
has cooled ten degrees
On the other hand, absolute modifiers like completely
,
absolutely (which imply some "absolute" top on a scale) go
with adjectives and inchoatives but never with comparatives;
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( 61 ) Adjectives Comparatives Inchoatives
completely
cool
completely
cooler
has cooled
completely
absolutely *absolutely has cooled
cooler absolutely
This reinforces the suspicion that the verb cool is
ambiguous. Partee has also noticed that we can say;
(62) the weather has finally cooled.
where finally implies an end state cool and also,
(63) The weather has cooled considerably.
where considerably implies a degree or comparative reading.
How should the reading of inchoatives paraphrased by "become
cooler" be represented? In Kamp, x is cooler than y is true
iff fo^ ^11 ways of resolving the vagueness of cool by
separating the cool from the non-cool, if y counts as cool,
then X counts also, but not in the other direction. In line
with Kamp, we can say that inchoatives with the "become
adj-er" reading, which I will call "comparative
inchoatives", are also derived from the positives. To do
this we introduce into our lexical rule T^ an existential
quantifier which binds the free variable over contexts;
T„; ^ x[
(
3 c ) Become [ cool
'
](x)]
M o
Argumentation for introducing an existential quantifier into
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our "comparative inchoative" rule will be given in the next
section. Inchoatives derived by T^, which is a closed
expression, are no longer vague, a fact which explains why
sentences (58a) and (59a) are fine.
2*3. Inchoatives in Sentences with Durative Time Adverbials
Dowty has given examples of verbs which would seem to
be achievements on some semantic and syntactic grounds, but
which nevertheless allow durative adverbs which only occur
with process verbs. These verbs express a change of state
and do not imply that the same change of state occurred over
and over. He says that these inchoatives which occur with
durative time adverbials are vague.
(64) The soup cooled for three hours.
(65) The sky darkened for half an hour.
(66) The Atlantic ocean widened for three years.
Dowty asserts that (64) should be analyzed as saying that
for each time t within the interval of three hours there is
some resolution of vagueness of cool by which the the soup
is cool is true at t, and false at t-1. One wants different
resolutions of vagueness to be used for each time covered by
the durative adverb. This is the reason why in the semantic
definition one should give "a resolution of vagueness" a
narrower scope than that of times. Dowty puts it this way:
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(Dowty 1979, pg. 90); "A sentence Become should be true at
t iff there is some resolution of vague predicates that
makes
f true at t but false at t-1; then (\/x: x e an hour)
fi
must be true iff for all times t' within the interval an
ho^^ there is some resolution of vague predicates that makes
^
true at t ' ”
.
How should we represent a sentence like (64) in a way
which captures Dowty 's suggestion?
To say that the soup cooled for three hours
, as in
example (64), means that there is some interval I of length
three hours, such that for any time t in I, there is a
^o^text such that the soup becomes cool (simplifying
assumption- the soup
'
equals s )
:
(67) ( 3 I) ^duration of I is three hours &
(\/t(tel) —^ (3 c) [Become cool
' ^
( s ) ( t ) ] )j
We have here an existential quantifier over contexts with a
narrower scope than that of the durative time adverbial.
Dowty (1972; 1979) has provided examples of achievement
verbs with indefinite plurals or mass nouns as subject or
object which occur with durative adverbs as in (68):
(68) John discovered fleas on his dog for six weeks.
and noticed that these sentences involve an existential
quantifier with a narrower scope than that introduced by the
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adverb, but it was Gregory Carlson (1977; 1977a) who
accounted for the presence of an existential quantifier in
sentences involving bare plurals. Carlson has given
examples of sentences with indefinite plurals like dogs
,
rabbits in constructions of various kinds: VP quantifiers,
negation, anaphoric constructions, frame adverbials and
aspectual verbs like continue
. He has shown that in each
case the only possible reading of these sentences is that in
'^'^hich the existential quantifier underlying the indefinite
plurals has a narrower scope than the other anaphor
. For
example
:
(69) Harry continued to kill rabbits.
(70) Dogs were everywhere.
Indefinite plurals also seem to have a universal or generic
quantifier
:
(71) Dogs bark.
(72) Smokers are rude.
Indefinite plurals, referred to by Carlson as bare plurals,
are never ambiguous between an existential and generic
reading; they are in complementary distribution.
Furthermore, anaphoric constructions with bare plurals fail
to show the difference between existential and generic NP ' s
;
in (73) the NP is generic and since it contains a universal
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quantifier, the pronoun they can not be bound, nor deictic
or an E-type pronoun.® Similarly, in (74) the NP is
existential, so again the pronoun can't be bound, deictic or
E-Type
;
(73) Mary hates raccoons because they stole
generic existential pronoun
her sweet-corn.
^74) Raccoons stole Mary's sweet-corn, so now
existential
she hates them .
generic
The behaviour of the pronouns in (73) and (74) is
inconsistent with the assumption that (73) contains a
universal quantifier and (74) an existential one. This led
Carlson to look for a semantic analysis of bare plurals. He
claimed that bare plurals do not contain a quantifier in
their NP. The difference between the generic and existential
interpretation of indefinite plurals lies in the meaning of
the verb they interact with. The indefinite plurals and
their pronouns in (73) and (74) share the same meaning, and
it is the different verbs hate and steal which determine the
interpretations of (73) and (74). Carlson claimed that bare
plurals are names of kinds, like chairs, cats and flowers.
He introduced a relation R which realizes the kind with an
individual. R(a,b) asserts that a thing a realizes the kind
or an individual b. Similarly, he distinguished between an
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individual and its stages. R(c,d) asserts that the stage c
realizes the individual d at a certain time. Certain verbs
and adjectives predicate things of individuals and kinds,
and others of stages of individuals or kinds at a certain
time
.
Carlson mentions Milsark (1974) and Siegel (1976) who
divided English adjectives into two classes: those which
select the indefinite plural existential reading, and those
which select the generic reading. Property adjectives like
f^, clever, tall are more permanent than adjectives which
denote states, such as drunk and happy
. Compare;
(75) Dentists were drunk.
(76) Dentists were tall.
Sentence (75) has the existential reading where the subject
is an indefinite plural, and (76) has the generic reading.
States are predicates of stages of individuals and
properties are predicates of individuals.
Hate is a primitive relation between individuals while
kick and eat are relations between stages of individuals. A
derived translation of eat is a relation between
individuals/kinds
:
(77) ^xy3x'3y'[R(x',x) & R(y',y) & eat(x',y')]
The part of (78)
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(78) Raccoons were eating sweet—corn.
which IS interior to the progressive operator is translated
into
;
(79) 3x' 3y'[R(x',r) & R(y',s) & eat(x',y')]
Dowty incorporated Carlson's theory into his Become analysis
of achievement, and in this way (68) can be represented in a
way similar to (64);
(80) (Vt;t€six weeks) At(t, Become [John know that
(3x[R(x,f)& X is on his dog])])
The existential quantifier in our representation of (64)
ranges over contexts and there is no context involved in
Carlson's theory. My treatment of comparative inchoatives
is an elaboration of a suggestion by Dowty which was
influenced by Carlson's treatment of bare plurals. The rule
of deriving comparative inchoatives introduces an
existential quantifier like that which is implicit in the
verb in Carlson's theory of bare plurals.
We will provide an example which illustrates the
difference between the two inchoative translation rules T^
and T
2
repeated below:
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(81) Absolut© and vagu© inchoativ©s:
^x[B©com© [o<.'^(x)]]
(82) Comparativ© inchoativ©;
'^
2
' ( 3 c)B©com© [«^'^(x)]]
L©t's assum© that th© two cont©xts of us© ar© Alaska and
Egypt. In Alaska anything und©r 0° c©ntigrad© is cool and
anything which is abov© 0^ c©ntigrad© is not cool. In Egypt
anything und©r 30 c©ntigrad© is cool and anything abov© it
is not cool. Suppos© a particular glass of l©monad© w©nt
down from 31^ to 29^ c©ntigrad©. In this cas© (83)
(83) Th© glass of l©monad© cool©d.
wh©n translat©d by and ( s©© (84) and (85) b©low) hav©
diff©r©nt truth valu©s with r©sp©ct to th© cont©xt of us©
Alaska and Egypt (wh©r© 1 stands for th© glass of l©monad©):
(84) B©com© [ cool
'
^ ( 1 )
1
(85) (3c)[B©com© cool'^(l)]
(84) is fals© with r©sp©ct to th© cont©xt Alaska and tru©
with r©sp©ct to th© cont©xt Egypt. On th© oth©r hand (85) is
tru© with r©sp©ct to ©ith©r cont©xt, b©caus© in ©ach cas©
th©r© ©xists a cont©xt, i.© Egypt, wh©r© th© glass of
l©monad© cool©d.
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3. Inchoative Process Verbs
^he Gap Problem and the Process Meaning of Inchoatives
As we saw in the previous section, a sub-class of the
inchoatives take durative time adverbials which usually go
with process verbs. Aspectually, these verbs seem to behave
like such process verbs as run and push a cart , although
morphologically they are derived by the inchoative lexical
rule (see chapter IV section 2.1.) and their meaning
involves changes of states. We will refer to inchoatives
which take durative time adverbials as "inchoative process
verbs"
.
In discussing inchoative process verbs we will deal
with two issues:
1. The gap problem which deals with the way of
representing the quantifier over times in (67), and the
relationship between the length of the intervals at which
the activity took place and the gaps in the case of
inchoative process and inchoative process verbs.
2. The two possible event and process readings of
inchoative process verbs.
In the representation of (64) repeated below:
(67) ( 3 I) [duration of I is three hours &
\/t[(te I) ~^(3c)[ Become cool
' ^
( s ) ( t ) ] ] ]
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the context is expected to change for every moment within
the interval I of duration three hours such that the soup is
not cool at a previous moment and cool at the next one.
However, it seems that the universal quantifier in (67)
forces us to accept undesired consequences which could be
avoided if a weaker quantifier were present. In (86^) there
is no context (resolution of vagueness) with respect to
which the soup become cool at moment a, yet, in intuition,
sentence (64) repeated below;
(64) The soup cooled for three hours,
is true in the following situation;
In all the situations described in (86)-(92) I is of
duration 3 hours and "am4M" represents not running.
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The problem of the representation of the durative time
adverbials arises not only when they occur with inchoative
process verbs but also when they occur with primitive
process verbs. For
(87) John ran for three hours.
to be true, John does not have to be occupied in the
activity of running at every moment throughout the duration
of three hours- he can rest for ten minutes or stop every
half an hour for a moment. This situation is described in
(86ii) where we have drawn the running and the gaps on a
single line. So sentence (64) and (87) are both true in the
situation described in (86)
.
Sentence (64) can not be true
in the case where for most of the time there was a steady
warming rather than a cooling of the soup (see (88i) below)
even though by the end of the three hours the soup is
definitely more cool than at the first moment. Likewise for
primitive process verbs like run in sentence (87). If the
running occupies only a small subinterval of the interval of
three hours, (87) is not verified. So in case (88),
sentences (64) and (87) are both false.
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( 88 )
Some important differences between the length of the
intervals at which the activity took place and the gaps show
up in the case of process and inchoative process verbs.
This seems to follow from the fact that the latter but not
the former involve change of states.
Consider the situation described in (89i). The soup is
not actually growing cooler for most of the time but at the
end of the three hours it is cooler than at the beginning.
Sentence (64) is true in this case. On the other hand, (87)
is false where the situation is as described in (89ii)
although the periods of acting and rest are the same as in
(89i). So, inchoative process verbs seem to behave
differently from process verbs in case (89).
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( 89 )
Furthermore/ consider the case where the soup cools
most of the time but by the end of the three hours its
temperature is the same as before, as diagrammed below;
(ii)
^AAAAli
0 time 3
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Where the circumstances are as described in (90) we would
not say that the soup cooled for three hours, but under the
same condition the sentence John ran for three hours is
true. This sentence is true whether John ran for three
hours circling a building and ended at the starting point,
or he ran back and forth along a line, finishing at the
point where he started. In running there is no notion of
making progress.
The truth of for n hours depends on the truth of p at
^^^i^tervals of the verifying interval whose duration is n
hours, and some condition on their length must be
stipulated.
The idea is that in evaluating the truth of ^ for n
hours we should ignore intervals shorter than some minimum
duration z. In the case we have been looking at, and where
the sentences were true, the duration of the "gaps" were
less than z. This condition is stated more formally in (91)
given below. j/ is true at I iff it is true at all
subintervals I' whose length is bigger than z which is an
interval whose length is determined by the context (sentence
(64) is vague). When
^
is true at all I'>z, then
^
is true
at I.
(91) [[^ for n]]=l iff (9 I) [duration ( I )=n &
( \/ I
'
) [ I
'
^ I & duration ( I ')> z —
>
[[)^]]j,=l]]
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Sentence (64) is true in case (89i). Since k is not a large
enough interval, the temperature increases at k. But for
^ duration ( I ')> z
,
then the temperature
decreases at I ' . This accounts for the truth of (64) in case
(89i). But consider case (92);
Sentence (64) is false in case (92i). No matter what z is,
as long as I itself has a duration longer than z, there are
intervals longer than z where the temperature increases. (I
itself is such an interval). This again illustrates the
unique feature of inchoative process verbs- it is the degree
of cooling which is significant, not just the set of moments
where cooling is taking place. Sentence (87) is true in
case (92ii) since for all I' bigger than z John ran is
true
.
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What about the cases described in (88i) and (90i)? with
regard to (88i), the soup warmed rather than cooled for
quite long subintervals of I. Assuming that any reasonable
value for z is less than, say, half the duration of I, this
explains why sentences (64) and (87) are false. With regard
to (90i), note that Become ( cool ( s ) ) is false with respect to
the interval I itself; recall that we required that a
reasonable value for z be less than the duration of I.
Let us turn to the second issue, that of a possible
aspectual ambiguity of verbs like warm
, redden , widen. These
may take a punctual or a durative time adverbial;
(93) The soup warmed at three o'clock.
(94) The soup warmed for three hours.
(95) His face reddened at three o'clock.
(96) His face reddened for three seconds.
Mourelatos has offered offered tests to distinguish event
type verbs from process ones as we mentioned in 1.1. He
claimed that an event predication has an equivalent
nominalization in which the original verb appears as a
gerund or deverbal noun. Event predications take cardinal
numbers, the existential quantifier and determiners like
many
,
few, while process predications never appear with the
indefinite article or cardinal numbers. The corresponding
nominalization seems to have the same features:
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(97) There were three eruptions of Vesuvius.
(98) For three hours there was pushing of the
cart by John.
Verbs like warm, redden
,
widen seem to have an event as well
as a process predication:
(99) a. The earthquake was preceded by a
warming of the sea. ~
b. How much warmina will this
tolerate?
(100)
^ widening of the road would facilitate
traffic flow.
b. How much wideninq is aopropriate for
this expressway?
(101) a. A reddening of the skin is a symptom
of measles.
b. How much reddeninq of the skin will this
drug cause?
The progressive tense does not entail the present perfect
tense as is the case with event type verbs:
(102) The soup is warming — the soup has warmed.
(103) The sky is darkening -y-9 the sky has darkened.
but notice the following entailments:
(104) The soup is warming —^ The soup has
warmed somewhat.
(105) The sky is darkening The sky has
darkened somewhat.
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This relates to Kamp
• s (1979) work on French passe simple
and imparfait. Just as we seem to be able to look at change
as either gradual or abrupt, we seem to be able to look at
time as either continuous or discrete. Kamp discussed the
difference between French passe simple and imparfait where
the first conveys that the action, event or state reported
with its help has come to an end and the second conveys no
such termination. The imparfait is used to provide the
background to a certain event or sequence of events, whereas
the succession of events which unfold against this
background is reported by the passe simple. The use of the
imparfait places the hearer inside the action and the passe
simple keeps him outside it. No one of these observations,
Kamp points out, can be captured by truth conditional
semantics. He provides the following sentences:
(106) II y a deux ans la Compagnie acheta un navire
de 100,000 tonnes.
"Two years ago the company bought a ship
of 100,000 tons”.
(107) II y a deux ans la Compagnie achetait un navire
de 100,000 tonnes.
"Two years ago the company had bought a ship
of 100,000 tons".
It is not so much features of the event, i.e the time it
took to conclude the deal, that determine the use of the
appropriate tense but rather the angle from which it is
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viewed. According to Kamp, the truth of a piece of
discourse should not be equated simply with the truth of its
component sentences. Truth conditions can be assigned only
to a discourse as a whole and the differences between the
imparfait and passe simple can be explicated in terms of
their distinctive contribution to the truth conditions of
the discourse. The particular order that the discourse
conveys depends on where the passe simple is used and where
the imparfait. The difference between the two is in how to
represent events used to report, or how to represent the
information in the discourse. The passe simple, for
instance, pushes the action forward since a sentence in the
passe simple is understood as reporting an event subsequent
to the last event. An imparfait sentence, on the other
hand, following a passe simple sentence is understood as
stating conditions which obtain at the time of the event e
which the passe simple sentence reports. It is not
specified whether the state introduced by the imparfait
sentence outlasts the event with which it is represented as
simultaneous or not. Kamp's theory of discourse
representation accounts for such temporal orders. However,
what we have attempted to point out here is the analogy
between viewing time and change as either punctual or
durative
.
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Let us discuss the process reading of inchoatives,
cool^ is a vague inchoative which denotes a change from
cool^ to cool^ and the presence of the durative time
adverbial suggests a reading with repeated changes from not
cool to cool as described below;
(108)
0
^
1 2 3 4 5 6
'^cool cool
/V cool cool
/^cool cool
'^cool cool
^cool
cool
The fact that for every two moments in the three hours the
soup turns from ^ cool^ to cool
^
i.e it becomes more and more
cool/ determines the gradual reading of sentence (64). No
comparative component is directly involved in the derivation
of inchoatives/ but given some facts about the meaning of
cool/ it can be proved that "become cooler" and ^x((9c)
Become cool'^(x)) are the same thing. The repeated reading
of cool^ is not different from the iterative reading
involved in sentence (109):
(109) John pinched Bill for three minutes.
where pinch is a regular event type verb. This brings up a
difficult issue; should sentences (64) and (109) be analyzed
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as process sentences or as event type sentences with an
iterative aspect; and is there a real distinction in the
world between repeated events and processes?
If an iterative event verb is a kind of process verb
then perhaps the aspectual ambiguity in verbs such as cool
and re^dden may be accounted for by the presence of an
iterative operator which changes an event type verb into a
process one. in this case, (64) should be represented as
follows
;
ii®^^tive operator seems to be involved in the morphology
of Hebrew where aspectual properties interact with its
binyanim system. (The Hebrew binyanim system and its
interaction with aspect will be discussed in chapter IV).
Some event type verbs in Pa'al, the base form, have an
iterative reading when formed in Pi 'el. The iterative Pi 'el
construction (which carries as well other aspectual
properties ) is more productive in Biblical than in Modern
Hebrew. Consider:
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Pa ' al Pi 'el
kafac kipec
' jumped
'
rakad riked 'danced
caxak cixek ' laughed
'
In Hebrew, the verb pattern formed in Pa'al can be used to
denote a single event as in kafacti pa 'am arat ("i jumped
y^l^ndti rikud exad (“I danced a single dance") or
caxakti cxok boded ("I laughed a single laugh"), but not
when conjugated in Pi 'el: *kipacti oa'am axat . *rikadti
rikud exad and *cixkakti cxok boded .
Comrie (1976) provides further examples from Slavic
languages which reflect iteration morphologically. In these
languages habitual forms are often referred to by the term
iterative": pivat '
,
znavat * in Russian are the habitual
counterpart of pit ' ("drink") and znat ' ("know").
Habituality is connected to iterative aspect since any
situation that can be iterated a sufficient number of times
over a long enough period can be expressed as a habitual.
In Hungarian there are several suffixes which serve to mark
iterativity like zorren ("knock") and zorog ("knock
repeatedly" )
.
The question of whether an iterative event is a process
seems to be related to my brief discussion of Taylor's
distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous
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processes. In some sense, heterogeneous processes
defined in terms of more primitive
are
accomplishments/achievements- whether there is a verb
corresponding to them or not. (Taylor gives the example of
chuckling, which can not mean chuckle once ). Motion verbs
like run, dance involve a complex pattern of change
and It is not true that every minimal subinterval of the
processes denoted by any of them is also an interval of that
process. it is not easy to determine what conditions should
be met for x_r\m to be true of a minimal interval, and the
fact that such an issue comes up at all casts a shadow on
any attempt to distinguish processes from iterative events.
It seems that there are few, if any, homogeneous process
verbs-
^all , rise, move , together with inchoative process
verbs may be thought of as constituting this group. But
even the processes denoted by these verbs can be viewed as
consisting of more primitive events. These are puzzling
issues related to metaphysical-conceptual considerations and
the answer to the question of whether there is a real
distinction between events and processes in the world, and
consequently between iterative events and processes, draws
heavily on such considerations.
As far as we are concerned, verbs which denote
iterative events satisfy the linguistic criteria mentioned
before which were set up to single out process verbs.
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Notice that iterative events have the subinterval property-
tf John knocked on the door for half an hour, he knocked on
the door at any large enough subinterval of the interval of
duration of half an hour.
EHJrther Issues Concerning the Amb iguity of inchoate „„
Process Verbs
I suggested that inchoative process verbs and not vague
ones incorporate a comparative component. in sentences
(112d), (113d) and (114d) the vague inchoatives "become
adj
, get adj
, turn adj", "change to adj" paraphrase the
inchoative process verbs and all these sentences sound odd:
(112) a. The Atlantic ocean widened at 12 noon
May 14 1955.
b. The Atlantic ocean became wide at 12 noonMay 14 1955.
c. The Atlantic ocean widened for three years.
d. *The Atlantic ocean became wide for three
years
.
(113) a. The soup cooled at three o'clock.
b. The soup became cool at three o'clock.
c. The soup cooled for three hours.
d. *The soup became cool for three hours.
Similarly when become is replaced by turn
,
change to
, get :
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(114) a. The sky darkened at six o'clock.
b. The sky
'^turned
changed to
got
r dark at three o'clock.
c. The sky darkened for three hours
rturned ")
d. *The sky changed to dark for three hours,
Sentences (112d), (113d) and (114d) sound odd since all of
them involve a vague inchoative. Something can not become
wide^ repeatedly, where c is fixed. This supports our
suggestion that widen, cool and darken in (112c), (113c) and
(114c) are derived from comparative inchoatives by something
like the iterative operator and not from vague inchoatives.
Notice that sentences (114d) and (113d) may involve a
good reading in which the Atlantic ocean remains wide for
three years and the soup stays cool for three hours, i.e the
time adverbial specifies the duration of the result state.
This is not the process reading we are interested in. in
(114d) changed to, turned to
, but not got give us this good
reading. A similar reading where the time adverb specifies
the duration of the result state occurs in sentences which
involve causatives. Dowty (1979) mentions Binnick, who
according to Morgan (1979) and MaCawley (1971; 1973) was the
first to notice the following sentence, which is ambiguous
between an iterative and a result state reading;
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?or “°°<5
in the Generative semantics lexical decomposition analysis
Of causatives, where is analyzed as composed of "cause
become x in jail" the iterative reading (in which at various
occasions throughout the four years the Sheriff jailed Robin
Hood) arises from a structure in which the adverb modifies
the highest S, while the result state reading arises from a
structure where it modifies a lower S. In the first case the
duration of the activity described by the VP cause become x
L? is specified, while in the second case it is that of
the state be in jail. The following structures (116) and
(117) represent correspondingly the result state and the
iterative reading of (112d), (113d) and (114d):
NP
the soup
VP
I
cool
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(117) S
Adv
for three years
the soup
VP
cool
Since the meaning of the inchoative process verb cool is
different from that of a vague inchoative which is
represented in structure (117), it is not surprising that
(114d) IS bad. On the other hand, when the verb is an event
type verb like that in sentences (112a), (113a) and (114a)
it can be paraphrased (under one reading) by a vague
inchoative verb as in (112b), (113b) and (114b).
We could expect sentences with "become cooler" and
durative time adverbials to be perfect, since the meaning of
inchoative process verb incorporates that of a comparative
inchoative. Consider;
(118) a. The Atlantic ocean widened for three years.
b. The Atlantic ocean became wider for three
years
.
(119) a. The soup cooled for three hours.
b. The soup became cooler for three hours.
Surprisingly, when read in the iterative sense, the
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following sentences sound a bit odd
:
(120) ?The Atlantic ocean became more widetor three years.
(121) ?The soup became more cool for three hours.
(122) ?He began to earn more money for three years
When replacing "become more adj" by "become more and more
adj" these sentences are good:
(123) The Atlantic ocean became more and more widefor three years.
(124) The soup became more and more cool forthree hours.
(125) He began to earn more and more money for
three years.
The iterative reading of inchoative process verbs is
explained by the existential quantifier over contexts which
change throughout the interval. The paraphrase "become more
and more wide" implies that such an iterative reading is
incorporated in widen. Still, it remains a puzzle why
(120)-(122) sound worse than (118)-(119) and (123)-(125)
since ^ x[ (3c ) Become cool'^(x)] means become cooler and the
interaction of the comparative inchoative with the durative
adverb should have implied the process~iterative reading.
Partee has mentioned (personal communication) that it
is possible that (120)
-(122) are odd due to morphological
suppletion facts. Since the verbs wide and cool
,
when used
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for comparison, have the specific adj+er forms wider and
cool«, the latter should be used with become rather than
the form moretadj. m the case where the adj+er form does
not exist in English, as for example *beautif ier . the
more+adj form can be used with become ;
(126) Mary became more beautiful for three years.
Sentences (127), (128) exhibit a similar difficulty:
(127) a. This flower darkened more than that flower.
b. *This flower became dark more than that
flower
.
c. *This flower became darker more than that
flower
(128) a. This boy grew more than that boy.
b. *This boy became tall more than that boy.
c. *This boy became taller more than that boy.
The oddness of (127b) and (128b) is predicted since once the
context of dark' is fixed, one flower can not become dark'
^ c
more than the other. The verb in (127c) is an inchoative
process verb, and the comparison in these sentences is
between the two processes of darkening, not between the two
result states. We may say that between the age of twelve
and fifteen Dan grew more than between the age of twenty and
twenty-three, although when twenty-three years old Dan was
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taller than when he was fifteen. Sentences (127c) and
(128c) do not imply the reading in which two processes are
compared, and as in (120)-(122), they present a difficulty
for the analysis of inchoative process verbs in terms of
inchoative comparatives.
Partee has also mentioned that increasingly wide , which
hardly seems like a predicate of any sort (
*
The Atlantic
Ocean is increasingly wide ) , inherently has to be linked to
gradual change. Sentence (129) seems to have the same
meaning as (130) and (131):
(129) The Atlantic Ocean became increasingly wide
for three years.
(130) The Atlantic Ocean became wider and wider
for three years.
(131) The Atlantic Ocean became more and more wide
for three years.
Another issue worth mentioning is the difference between two
kinds of inchoative verbs. One of my examples illustrating
the possible ambiguity of inchoatives between the vague and
the comparative meaning was sentences (58a), (59a)
P^^^ph^^sed by (58c) and (59c). When we replace widen and
grow by warm and darken sentences (132a) and (133a) are less
good
;
(132)
a. *The soup was warm and was warming.
b. *The soup was warm and becoming warm.
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c. The soup was warm and becoming warmer.
(133) a. ‘The sky was dark and was darkening.
b. ‘The sky was dark and becoming dark.
C. The sky was dark and becoming darker.
The oddity of (132b) and (133b) is predicted as is the case
in (58b) and (59b), since once the sky is dark'^ relative to
some fixed context, it can not become dark'^ again.
Sentences (132a) and (133a) which were assumed to be
paraphrased by sentences (132c) and (133c) are bad. This is
puzzling.
There seems to be a difference between verbs like
wi^. 2IOW, ^tten and verbs like warm
, darken and redden .
There is no upper bound to the degree of tallness or width
of an object relative to a comparison class- any tall object
may become taller, but this is not true of predicates like
redden
, darken. To get the difference one may ask whether a
red object may become redder, i.e is there a degree of
redness such that an object red to that degree can not
become any redder? Intuitively the answer is yes for red
and dark and no for wide and grow . At the same time we count
something as red in a context even when it has not reached
the maximal value of red in that context. Perhaps the fact
that something can be red without reaching the maximal value
accounts for the good reading of (132c) and (133c). I
mentioned previously that we can say that a is a red cloth.
69
b IS a red cloth and a is redder than b.
comparison class is the set of cloths and
In this case, the
one compares
between two members in the positive extension of red.
Adding the degree adjective quite makes a difference in
the grammaticality of (132a) and (133a), since it implies
that the property has not yet reached
the process may still go on.
its upper bound. so
(134) a. The sky was quite dark and was(still) darkening.
b. *The sky was quite dark and(still) becoming dark.
c. The sky was quite dark and
(still) becoming darker.
There are other suggestions in the literature for treating
change. in a first attempt Hoepelman (1981) adopted the
framework of fuzzy logic to analyze gradual change. He
talks of a sentence describing a state of affairs as
becoming more and more true. Roughly speaking, a sentence
the door closes is given the anaysis "It becomes more
and more true and finally is true that the door closes".
Hoepelman later replaced the framework of fuzzy logic with a
new one, which analyzed change in terms of comparison
(1982). The notion of becoming is defined in terms of MORE
and LESS. If something changes it has a certain property to
a greater or lesser degree than it had before. To evaluate
John grew, different stages of John must be compared, and
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this is where Hoepelman introduces individual concepts into
his semantics.
In treating process verbs our intuition was similar to
that of Hoepelman, however we further extended the
discussion and provided an analysis of inchoatives in
general. We have pointed to a general ambiguity in the case
of inchoatives which has to do with the way we view change,
and provided plenty of evidence to support it. We have also
shown how the notion of change incorporated in the meaning
of inchoative process verbs distinguishes them from process
verbs, whose meaning does not involve change, and how the
gap problem interferes with that difference. In the next
chapter we will see that time and change are not the only
aspectual notions which can be looked at as either punctual
or gradual in metaphysics and language.
4. Conceptual Puzzles
4.1. On Change and Time
The Become operator was introduced in our two lexical
rules which derive absolute/vague inchoatives and
comparative inchoatives and its semantics has not been
discussed yet. Now that we are familiar with different
^irids of inchoatives whose meaning, we said, involve abrupt
and gradual changes of state, we can turn to the more
general issue which seems to underly any talk of change.
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There is an old argument for the contradictoriness of
change taking place in time (see discussion of it in Van
Benthem (1983) and Kamp (1980). Whenever there is a change
there is a succession of incompatible events and where there
IS a succession of incompatible events there is change. It
IS argued that when a state p is followed by an incompatible
state q, which is ^p, then a change occurs. The question
IS about the time of its occurence. It could not be before
p has ended and not after q has come about. Two principles
seem to be in conflict when dealing with the time of change
from p to ^p: that of bivalence which states that at any
time t either p obtains or p obtains and that of
incompatability which asserts that at the time of change
from p to q neither p nor q obtain. These two principles
exclude the possibility of change occuring at any time since
the first requires that either p or p should hold at such
a time and the second requires that neither of them should
hold
.
When time is discrete such a problem does not arise
since if a is the last point where p holds, and b is the
fi^st point where ~ p holds, there is no point between a and
b and the question about the time of change does not arise.
( 135 )
P p
£ j
a h
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In this case change is instantaneous and the borderline
between predicates denoting states is sharp. when time is
dense it seems more problematic. However, there is a way to
attack the puzzle. in (136)
(136)
P a
~ p
there is no point between the last point where p holds and
the first point where ^>'p holds, for there is no first point
where ~p holds. Things are similar when we take the notion
of truth at an interval rather than at moments as basic. If
is bivalent and time is discrete the minimal interval
where change occurs will contain only two moments. In
chapter III, which deals with the progressive, we will
discuss the advantages of interval semantics over point
semantics
.
Dowty's (1979) truth condition for [Become given
below involves the notion of an interval.
(137) [Become is true at I iff (1) there is an
interval j containing the initial bound of I
such that is true at J, (2) there is an
interval K containing the final bound of I
such that
^
is true at K, and (3) there is no
non-empty interval I' such that I ' <^ I and
conditions (1) and (2) hold for I' as well as I.
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Dowty introduces the third condition to prevent sentences
like M-e door closed from being true of any interval
whatever as long as the interval contains the first moment
at which the door was closed. One wants to limit the truth
of the door closes to the smallest interval over which the
change occured. Dowty suggests that perhaps the third
condition should not be part of the definition of [Become
^
but rather understood as a felicity condition on the
assertion which follows from Grice's conversation maxims.^®
Let's consider the case where j is bivalent and
(138)
a
at a
-/holds. Suppose c ^a, b, c 6 [a,b]. Since / is
bivalent, either / at c or -/ at c. If / at c then [a,b]
does not satisfy (137), since [a,c] is a smaller interval
which satisfies (137). If
-/ at c then [a,b] does not
satisfy (137) since [c,b] is a smaller interval satisfying
(137). But when / is not bivalent (and time is discrete)
there may be other moments contained in [a,b] for which / is
undefined. According to (137) the sentence It turned red is
true with respect to an interval [a,b] where at a it is red
is false (let us assume it is orange) and at b it is true.
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(137) does not specify what must occur at the times between
a and b. Also, that a change from orange to red can be
defined with respect to a minimal interval [a,b], as is
required by (137), is not so obvious. It is not clear what
is the minimal interval at which sentences containing fuzzy
predicates, like the inchoatives, are true. Inchoatives may
be used in the present progressive, for example, it is
^ding
, Uie soup is cooling, John is dying
. In all these
cases there is a transition from a state p to an
incompatible state q, separated by intermediate states which
also begin and end and thus also involve the question of the
time of change. When the color of the sun changes from
orange to red it is difficult to determine at what time it
ceases to be orange and becomes red since the borderline
between orange and red is fuzzy. Kamp (1979), (1980)
discussed at length these issues, which directly lead to
questions about the nature of time. Kamp mentions two views
on time- one taking time as the totality of temporal
relations between events and processes which constitute the
history of the world, and the other taking statements about
time to be in last analysis complex claims about our
experiences. What is common to both views is that they take
as primary certain entities (physical events or mental
experiences) of finite duration, i.e events. According to
Kamp, Wiener has shown how from events of finite duration.
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and the temporal relations by which they are recognized, one
can construct a linear order of instants.
Given the meaning of the precedence and overlap
relations Kamp quotes seven postulates. However, there are
some difficulties with the last one:
(139) (\/x)(\/y)(x-c:yv xOy v y-^x)
(where x and y are individual variables over events and ,0
are correspondently the relations of complete precedence and
temporal overlap). Kamp gives examples which illustrate the
indeterminancy of the relations of temporal overlap and
precedence involved in (139). This is because of the
vagueness of the concept used to individuate events, so the
structure of time can not be determined by events with fixed
relations. (139) can be satisfied only when the vagueness
of event individuation disappears.
So far we have discussed the problem of the minimal
interval of change when fuzzy predicates are involved.
Since some of the inchoatives we discussed are vague and
others are not, we would like to see how change interferes
each kind of inchoative and summarize what we have said
so far.
In the case of absolute inchoatives, where time is
discrete, there is a first moment b such that at any time
before b and at b In this case is bivalent and
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change is instantaneous, when time is dense, such a minimal
interval does not exist. Let us assume there is a single
moment b where
^ is true and [a,b] is the minimal Interval
where change occurs. By hypothesis, for any a before b
holds. Since time is dense, there is an a' between a and b
and by hypothesis
~ji( is true at a' which precedes b.
Therefore, [a,b] is not the minimal interval where change
occurs. This shows that Dowty's definition of (Become is
too strong since it works only when time is discrete. When
time IS dense one would like to get rid of the minimal
interval condition.
In the case of vague inchoatives, if the vagueness of
the adjective is resolved by the context, then there is a
minimal interval where the instantaneous change from
^
to
/ occurs, as was the case with absolute inchoatives.
Whenever the vagueness of the adjective is resolved but
^
is
not bivalent, i.e there is a truth value gap, the minimal
interval depends on the context picked up.
What about comparative inchoatives? There is no
minimal interval where the soup became warmer is true. The
soup became warmer is consistent with a situation where the
soup reached the maximal value of warm for soups and also
where it has warmed by one degree only or anything between
the two
.
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The Logical Form of Verbs of Changp
Do all events involve a change of states? This is not
implied by definition (137), where
^
can be of any aspectual
kind. Some achievements seem to involve a change from a
state to a process, like the Hebrew verb parax
, which means
"began to fly-;
-took off (bird, insect)". Von Wright
(1963) mentioned that events may be transitions from a state
to a process, from a process to a state, from a process to
another process or from a state of a process to another
state of the same process, for example, from quicker to
slower or from louder to weaker. The four possibilities of
transitions among states and processes are given below:
Verb
1. state to state cool
2. state to process began to fly ("parax" in Hebrew)
3. process to state
4. process to process
Ibare is no English verb to my knowledge, which denotes a
change from a process to a process. As I mentioned in 1.3.
,
Dowty holds that achievements may stand for "an inchoation
of an activity", with germinate ("become plus grow") as an
example. One should not confuse an inchoation of a process
with a process consisting of inchoation, as in the case of
inchoative process verbs. The complex VPs begin running
,
begin moving also constitute examples of verbs of class (2).
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John stopped walkinc and beg.. exemplifies a change
from one process to another, i am unaware of any example of
a simple Hebrew verb which denotes this kind of complex
change
.
The verbs ^ may be examples of a change from a
process to a state although stop seems to imply doing
something. it is hard to determine whether the fact that
follows a process of walking or running is part of its
meaning or a presupposition. There are few examples of
verbs of category (2) and (3) and these verbs are not
derived from adjectives.
Dealing with verbs of class (2) and (3), we must not
confuse our linguistic and conceptual intuitions. The
assumption that there are states of which begin flying or
^^in growing are the negation is a purely conceptual one.
Since our decision about the kind of change expressed by the
verbs in category (2) and (3) is often based on conceptual
intuitions rather than linguistic ones (binary adjectives
small and tall can be considered as linguistic
aspectual evidence), indeterminancy may arise in many
cases. To give an example, is begin running a transition
from a state to a process or from a process to a process?
Stop running can be argued to be a transition from a process
to a state since the verb run is a process.
Questions may be raised about a verb like die. Because
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of the existence of the adjective alive
, it is tempting to
derive die by
( 140 ) ^ x[ Become [not (alive
' (x) ) ] ]
.
and regard it as a transition of states. The following
argument, however, may be given against it: ^ has the same
meaning as stop living and as stop being alive
. The first
expression demonstrates linguistically and conceptually a
transition from a process to a state, while the second one
demonstrates a transition of states. Since stop living and
stop being alive have the same meaning, they should also be
of the same aspectual type- that of statives. We see that
in the case of some verbs, there is no way to determine what
kind of transitions underlie their meanings.
In our two lexical rules deriving inchoatives, only the
output state denoted by an adjective translation is
given. o< may denote a certain state or its negation and
the inchoatives formed from them are "opposite". There are
many such examples in Hebrew: katan "became small" vs.
g^dal "became tall"; hitraxev "became wide" vs. hitkacer
"became narrow"; hismin "became fat" vs. hirza "became
thin". Definition (137) specifies a change from "
^
to
(and no restriction on ^'s aspectual type is given). I have
said that ^ may be of a different aspectual type than
although it is difficult to prove it (in the same way it is
difficult to prove that they are of the same aspectual
type). When << is an adjective, the state it denotes may
either the output of the transition from a process to a
State, or an output of a transition of states.
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exegesis of
verbs
.
FOOTNOTES
(1963:173-183) provides
Aristotle's discussion
references to and an
of different classes of
and
accomplishments are Kenny's performativesRyle s achievements with an associated task. Kennyiscriminated between achievements with an associated taskand purely lucky achievements.
.. .
* indicates that the sentence marked byIt IS ungrammatical. ? indicates that speakers differ in^eir acceptability judgements of the sentence and ?? meansless grammatical than ?.
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This and other details of his
manuscript
.
theory are given in his
Achievements satisfy some stative tests and fail to
satisfy others.
For a discussion of interval semantics see chapter
III, section 1.
An E-type pronoun is a plural pronoun referring back
to a group of individuals. Gareth Evans introduced this
term and discussed the issue in "Pronouns", Linguistic
Inquiry 11.2:337-362.
9The problem of the possible length of the gaps in the
interval at which a sentence is true is different from that
of the "relevant moments" mentioned by Dowty. We say of John
that he worked in the factory for the last year and do not
imply by it that he worked at weekends, holidays or during
the nights. If the universal quantifier stands for the
durative time adverb, then the relevant moments it
quantifies over are the standard work hours in John's
factory. According to Dowty, if we are to use the universal
quantifier to represent durative adverbs, then the moments
it quantifies over are relevant moments which are vaguely
specified and contextually determined. After the relevant
moments are determined by the context we can still inquire
about the possible length of the gaps in the interval which
consists of the relevant moments: if John stayed in the
hospital for eight months during the last year and spent the
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lOn 4- ui'artee has mentioned to me that definition M-^ 7 ^
AccoS toaerinition (137), [Become is true at [b,b] iff;
(1) 3j containing b such that ~ is true at j.
(2) 3k containing b such that
<j> is true at k.
rif°trurafr '^hat is true at b, and from (2) that
(137)
®°' ‘=°atradiction. Thus for definition
vij/J la^bj can not be a=b.
CHAPTER II
CAUSATIVE VERBS AND ASPECTUALITY
1. Accomplishments, Causatives and Aspect
^ 1 • Not all Causatives are Event Type Verbs
In my brief review of verb classification I discussed
accomplishment verbs and the linguistic tests which
determine this class. The activity involved in building a
house or drawing a circle is that of bringing about some
result state- that of a house having been built or a circle
having been drawn. In chapter I in my discussion of
inchoatives, I discussed the operator Become which is
present in the logical representation of achievement
sentences. The logical representation of accomplishment
sentences consists partially of that of achievement
and, as is the case with the latter, also involves
the operator Become. In his aspect calculus Dowty suggests
constructing all accomplishments as having a logical
structure CAUSE
'f ] where ^ and f are sentences. He
does not place any restrictions on the aspectual type of (ji
and f but notes that in most cases ^ is a become-sentence
or contains an activity predicate, and f is a
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become-sentence
. The sentence John kllleri hi 1
1
has the
following logical structure:
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(tJ°hn^do^ something] CAUSE [Become not [Bill is
The motivation for analyzing CAUSE as a bi-sentential
operator will be discussed in 1.2.
Dowty suggests analyzing ^ accomplishment verbs as
having a CAUSE operator in their logical structure. In one
place he says (Dowty 1979; pg.l06): "As has often been
noticed, natural language causative structures
(accomplishment sentences) ordinarily single out ", and
elsewhere he refers to a linguistic class of verbs as
"causative/accomplishments" (Dowty 1979; pg.l09). Nowhere
does he claim explicitly that accomplishments and causatives
are co-extensive (although by refering to a class of verbs
as "causatives/accomplishments" he may imply this). He only
insists that all accomplishments have in their logical
structure a CAUSE operator. If we could find examples of
causative verbs which aspectually are not classified as
accomplishments (which are event-type verbs), it would show
that causatives and accomplishments are not co-extensive.
Such verbs exist, and many important issues concerning
causation and aspect in natural language arise when dealing
with them. We would like to discuss these issues in this
chapter. Our discussion of causative verbs (a great number
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of which are accomplishments) is related to many points
raised in chapter I, where change and time were discussed.
I have already noted that Dowty does not place any
restrictions on the aspectual type of two sentences combined
by the CAUSE operator. He lists the following kinds of
accomplishment sentences;
(A) Non-agentive accomplishment sentences which have
two become-sentence clauses as in the door's opening causes
the lamp to fall down
.
(B) Non-intentional agentive accomplishments where the
first clause is an activity sentence and the second one an
accomplishment as in John broke the window
.
(C) Agentive accomplishments with secondary agent as in
John forced Bill to speak and intentional agentive
accomplishments as in John murdered Bill .
Somewhere else he mentions Fillmore's example ( 1971 ) of
stative causative sentences like Mary's living nearby causes
John to prefer his neighborhood
. There is no English verb
which is a stative causative, just as there is no English
verb which exemplifies the first class of accomplishments
given above.
Accomplishments and causatives are not co-extensive . A
group of causatives behave aspectually like processes.
Consider
;
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(2) John galloped the horse for three hours.
(3) The mother fed her baby for half an hour.
In line with what was said before, the logical
^®P^6sentation of sentence ( 4 )
(4) John galloped the horse,
should be;
(5) [[John do something] CAUSE [the horse gallop]]
The only reading of sentence (4) is the process one.
Sentence (4) can not be uttered in a situation where John
did something abruptly which made the horse start galloping,
like for example pricking his back once with a spear. To
describe such a situation a periphrastic causative must be
employed as in ( 6 )
;
(6) John made the horse gallop.
The activity specified by the causative verb is almost
always that of the subject of its second underlying clause.
In most cases this subject undergoes a change of state but
sometimes it is the agent of the activity described by the
causative verb. The causative verbs gallop
,
walk constitute
such examples where their IV counterparts have agentive
subjects
:
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(7) The horse galloped.
(8) The dog walked.
The activity of the subject of the sentence in the first
clause underlying the causative verb is usually
unspecified. Mary can kill Bill in many ways; she may
poison him, strangle him, put a bullet through his chest or
push him through a window on the 70th floor of the Empire
State building. The consequences of all these vicious acts
are one- Bill undergoes a change of state from being alive
to being not alive. The activity of John in sentence (4) is
unspecified as well; he might have been sitting on the
horse's back kicking him with the spurs on his boots or
running beside his horse whipping it occasionally. All the
possible contextualizations of (4) involve an activity on
John's part which is durative in nature. Sentence (4) can
not be uttered in a situation where John fired a single shot
in the air as a consequence of which his horse started
galloping; nor in one in which he kicks his horse
continuously, but it jumps only once. The sentences in the
two clauses underlying the causatives gallop and walk are
process type one. Roughly speaking, the causal connection
between John's kicking the horse and its galloping as a
result occurs repeatedly or continuously. A formal
®^plication of this is given in section 2. of this chapter.
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The class of verbs discussed here, which we will call
"causative process verbs” (CPV), is very small in English,
as is illustrated in the following list of transitive verbs
(9) gallop
feed
run
bounce
walk
roll
In Hebrew, the class of CPV is somewhat larger, but still
small when considering the total number of Hebrew verbs.
What is of interest to us is the fact that Hebrew CPV
constitute a morphological class. The list of Hebrew CPV
is
:
(10) hidhir
heric
hiska
he ' exil
hikpic
gilgel
holix
hirkid
hirkiv
Philbis
?hif sit
' gallop
'
'made run'
'made drink'
'made eat'
' bounced
'
'made roll'
'made walk'
'made dance'
'made ride'
' dressed
' undressed
'
To show that Hebrew CPV form a morphological natural class,
a brief introduction to the Hebrew binyanim system must be
provided.
There are seven morphological verb patterns
(conjugations or binyanim) in Hebrew. A verbal root normally
consists of three consonants, and can be realized in one or
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more of the seven binyanim. The root p,M (actually p,<„i,
synchronically realized as p,',i owing to the merger of
S with •) is used traditionally as a prototype, where p
stands for the first radical, the second one and 1 the
third. The stem forms of the seven binyanim are:
(11) CaCaC
— pa'al
ni+CCaC - nif'al
CiCeC
- pi 'el
CuCaC
- pu'al
hit+CaCeC - hitpa'el
hu+CCal - huf'al
Adjectives and nouns follow other morphological patterns
(miskalim) whose number is greater than that of the
binyanim. Verbs can only be realized in one or more of the
seven binyanim. The binyanim tend to carry certain
syntactic and semantic characterizations described in table
2. More detailed tables which characterize the binyanim will
be given in chapter IV 1.2., where I discuss the interaction
of the Hebrew binyanim and aspect.
90
Table 2. The Hebrew Binyanim (l)
name of
binyan
syntactic
function
meaning example
pa 'al base form
t[ transitive
]
samar
' guarded
'
nif 'al passive of
pa 'al
-[transitive
inchoatives nexlas
'became we
pi 'el +[ transitive
]
causativization
repetition
intensifying
silem
'paid
'
pu 'al passive of
pi 'el
sulam
'was paid'
hitpa ' el - [ transitive
]
inchoative
reflexive
reciprocal
hitraxec
'washed
himself
'
hif 'il normally
transitive
causative
inchoative
hiskiv
'made
lie down'
huf 'al passive of
hif 'il
huskav
'was laid
down
'
Almost all traditional Hebrew linguists agree that verbs
occurring in the binyanim bear partially systematic semantic
and syntactic relations to the root. The evidence provided
in Chapter IV shows these regularities can not be captured
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by syntactic rules, but at the same time, one wants to
represent them as part of the speaker's knowledge of Hebrew.
Bolozky and Saad (1983) have shown how different
semantic properties are distributed among verb-patterns
(binyanim) in Arabic and Hebrew. One of the semantic
properties they discuss is what they call "activity". An
active verb is a transitive verb whose object is agentive
(2aHop ) and a non-active verb is a TV with a non-agentive
object (vra^). Arabic and Hebrew demonstrate two
morphological causative verb patterns: Arabic 'af Sala/Hebrew
hif'il and Arabic fa 'i'iala/Hebrew pi 'el. They claim that
hif'il is the unmarked causative form and that it is not
restricted with respect to causativization. There exist
non-active verbs which are causativizable in pi 'el only, and
non-active verbs which are causativizable in hif'il only.
Some non-active verbs are causativizable in both hif'il and
pi el. The distribution of causativizable active verbs
between pi 'el and hif'il is different. There are active
verbs causativizable in hif'il only and some active verbs
which are causativizable in both. But there are no active
verbs which are causativizable only in pi 'el. The same
generalization about the distribution of causativizable
active and non-active verbs among the binyanim holds also
for Arabic where 'af'iala corresponds to Hebrew hif'il and
fa^Sala to Hebrew pi 'el.
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To make this clearer, tables 3 and 4 contain the
distinctions made by Bolozky and Saad and illustrates them
with examples of Hebrew verbs which appear in their lists.
Table 3. Non-Active Verbs
base form causativizable
in pi 'el only
causativizable
in hif ' il only
causativizable
in both
ratav
'was wet'
balat
'stood out'
hirtiv
'made wet'
hivlit
'made stand out'
yafe 'be
beatiful
'
kava
'died out'
yipa
' beautified
'
kiba
'put out (fire)
'
rava
' quenched
xay
' lived
'
riva
hirva
' saturated
'
hexya
xiya
' revived
'
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Table 4. Active Verbs
base form causativizable
in pi ' el only
causativizable
in hif il only causativizablein both
hevi '
' brought
'
holix
'made walk'
NONE
hogia 'made
yigea tire out'
hikriv 'made
kerev draw close'
yaga
' labored
'
karav
'drew close'
ba
' came
'
halax
' went
the unmarked causative binyan for active verbs
since there are no active verbs causativizable only in pi 'el
and only few active verbs are causativizable in both.
The fact that most process verbs have agentive subjects
led some linguists and philosophers to define process verbs
in terms of agency. However, the property of subintervality
and agency must not be confused- the first has to do with
properties of time and the second with notions such as
volition, intention, effectiveness etc. The set of process
verbs and that of agentive verbs are not co-extensive
.
Bolozky has pointed out that causatives with agentive
objects (and also agentive subjects) are conjugated in
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hif'il (and a few verbs in both hifil and pi 'el).
Similarly, Hebrew CPV are exclusively conjugated in hifil
and in this sense, form a morphological class in Hebrew. We
see that Hebrew morphology treats causative verbs which are
processes, and causative verbs with an agentive object and
an agentive subject, in the same way by assigning them to
the same binyan. There are interesting relations between
the class of process verbs and the class of active verbs
but, as remarked above, they are not co-extensive
. There
are causative active verbs which are not CPV, and also
causative process verbs with non agentive objects (non
active verbs). hekim 'made stand up' and he'ziv are
examples of the first kind; the subjects of k^ 'stood up'
and j azav 'left' are agentive but the activity described by
the verbs is not durative. On the other hand, hikpic
'bounced', hilbis 'dressed' and hif sit 'undressed' are CPV
which are non-active. In John hikpic et hakadur 'John
bounced the ball', the ball is not an agent, but the
activity it is involved in is durative (an iterative
event). In hayalda hilbisa et habuba 'the girl dressed the
• the object of the verb is inanimate, so it is not
agentive, though it is involved in a process. (There is a
sense of perfection in the meaning of dressing and
undressing so hilbis and hif sit may by thought of as
non specific between a process and an event reading).
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Notice also that h^exil
-fed' does not always behave as a
CPV. The sentence j^'em he'exila et
-the mother fed
the cat can describe a situation where the mother fills the
cat's plate with Purina before it starts eating. The
mother's act is punctual, and even if it takes time it does
not occur at the same period at which the cat eats Purina.
In Chapter I we discussed inchoatives which behave
aspectually like process verbs. We claimed these verbs are
derived from vague adjectives and have a comparative
component in their logical representation. We distinguished
between inchoative process verbs such as cool
, warm , redden
which involve change, and primitive process verbs like walk
and rim. There are many causatives which have a process
inchoative verb in their second clause, such as cool
^„,
warm
,py and redden ^.^.
Verbs which are formed by a causativization of
inchoative process verbs are usually conjugated in pi 'el.
is the causativization conjugation of verbs in
hitpa'el. One of the meanings of verbs in hitpa'el is that
of inchoation (see chapter IV section 2.1.). Only a few such
causatives (let us call them 'inchoative process
causatives ) may come in hif 'il and they are derived from
color term predicates like he'edim 'reddened or human
quality properties like hismin ' fattened^^ ' . Examples of
process inchoative causatives and the verbs they are derived
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from are given below;
( 12 ) pi ' el hitpa
' el
kerer 'made cool'
ximem 'made warm'
kicer 'made short'
'made become
decayed
'
piteax 'made be
developed'
xizek 'made strong'
hitkarer
hitxamem
hitkacer
hitnaven
'became cool'
'became warm'
'became short'
'became decay'
hitpateax 'became developed'
hitxazek 'became strong'
We have here another case where Hebrew morphology
distinguishes between CPV with a "primitive" process in
their second clause, which come in hif il only, and
causative sentences with a process inchoative in their
second clause, which usually come in pi 'el.
To conclude, table 5 illustrates the distribution of
different kinds of Hebrew causative verbs in the binyanim:
Table 5. The Distribution of Hebrew Causatives
Basic Form
pa ' al
event causative
verbs
Derived Forms
hif 'il
event causative
verbs
pi ' el
event causative
verbs
causatives whose
second clause is
an inchoative
process verb
CPV
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gX-J-^ence that Accomplishment s Analyzed by CAUSE arp
Bi
-Sentential
Generative semanticists proposed a level of linguistic
representation which carries the meaning of a sentence. At
that level abstract lexical items may be found that are not
English words. In the course of a derivation individual
lexical Items replace parts of the underlying tree.
Inchoatives and causatives were of major interest. McCawley
(1968) suggested analyzing kill into the following
components
:
ALIVE y
theories argued for different transformations,
grouping underlying abstract elements into constituents
before lexical insertion took place.
Bnther than discuss these proposals, I will review the
linguistic evidence which Dowty presents for his
reconstruction of the bi-sentential analysis; his arguments
were mainly borrowed from Generative Semantics. An
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accomplishment construction known in traditional gramitiar as
factitive is one of them, m these constructions, an
activity verb combines with an adjective and an object NP to
give an accomplishment, where the adjective describes the
result state of the derived object. Consider:
(14)
John hammered the metal flat.
By the analysis of accomplishments given above, sentence
(10) could have the following representation:
(15)
[[John hammered the metal] CAUSE[Become [the metal flat]]
Other examples of the same kind are:
(16) Bill hung the picture straight.
(17) Peter painted the wall blue.
(18) Mary washed the dishes clean.
(19) The Boy Scouts beat the snails dead.
Another case mentioned by Dowty which calls for a
bi-sentential analysis of accomplishments are those verbs
which form a subset of verb particle constructions. The
particle in example (20)- (21) expresses the location of the
direct object, which is a consequence of the activity
described by the verb. In English these sentences can be
varied in two ways: the activity can be held constant and
the result state varied, or the result state held constant
while the activity varies,
examples
:
Dowty gives the following
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( 20 ) throw NP away
throw NP down
throw NP aside
throw NP in
throw NP up
(21)
put NP away
throw NP away
send NP away
drive NP away
call NP away
Examples (20) and (21) suggest that verb particle
constructions should be treated compositionally as
consisting of an activity verb and a result state.
Other evidence to support the bi-sentential analysis of
accomplishments is provided by examples of anaphora in some
constructions. Jerry Fodor (1970), arguing against the
transformational anaysis of verbs like melt and kill,
mentions some traditional arguments used to show that these
verbs are derived from cause to melt and cause to die . He
mentions Lakoff (1965) who suggested that sentences like
(22)
derive from deep structures like (23):
(22) Floyd melted the glass.
(23) (Floyed cause (the glass melt))
Fodor noticed that (24) is ambiguous between two readings in
just the way that the derivation of (22) from (23) would
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predict: that what surprised the speaker is either that
Ployed melted the glass or that what surprised the speaker
is that the glass melted.
(24) Ployed melted the glass
and that
and it
which
surprised me.
Fodor notes that a similar argument holds for the "do so"
construction associated with (22):
(25) Ployed melted the glass
that he would do so.
though it surprised me
(26) Ployed melted the glass though it surprised methat It would do so.
The do so in (25) replaces the matrix VP 'cause to melt' and
in (26) it replaces the VP in the constituent sentence 'the
glass melt'. Fodor noticed that such examples can not be
formed with a verb like kill
,
which morphologically is
unrelated to the intransitive verb die . Fodor raised
objections to the transformational analysis of melt and
but did not provide an alternative explanation for
examples (22)-(26), which encourage the analysis of many
accomplishments with a bi-sentential abstract CAUSE
operator
.
Examples of adverb scope provide further evidence for
the lexical decomposition of accomplishments. Dowty
mentions Binnick who gave the following example:
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(27 ) The sheriff of Nottingham
for four years.
jailed Robin Hood
and noticed that this sentence has a duratlve reading
as well as an internal one (27b):
(27a)
(27a)
(27b)
The sheriff of Nottingham spent four yearsbringing it about that Robin Hood was in jail
Nottingham brought it aboutthat for four years Robin-Hood was in jail.
Dowty notes that (27a) may have in addition to the durative
reading, an iterative one- according to which on multiple
occasions throughout the four years, the sheriff of
Nottingham jailed Robin Hood. The adverb in the durative
reading specifies the time of the action denoted by the
verb, and the adverb in the internal reading specifies the
time through which the result state obtained. Given the
Generative Semantics framework, Dowty suggests the following
two structures to represent correspondingly the durative and
internal readings:
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(27 'a)
adv
for four years NP vP
the sheriff v np
of Nottingham
1
CAUSE S
Become
NP VP
Robin Hood in jail
(27 'b)
NP VP
/
the sheriff v
of Nottingham
NP
CAUSE
Become
adv
for four years NP VP
Robin Hood in jail
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Dowty mentioned other examples of adverbial scope given
in the literature:
(28) John closed the door again.
(29) John lent his bicycle to Bill until tomorrow.
Sentence (28) has an external iterative reading, and an
internal in which John caused the door to be again in a
closed state (he need not have been the agent who closed it
before). The durative reading does not exist, since again
IS a point-time adverbial which only implies that John
closed the door at least once before. In (29), the future
adverb until appears with the past tense verb lent
. The
failure of tense-adverb agreement can be explained by a
decompositional analysis in which the adverb until modifies
the result state clause as specified in (29'):
(29') John caused Bill to have possession of hisbicycle untill tomorrow.
Dowty points out that the ambiguity involved in sentences
like (27)-(29) is a structural one, since the internal
reading is present only when the adverb appears at the end
of the sentence. When the adverb is preposed, the result
state reading is lost and only the external one remains:
(30)
For four years the sheriff of Nottingham jailed
Robin Hood.
(31)
Again John closed the door.
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(32) *Until tomorrow John lent his bicycle to Bill
It is not so Clear to me that a durative reading is involved
in (27a) in addition to an iterative one. m the case of
aaarn in sentence (28), the activity of the subject can be
Iterated as well as the result state, i will replace the
terminology durative/internal by external/result state
readings
.
Dowty attributes to Bennett the observation of a
possible intentional interpretation of the result state
reading. The result state reading of (27b) may refer to the
length of time the agent intended the result of his action
to last, and not to the length of time that Robin Hood
remained in jail. To test this he constructs the following
situation: imagine that John places a cake in the oven with
the intention of leaving it there for forty five minutes.
Mary enters the kitchen shortly after John left it and
removes the cake ten minutes after it was put in the oven.
The question is whether (33) is true when uttered at that
situation
:
(33) John put the cake in the oven for forty
five minutes.
Dowty reports that speakers differ in their judgements of
(33) uttered in the above context. The fact that some
speakers accept (33) should not be taken as counterevidence
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to the compositional analysis of accomplishments, since the
scope of the durative adverb in (33) is still the intended
result of the action and not the act of putting the cake in
the oven. He noticed furthermore that the external/result
state ambiguity can not be found in sentences with statives
and process verbs
(40) John loved his wife until her death.
(41) The world champion ran the marathon again.
(42) The wounded soldier stayed at the hospitalfive months.
In Hebrew a genuine ambiguity exists in the case of sentence
(43)
which is the Hebrew equivalent of sentence (27). The
same ambiguity of adverb scope demonstrated in (27) occurs
also in Hebrew with the durative time adverbial phrase
—mesex . Hebrew has an additional durative time adverbial
phrase lemesex which occurs only with the result state
reading
;
(43) haserif sel Nottingham kala et Robin Hood
bemesex arba sanim (ambiguous).
"The sheriff of Nottingham jailed Robin Hood
for four years".
(44) haserif sel Nottingham Kala et Robin Hood
lemesex arba sanim (result state
reading only).
"The sheriff of Nottingham jailed Robin Hood
for four years".
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le are Hebrew prepositional phrases which are cliticized
to object NP's like in ^ganim 'in parks' and leganim 'to
parks'. ^ is a prepositional phrase which usually means in
squrim beargazim kvp.d.'n,
.-The books are locked
in heavy boxes". is a directional preposition like in
h l^axti leganim ciburiyim "i went to public parks" or
hikdasti et hasefer leyeladot ceirot "i dedicated the book
to young girls". m colloquial Hebrew one may omit mesex
duration' in Igmesex and cliticize ^ to the object.
Consider (44'), which like (44) has only the result state
reading
:
(44') haserif^sel Nottingham kala et Robin Hoodl^arba sanim.
"The sheriff of Nottingham jailed Robin-Hood
for four years".
In English when the adverb "for four years" is preposed the
result state reading is lost; the same is true for Hebrew
when preposing bemesex
. When lemesex is preposed, the
sentence sounds bad; this is predicted since lemesex only
allows the result state reading:
(45) bemesex arba sanim haserif sel Nottingham kala
et Robin Hood (external reading only).
(46) *lemesex arba sanim haserif sel Nottingham kala
et Robin Hood.
As in English, Hebrew also allows the intentional result
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state reading. lemesex may specify either the duration of
the result state or the agent's intention as to its
duration. Sentence (47) does not have the internal reading
when uttered in a situation where Mary takes the cake out of
the oven after John had put it there. Sentence (47) is
false when uttered in such a situation.
(47) John sam et hauga batanur bemesex salos saot.
John put the cake in the oven for three hours".
However, (48) uttered under the same circumstances is
fine
;
(48) John sam et hauga batanur lemesex salos saot.
"John put the cake in the oven for three hours".
This suggests perhaps that Hebrew has a genuine ambiguity
between the intentional result state reading and the
non-intentional one.
Can we make the generalization that lemesex occurs with
the intensional result state reading only while bemesex
occurs with the non-intentional one? To answer it we must
examine sentences with lemesex with subjects which lack
intentions. Consider (49)-(51):
(49)
a. ahavat John hirgiza et Mary bemesex
salos sanim (only external reading).
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b. *ahavat John hirgiza et Mary lemesex
sales sanxm.
"John's love irritated Mary for three years".
(50) *john hirgiz et Mary lemesex salos sanim.
"John irritated Mary for three years"
(51) a. haruax^kerera et hamarak bemesex
salos saot (only external reading).
b. *haruax kerera et hamarak lemesex
salos saot.
The wind cooled the soup for three hours",
kerer et hamarak lemesex salos saot.
"Dan cooled the soup for three hours".
(49a) and (51a) are not ambiguous, and allow only the
external reading (which in this case can be either iterative
or durative depending on how one chooses to view change).
The result state reading is blocked whether the agent is
human (has intentions) or not. Both the intentional and the
non-intentional readings of the result state are bad. But
consider the following examples:
(53) a. ?Dan his'ir et hagufa al gdat-hanahar
bemesex salos saot.
b. Dan his'ir et hagufa al gdat-hanahar
lemesex salos saot.
"Dan left the body on the bank for three hours"
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( 54 ) *hanahar his'
lemesex galos
ii^ et hagufa al hagada
^aot
.
he river left the body on the bankfor three hours".
(55) a
.
hakala kista et panea
salo^ 5aot
.
becaif bemesex
b. hakala kista et panea becaif lemesex
salos saot.
The bride covered her face with a veil forthree hours "
.
*hasufa kista et habyit besmixat avaklemesex saloS saot.
The storm covered the house with a blanket ofdust for three hours".
Sentence (53a) is not so good but the result state reading
is fine with lemesex, when the agent is human. Sentence
(55a) has only the external reading and (55b) with lemegex
has the result state reading only when the subject is
agentive
.
lehargiz 'to irritate' and lekarer 'to cool' do not
have a temporal meaning built into them, as is the case with
verbs like 'jail', 'crown' and 'nominate'. The subject of
these verbs may be agentive or not- this does not affect the
result state reading of sentences with such verbs. This is
the reason that bemesex may occur with non-agentive subjects
and have the result state reading:
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(57) haoava hixtir oto lemelex bemesex sales sanim.
The army crowned him for three years".
"for tFF ^SurF."°°'^ --
~ cover (+fem) '
, hj-s ' ir 'leave' do not necessarily have
a temporal component incorporated in their meaning, but such
a component may be present, given the intention of the
subject of the verb that his activity will carry
consequences which would last for a certain period of time,
as demonstrated in (53b) and (55b): i.e, that the bride face
would remain covered and the body would be left on the bank
for a specified length of time. When no such intentions are
involved, the specification of a certain length of time is
odd since it is not part of the meaning of the verb, as
examples (54) and (56) indicate. While lemesex occurs with
the intensional result state reading, bemesex occurs with
the result state reading, which is not intentional. lemesex
specifies the subject intentions as to the duration of the
result state and bemesex specifies the length of time of the
result state which is part of the meaning of the verb. A
period of time for which someone is crowned or nominated
constitutes part of their meaning. This is why the result
state reading is presented in sentences (57) and (58),
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although intentions are lacking. with verbs like lehas'ir
'to leave', lexasot 'to cover' it is the intentions of the
agent which impose the result state reading. lehas'ir
implies, in a certain sense, a length of time for which the
thing is to be left (This is not always true of the English
verb leave"). This is not the case with verbs like lekarer
'to cool' or lehargiz 'to irritate'. in some sense lehas'ir
and lexasot are institutional in terms of time, and it is
the agent's intentions which impose the result state
reading. (They are less institutional than verbs like
jail
, nominate' and 'crown' which are institutional
whether intentions are present or not). with verbs like
lekarer 'to cool' and lehargiz 'to irritate' which are
non-institutional in terms of time, the agent's intentions
can not impose the result state reading.
2. Time Adverbials and the Time of the Two
Clauses of Causatives
2.1. Event Causative Verbs
In the previous section evidence from English and
Hebrew was given to support the claim that accomplishments
analyzed by CAUSE are bi—sentential
. In this section we
want to discuss various issues concerning the relationship
between the interval specified by a time adverbial modifying
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an accomplishment sentence, and the time at which its two
constituent sentences combined by CAUSE are true. Causation
was often regarded by philosophers as a a relation between
events. Dowty
' s semantics for CAUSE, which we will discuss
in section 3. of this chapter, is a version of David Lewis'
treatment of causation. Lewis analyzed the operator CAUSE
in terms of counterfactuals
, and this is why it is a
relation between propositions (the proposition that event e
occurred, the proposition that event c occurred, etc).
CAUSE is treated by Dowty as a sentential operator, so there
IS no need for him to construct expressions denoting events
and form from them sentences which assert that events
occurred (The sentences which are the argument of CAUSE
already assert it).
It was claimed in section 1.1. that sentences combined
by CAUSE might be of different aspectual kinds. Since the
time adverb modifies the complex accomplishment sentence,
interesting questions arise about the way in which it
interacts with the time of the two constituent sentences,
especially when they are not of the same aspectual type. We
will discuss these issues, examining causatives of different
aspectual kinds which occur with different time adverbials.
We will look for a generalization which holds in all these
cases
.
Is it the case that we can always talk about the
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aspectual kind of the sentences combined by the CAUSE
operator? By looking at the meaning of the causative verb.
It IS not always possible to discover the two sentences
combined by it. This is in particular difficult when we try
to determine what the sentence in the first clause of the
accomplishment (and causative) sentence is. Consider
sentence (58):
(58) John killed Mary.
The sentence in the result state clause underlying (58)
should be ^ry is dead, but it is not clear what is the
sentence which must appear in the first clause. It might be
either John poisoned Mary, John shot Mary
, John strangled
Ma^y or many others. The two events described by the two
clauses underlying sentences with event causative verbs
(which we will refer to by ECV) do not have to occur at the
same time. Consider sentences (59) and (60) with the frame
adverbs
:
(59) John killed Mary yesterday.
(60) John killed Mary between noon and midnight.
Sentence (59) could be uttered in a situation where John
shot Mary at noon and she died in consequence four hours
later. The only condition is that the time of shooting and
the time of dying are contained in the interval specified by
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Y£ster^. The frame adverb in (60) specifies an interval
with a length of twelve hours, and the time of the two
events of shooting and dying must be contained in the
interval whose end points are noon and midnight of the same
y (There is a restriction on the precedence order of the
two events. Maybe this has to do with the nature of
causation- a property of the model and not of the
language). We can not utter sentence (61):
(61) John killed Mary on Sunday
in the case where John shot Mary on Sunday and she died as a
result on the following Monday, or where John shot Mary on
Saturday and she died on the next Sunday. The event verb
specifies the activity of the subject of the sentence
in the first clause. The subject of the sentence of the
second clause might be dead, wounded, lightly injured etc.
On the other hand, the ECV kill specifies only the result
state described by the sentence in the second clause
underlying (59) and (60). The ECV kill leaves a wide range
of activities possible for the subject of the first clause
underlying (59) and (60). In the case of the event verb shot
it is not determined whether the subject of the sentence in
the second clause is dead, wounded or unharmed. We said the
time of the events described by the two sentences underlying
the sentence with the event causative verb is contained in
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the time specified by the adverb modifying this sentence.
If this is correct, we expect that when the time adverb is
punctual, the two events must occur simultaneously.
Consider (62):
(62) John killed Bill at three o'clock.
It seems that sentence (62) can only be uttered in a
situation where the shooting and the dying occured at very
nearly the same time. Dowty does not discuss this issue in
his book but a restriction which appears in clauses (1) and
(2)
in his definition of CAUSE (rule 15 pg. 353 in the
fragment he provides) suggests he was thinking of cases like
those discussed by us. Let us repeat his definition below:
(63) If
^
^ ME^ then (^ CAUSE f ) e mE^, and
[[(j^ CAUSE iff ( 1 ) there is some
i^c i such that
^
.^^g=l, (2) there
is some i c: i such that [ [^]
1
=i
(3) there is no i'^i meeting (1) and (2), and
(4) there is a sequence of formulas X, ,X_,...X12 n
where )^=Xj^ and
'f
such that
[[( Xj^a-2
' w, 3fg=if
1 ^ k <n and j Ci.
where
Clause (1) in the above definition requires that the
interval at which the first sentence
^
of the causative
116
sentence is true (i^ in the above definition) should be a
subinterval of the interval i at which the causative
sentence is true. Clause (2) requires that the interval at
which the second sentence f is true (i^ in the above
definition) should be a subinterval of the interval i at
which the causative sentence is true. Clause (3) says that
i is minimal.
At present we will only concentrate on clauses (1) and
(2) of the above definition and investigate whether they
hold in the case of other causatives which are not ECV.
2.2 Process causative verbs
In our discussion of CPV we have said that the
sentences in the two underlying clauses are processes. One
can not utter sentences with CPV when the first clause or
second clause specifies a punctual event. Although the
causative gallop (like kill ) leaves quite a wide range of
possible activities that its subject may be involved in, all
of them are durative in nature.
Spears (1977) distinguished between sentences with
infinitival sensory complements and sentences with gerundive
complements, for example:
(64) a. I watched Sheila build a cabin.
b. I watched Sheila building a cabin.
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IS a sensory verb and its infinitival complement build
in (64a) implies that a cabin was completed. m
sentence (64b) we have a gerundive complement and there is
no implication of Sheila *s completion of the cabin.
Infinitival and gerundive complements of verbs of
(dis)li)cing are also perfective and imperfective
correspondent ly. Spears gives the following examples:
(65) a. I hated to write that book. That's why
I did not finish it.
b. I hated writing that book. That's why
I did not finish it.
Sentence (65b) with the gerundive complement sounds
better than (65a), since it is imperfective and does not
contradict the subsequent sentence, which asserts that the
the book was not completed.
Spears notes that the same distinction holds with
monoperfective predicates, which denote an event or state
which can be completed only once as in write a book , eat an
apple and grow up
. Infinitival complements which are
monoperfective predicates are perfective when they appear
with the disliking verb hate . The gerundive complement of
these verbs is imperfective (^ means that the sentence is
anomalous )
;
(66) Flora hated to grow up in Brooklyn; that's why
she committed suicide at the age of five.
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(67) Flora hated growing up in Brooklyn; that's whvshe committed suicide at the age of five.
^
Sentence (66) is anomalous since the infinitival
complement implies that Flora actually reached adulthood,
and this contradicts the information in the subsequent
sentence. Sentence (67) is fine since the gerundive doesn't
have a perfective implication.
Sentences (64b), (65b), and (67), which have the
gerundive complements, behave like CPV in the sense that the
activities described by the sensory or (dis) liking verb are
durative (The durative state of watching is described by the
first clause of the first sentence of (64b), and that of
working is described in its result state clause). The
adverbial specifies the length of time for which these
activities lasted. Consider:
(68) For ten hours I saw Sheila building a cabin.
(69) For eight months I hated writing the book.
(70) For ten years Flora hated growing up in Brooklyn.
The sensory and (dis) liking verbs in examples (68)-(70)
are not causatives but exhibit a similar behavior to that of
CFV. In these examples we have two different continuous
activities which last for the time specified by the time
adverbial
.
When the subject of the causative verb is a gerund we
119
get the same effect as with CPV verbs. Consider:
exercising strengthened John's
(72) For three hours heating it darkened it.
(73) For ten years drinking gin weakened John's mind.
The time adverb was preposed in (71)- (73) to block the
reading where it specifies the length of time of the result
state. Sentence (71) can only describe a situation where
John does exercises for a year and as a result of each
exercise his muscles become stronger and stronger.
In (72) the two processes that of heating and that of
becoming darker are continuous, while in (71) exercising and
becoming stronger are not. In chapter I section 3.1. we
discuss the difference between verbs which describe a
continuous activity and these which describe an iterative
one. The same issue is involved here.
It is the gerundive in the first clause of the
causatives strengthen
, darken and weaken which create the
same effect as that in the CPV. The inchoatives strengthen
,
darken and weaken are non specific between the punctual
reading (vague inchoatives) and the process reading, which
involves a comparative component (see my discussion of these
issues in chapter I), and it is the presence of the durative
time adverb which imposes the durative reading on the
ambigiuous inchoatives in the second clause of (71)- (73).
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CPV take durative time adverbials. As earlier in
dealing with ECV, we would like to investigate the
relationship between the interval specified by the time
adverb modifying the CPV-sentence and the time at whioh its
two constituent sentences are true. This relationship is
more complicated in the case of CPV, and this follows from
the interpretation of the durative time adverb and its
interaction with the two clauses. Something like a
continuous or repeated causation is involved in the reading
of sentence ( 74 ) :
(74) John galloped the horse for three hours.
We get the "continuous causation" reading in the above
sentence from the interpretation of the durative adverb "for
three hours", and clauses (1) and (2) in the definition of
CAUSE. To show how the interval specified by the time adverb
relates to the time at which the two constituent sentences
are true, and how the "continuous causation" reading of CPV
is created, we must understand the way durative time adverbs
work
.
Dowty interprets for as belonging to the category
( ^^/^^ ) / ( t/i ) . For combines with an expression denoting a
property of intervals to form a verb phrase adverbial:
(75) ^ P ^x[P^(n] & \/t [te n AT(t, p[x/ ) ] ]
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We will try to understand what the above translation
means. The indexical constant n (for "now") denotes at any
index the time coordinate of that index, i.e at any index
<W, 1 > the denotation of n is i. After applying lamda
conversion three times and introducing a subject NP, a VP
and a property of times we arrive at:
(74')
-three hours '(n] & \/t [ t o n AT ( t , CAUSE f ) ]
evaluating (74') at an index <w,i> we get:
(74'') [[three hours'(n) & \/t[tCn-^
AT(t, y CAUSE ^
The denotation of ([[three hours ']]( n ))
,
is that of
<w
,
i>
[ [ three hours
' ]
]
<w, i> ([[n]
j
<w ^i>)/ and this is equal to
[[three hours ( i )
.
in the same way we get rid of the
indexical constant in the second conjunct of (74''). when
(74'') is true, then the duration of i is three hours and
for all subintervals t of i [ [ cf CAUSE 1 1 =l^ ^ <w, t> '
After applying the past tense to (74'') (rule S39 in
Dowty's fragment) we end up with
(74''') 3 1 [ Past ( t ) & three hours' (t^^) &
Vt[tct^-^ AT(t,
^
CAUSE ^)]\
i.e for some past interval t^^, the duration of t^ is
three hours and for all subintervals t of t^^^,
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[[f CAUSE f
How do clauses (1) and (2) in the CAUSE definition
interact with the interpretation of the durative time
adverbial?
Consider (76) which describes a situation where (74) is
true
:
(76)
[-[-(-)—
3 hours t t
According to the interpretation of for
,
for each
AT( t, CAUSE
^ ) .
From clauses (1) and (2) in the CAUSE definition it
follows that for each tc t^^
1. for some t, AT(i^, and
2. for some C t, ATd^, y/
)
and from the interpretation of for;
(77) (\/t ) [ (tCtj^
)
—> 3ij^ [ (ij^C-t ) & AT(i^,j^)] &
Ji^[ (i2^t) & AT(i2, (^ )]]
The interpretation of the durative adverb and the
requirements in clauses (1) and (2) of CAUSE are responsible
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for the continuous causation reading of CPV. The requirement
that the time at which the two sentences in the clauses of
causative sentences be true must be contained in the
interval specified by the time adverb modifying the CPV
sentence is justified if we want to account for the special
behavior of CPV.
2 • 3
.
Culmination Causative Verbs
Some causative verbs like build a house and write a
symphony describe extended events, i.e their completion
takes time. We will call such causative verbs culmination
causative verbs (CCV). The relationship between the time
specified by the time adverb modifying CCV-sentences and the
time at which its constituent sentences are true involve
issues which did not arise in the case of ECV and CPV. CCV
take the time adverb in two hours
. Consider:
(78) John built a house in two hours.
(79) The composer wrote the symphony in a year.
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Dowty
'
s
translation of ^ in the time adverb in n hours is
:
( 80 ) /Ip^ ^x[p^(n} s s AT(tj^,p(x|)] s
Vt2[(t2 cn s AKt^, P{xl)j t2=t^l
The interpretation of in differs in two respects from that
of for. We have an existential quantifier binding t^ in the
above translation while in the translation of we had a
universal quantifier at that position. it is required that
the time of the verb's truth is some subset of the interval
mentioned, though not necessarily a proper subset. Dowty
suggests that for Gricean reasons we usually consider t^ in
the above interpretation of to be equal to n; and in
particular when dealing with multiple-change accomplishments
John washed the dishes in an hour . If we expect the
time that a certain verb takes to be shorter than that
specified by the adverb, then the verb is understood to be
true at a finite proper subinterval of the indicated
interval as in John closed the door in an hour . We could
utter this although we know it would take him one minute to
do so
.
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The second respect in which the interpretation of in
differs from that of for is in the requirement of the
uniqueness of t^. The uniqueness condition distinguishes
accomplishments from statives. In order to explain why
stative verbs do not take in-adverbs ( ?John slept in an
hour) and accomplishments do take them, the translation of
in must specify that the verb is true at a unique
subinterval (not necessarily a proper one) of the measured
interval. if John built a house in a year (where it took
him a whole year to build it), it is false that he built a
house in 364 days (if tj^ is a proper subset of n, the same
uniqueness requirement holds for that subset). Stative
verbs do not obey this requirement.
Let us consider again the requirement in clauses (1)
and (2) of the definition of CAUSE, and their interaction
with the above translation of (81) below describes the
situation where CAUSE
^ ]
in n hours is true:
The translation of implies that for some interval I of
duration n hours Bt^^CI [AT(tj^,
(f
CAUSE f )] and this holds
for no other interval than t^^.
Clauses (1) and (2) in the CAUSE definition require
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that
(1) for some AT(i^, j)
(2) for some g.t^,
'f ^
The translation of in and clauses (1) and (2) of CAUSE
specify only two intervals: that at which the event
described by the first constituent sentence of the
CCV-sentence occurred and that at which the event described
by the second sentence occurred. Both are contained in a
subset t^ of I, where I is the interval specified by the
time adverbial.
(81) does not seem appropriate when we take into
account linguistic and metaphysical considerations which
arise when dealing with CCV.
In our discussion of CPV we have claimed that the
sentences in their two clauses must be of the same aspectual
type- that of processes. A sentence with a CPV as its main
verb can no longer be classified as a process when one of
its constituent sentences is of a different aspectual type.
We showed in detail the way in which the interval specified
by the time adverb modifying the sentence relates to the
time at which its two constituent sentences are true. When
discussing sentences with event causative verbs like kill,
we assumed that each of the sentences underlying it is an
event type, and stated a condition about the relationship
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between the time at which they are true and the time
specified by the time adverb.
That the two constituent sentences of a sentence
containing a causative VP like John built a house in two
composer wrote a symphony last year are event
type sentences is not so clear. The activity of writing a
symphony takes a long time, but the result state where some
piece of music becomes a symphony occurs at a point.
Whatever the activity denoted ‘n the first clause of the
above sentences is, its nature is durative: that of writing
a symphony and of building a house. Somebody is in the
process of writing a symphony or building a house before the
house or the symphony are completed (see my discussion of
Vlach in chapter III 2.1.). There are certain rituals and
conventions involved in activities of such kinds (which
usually lead to the completion of a certain object) that
make them such activities and not others. And if the first
sentence underlying a CCV sentence is a process while the
second is an event type (an achievement sentence), then we
have a case where the two constituent sentences disagree in
their aspectual type. If this is the case, it is not so
clear how the time indicated by the time adverb modifying
the CCV-sentence relates to the time at which its two
constituent sentences are true.
One may claim that the activity unspecified in the
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first constituent sentence is an extended event rather than
a process. if this is so, this event could not be that of
building a house or writing a symphony since the house or
the symphony are not yet completed. Also, it could not be
the event of building one third of a house or half a house,
because neither of these when considered separately is the
cause of the result state, where a house came into
existence. We can think about different events underlying
the activity described in the first sentence of the
CCV-sentence, each of which has a different object (building
a roof, building a window), and all of which constitute an
extended event which causes the result state of a house that
came into existence. Each of these events is complex since
each of them contains a causal element. If this description
of the activity underlying the first clause of the CCV is
correct, then either picture (81) is wrong or
^
in
CAUSE ] is a causative sentence itself whose first
constituent is a causative sentence, and so on. To describe
the way in which the time adverb relates to the two clauses
such a situation is very complex. Consider diagram (82):
(82) I
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1 IS an interval of length n at which John build a hone, is
true. At a, John started to build a house and at o he
finished it. There exist subintervals t of 1 where at t^
John does something and at t^ some result state obtains.^
The sequence of events which occur at the interval [a,b]
cause the result state to obtain at c.
One may argue that all these complications which arise
when- we think about the world do not prevent us from
considering in our semantics the interval [a,b] as the one
at which an extended event occurred. in such a situation,
the time relationship between the interval specified by the
time adverbial and the time of the two sentences is as
described in (81), and not different from that which holds
for ECV. But what kind of extended event occurred at the
interval [a,bj? It is difficult to think of such a specific
event which is the cause of the result state where a house
came into existence.
Let us discuss the possibility in which the first
sentence underlying the CCV is a process while the second
one is an event. Since we are dealing with aspectual
properties of languages and not of the world (for a
discussion of this distinction see section 1.1. on verb
classification in chapter I) we must look for linguistic
evidence. Consider the following sentence.
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(83) ?John warmed the soup at three o'clocJc.
which is fine for some speakers. For these speakers the
punctual time adverbial refers to the time at which the soup
became warm rather than the time at which John started to
gjree o'clock can not Indicate the time both of
John turning on the gas and of that at which the soup became
warm. John's act may be a durative one- that of refraining
from turning off the gas. Such a situation is described in
sentence ( 84 )
:
(84) John warmed the soup for half an hour by lettingIt Stand on the fire.
The time specified by the durative time adverb indicates the
duration of the process of having the soup stand on the
gas. The causative verb warm in (84) is a process rather
than an accomplishment and the verb in the result state
clause is the process inchoative verb become warmer (We say
Ijie soup warmed for three hours ). The sentences in the two
clauses of (84) are of the same aspectual type- that of a
process; and the time adverb relates to them in the same way
as in the case of CPV . Warm in (84) is ambigiuous between a
process and an accomplishment in the same way that wash is
(this ambiguity was mentioned to me by Partee )
:
(85) The maid washed the clothes in two hours.
(86) The maid washed the clothes for two hours.
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Sentence (86) describes the process of washing connected
with certain rituals as rubbing the clothes with a soap,
dipping them in the water, etc rather than the result state
where the clothes are clean.
Consider the following sentences:
(87) John was cured by administering vitamins.
(88) The door was closed by blowing at it.
(89) The lock was broken by kicking at the door continuously.
In sentence (87) the activity of the missing deep
structure subject (let us say it is the doctor) is durative;
It IS that of administering vitamins. In the result clause
we have an achievement "got healthy". The same contrast in
the aspectual type of the sentences in the two clauses also
exists in (88)-(89). In the case of the causative verb cure
,
only the result state of its object ("get healthy") is
specified but not the activity of its subject. The VP's
administering vitamins
, blowing at it and kicking at the
door are process type verbs. Consider:
(90) The doctor administered vitamins for three hours.
(91) The wolf blew at the door for half an hour.
(92) The police kicked the door continuously.
This perhaps suggests that culmination causative verbs have
a process type sentence in the first clause and an event
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type sentence in the result state clause.
The instrumental adverb "by administering vitamins" in
(87) shares the verb c^ with the missing deep structure
subject of the sentence. it was the doctor who administered
vitamins, not John. Jerry Fodor (1970) observed that many
instrumental adverbial phrases share the deep underlying NP
with the verb they modify. in his example (93) it is the
deep subject John rather than Mary who used the phone:
(93) John contacted Mary by using the phone.
He also mentioned that instrumental adverbs can not appear
in full passive due to a surface constraint on iteration of
iMary was found by John by using radar , but are
fine when they appear in agentless passives like (87)-(89).
Since the adverb for n hours in sentence (94) is a
constituent of the ^-phrase, it specifies the length of the
duration of the activity of the doctor and not that of John.
Consider
:
(94) John was cured by administering vitamins
for three week.
(95) The door was closed by blowing at it
for half an hour.
When the for n hours adverb is extracted from the VP and
pi^sposed
, sentences (87 )
— (89 ) are no longer good:
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Ci?amins?® *’i' administering
at°it!^"
’^*’® door was closed by blowing
This is so because in (96)-(97) the for-adverb modifies the
hole sentence, as in the case of CPV. But for CCV like cure
and close (as in (87)-(89)) the for-adverb inside the
^-phrase modifies the VP in the ^-phrase.
Although sentences (87)-(89) have an achievement verb
in their second clause, they are semi-grammatical with a
punctual time adverbial:
(98) ?John was cured at three o'clock
by administering vitamins for three hours
.
(99) ?The door was closed at two o'clock
by blowing at it for half an hour .
Sentences (98)-(99) are only partially acceptable, so they
do not allow the reading (which (87)-(89) have) where the
administering of vitamins which lasted for three weeks
preceded the time at which John got healthy. It is not the
case that (98)-(99) are ruled out because of a restriction
that only one time adverb can occur at a sentence; something
else is involved here. In a construction where the main
sentence is restricted by a frame adverb and also contains
an additional durative time adverb, the time specified by
the durative adverb can not be longer that that specified by
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the frame adverb. Sentences (98)-(99) are bad because the
time of the durative adverb is longer than that indicated by
the time adverb restricting the main sentence:
Sentence (100) which does not violate the above
condition is fin©:(100)
John was cured yesterday by administering
vitamins for three hour.c;.
Notice that when the verb completed appear in the main
sentence, you can have a durative adverb in the other:
(101) *John painted the picture at three o'clockby using an air brush for three hours
"
(102) John completed the picture by using an airbrush for three hours
.
To complete does not always imply finishing something at a
point. If an activity takes some time, its last stage can
be considered as its completion. Sentence (102) can be
uttered in a situation where John was painting a picture for
three months or even longer. (The completion of the picture
lasted three days and during one of these days John was
using an air-brush for three hours). Quite surprisingly, we
can add a punctual time adverb to the main sentence when the
other one is modified by continuously :
(103) The police broke the door at three o'clock
by kicking at it continuously.
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we can utter (103) in a situation where the kicking of the
door by the police lasted through a short interval of time,
for example, two to five minutes. In the same way we can
say of John that he picked up his mail at noon when it took
him five minutes to pick it up, but not when it took him
three hours to do so. This follows from the fact that
-at n
o'clock' lacks a definite time reference, it depends on how
we choose to construct time. 'At three o'clock' indicates a
time around three o'clock and not necessarily the time when
the small and big arms of the clock point to the numbers
three and twelve respectively. In sentence (103),
continuously modifies a process sentence and the activity
described by it lasts for an interval of a few moments
duration. This short interval is contained in the interval
specified by the "at three o'clock" adverb, so the above
restriction is not violated and this accounts for the
acceptability of (103).
Partee and Bennett (1978) gave examples of adverbial
phrases which serve both as durative and frame adverbial
phrases. Consider:
(104) John was hungry all day yesterday.
(105) John walked from two to three o'clock.
(106) John will be building a house until tomorrow.
But culmination causative verbs can not appear with such
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examples
.
3. The Semantics of CAUSE and Aspectuality
^ 1 • The Semantics Analysis of CAUSE
In his paper on causation (1973) David Lewis analyzed
this notion in terms of counterfactuals
. Dowty adopted
Lewis' analysis of causation for his bi-sentential operator
CAUSE and further revised it. We will present both Lewis'
analysis of causation and Dowty
' s version of this analysis
and then we will point to difficulties which arise with the
semantics of CAUSE and other issues concerning its
interaction with aspectuality.
Causation is a relation between events, but when
treated in terms of counterfactuals it is a relation between
propositions. Lewis does not analyze a relation between
events e and c but a relation between propositions 0(e) and
0(c) which assert correspondingly that event e occurred and
event c occurred. Dowty 's CAUSE is a sentential operator
and the sentences which are its arguments assert that events
occurred. We have to distinguish between the events e and c
and the sentences 0(c) and 0(e) (causative stative sentences
can not be analyzed as relation between events )
.
Lewis defines the relation of causal dependence between
event e and c in terms of the notion of counterfactual
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dependence between the propositions that events occurred, e
depends causally on c (cDe) iff 0(c) -> o(e) and
~0(c)0—> '^O(e).
For Lewis, causal dependence is a different relation
from causation: while causation is transitive, causal
dependence need not be (causal dependence is not transitive
since it fails for Lewis' counterfactual connective ).
Causation is defined by Lewis in terms of causal dependence:
actual event c causes an event e just in case there is a
series of events c, c^, c^, C
3
c^, e such that c^
depends causally on c, c^ depends causally on c^ etc.
Causation (C) is the transitive closure^ of the
converse of causal dependence (D) and is defined as follows:
(107) cCe iff ( 3 a^
^
^
^n^^n-1 ^ c=aj^ and e=a^ ]
Causation does not entail causal dependence (because
causal dependence is not transitive) but causal dependence
entails causation.
Lewis treatment of causation contains two components:
its definition in terms of the notion of causal dependence
and the definition of causal dependence in terms of the
counterfactual connective (see Lewis' counterfactual
analysis in his (1073a).
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Dowty remarks that there is another important issue
Which he calls the "causal selection", which n.ust be
considered in the definition of CAUSE. Causation statements
in natural language ordinarily single out one event as "the
cause of the other, while the oounterfactual analysis
allows a number of events to be considered as causes. He
mentions Kim (1973) and Abbott (1974), who have shown that a
large number of counterfactuals are odd when converted to
causal statements, quoting some of Abbot's examples:
(108) a. If I had not lit John's cigarette,
he wouldn't have smoked it.
b. My lighting John's cigarette caused him
to smoke it.
(109) a. If I had not been born I would not
have come to Amherst.
b. My being born caused me to come to
Amherst
.
(110) a. If Mary had not gotten married, she would
have not become a widow.
b. Mary's getting married caused her
to become a widow.
Since English causative statements require a causal
selection as the abnormal sentences ( 108b )-( 110b
)
illustrate, Lewis' analysis of causation in terms of
counterfactuals is problematic when taken as an account for
causative sentences in languages. Dowty 's CAUSE operator is
supposed to account for causative statements in natural
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languages. Therefore he suggests adding to its definition
another clause which will take care of the above mentioned
difficulties. He suggests that one select "the cause" of an
event as the one whose deletion from the actual course of
events would result in the least departure from the actual
world. If we quantify over a multiple of causes of an
event, we can identify as "the cause" the one whose
non-occurrence can be found in worlds at least as similar or
more similar to the actual world than the non-occurrence of
any of the other causes of the event. (Since sometimes more
than one cause could be equally easy to get rid off, Dowty
would like the world in which the cause does not occur to be
as similar to the actual world as any other worlds where
other causes do not occur)
.
Perhaps this is why we so often find human actions
Identified as "the cause" in a causal chain of events. We
feel intuitively that the actions of human agents usually
could be different from what they are but that this is not
so often true for inanimate objects which obey physical
laws. To see this more clearly consider the following
example; John pulled the trigger of the gun, lifted the
barrel, the bullet travelled along a parabola and Bill died
as a consequence. John's pulling of the trigger is "the
cause of Bill's death rather than the bullet going in a
parabola. This is so since worlds in which bullets do not
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go xn straight lines are less similar to the actual one
those in which John didn't fire his gun.
Dowry's definition of CAUSE has three clauses: In
than
clause (Ilia) he adds some conditions to Lewis' definition
of causal dependence (which is defined in terms of
counterfactuals) by requiring that
^ and should be true.
If i and y/ are true, then f ^
why Dowry drops it from clause (111a) in his definition of
CAUSE, in clause (111b) the definition of "causal factor" Is
his adaptation of Lewis' analysis of causation as a
transitive closure of the converse of causal dependence.
The third clause (111c) in Dowty is the causal selection
condition, which was discussed above.
When
^
and are arbitrary sentences the truth
conditions for [j^ CAUSE (// ] are given by the following
definition
;
(111) a.
^
depends causally on
^ iff \j/ and
are all true.
b. jzf is a causal factor for ^ iff there
is a series of sentences
. . . , , (j
(for n 0) such that each member of the
series depends causally on the previous
member
.
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o- [4 CAUSE V- ] is true iff ( 1 ) ^ is a causal
factor for
, and (2) for all other such
that p IS also a causal factor for
(f/ ,
some
-world IS as similar or more similar to
the actual world that any
-world is.
Partitivity, Additivity and Process Verbs
In section 1.2. of chapter I we discussed the
properties of additivity and partitivity which were
connected with process verbs and mass nouns (for which we
must maintain a weaker version of partitivity). Sentences
which contain CPV have two underlying sentences
^
and
^ ,
each of them describing a process. Can we show that if
and KjJ are process sentences then it follows by logic that
[f CAUSE ] is a process sentence?
If something is a process sentence iff it is partitive
and additive then to answer the above question we must show
that if jli and [j/ are partitive and additive so is
[f CAUSE ^ ] . We will show that this consequence does not
hold for a weaker relation than CAUSE which we will call
KAUSE. When j/ and f are partitive and additive then
KAUSE ] is additive but not partitive. We will also
show that this is consistent with linguistic facts
concerning the interaction of partitivity and causative
P^o^^ss verbs
. Here we have a nice case where logic and
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language coincide.
The relation KAUSE in kausE f ] is the converse of
Dowty s relation of causal dependence in clause A of the
definition of CAUSE. We do not know how partitivity and
additivity interact with the notion of causal chains (clause
(111b) in the definition of CAUSE) and how relevant the
notion of causal selection to our proof is.
In our proof we will use Lewis' definition of the
counterfactual conditional, Dowty 's definition of causal
dependence and Dowty 's definition of [d CAUSE (Z'
1
where the relation between the time at which the causative
sentence is true and the time at which
^
and f are true is
made explicit. Lewis' definition of the counterfactual
connective -> is:
( 112 ) If y/ 6 ME^, then (^0—>
^ ) € ME^,
and [[(^0-#
^
^ ,w,g,i~^ either
(1) there is no set S e$ for whichw
there is w' 6 S such that [[^1]^ =i
^ '(U,w' ,i,g
or else (2) there is some set S6$ such that
w
t J(5^w'
,i,g"^^ for some w' 5 S and for all
w S, [ [ (j^ -^ »^) ] ]
C? fW' ' /i/g ^
We want to prove that;
( 113 ) / is partivive and additive
^ is partitive and additive
^ f P KAUSE KjJ ] ] ifs additive
The formal proof is given in the appendix.
We still need to show that partitivity does not hold
general, i.e there is a model where / and y/ are additive
and partitive and KAUSE y/ ] fails to be partitive. Let
our model have two worlds fw,w'] and three intervals i
and where 13 = 12^1/12 • ^ is partitive in a model A iff for
any worlds w and time intervals I i
1 ' 2
^
and f have the indicated truth values in w and w':
( 114 )
w
h ^2 I3
1
1
—
1
1
f 1 1 1
^ /V y/ 1 1 1
w
'
1
—
1
M I3
0
1
—
1
0
1 0 0
^ j —^ ^ y/ 0 1 1
In this model,
^
and y' are both additive and partitive at
both w and w'. A counterexample to additivity would be a
row of the form 1 1 0 ; a counterexample to partitivity
would be a row of the form Oil or 101 or 001 .
144
There are no such rows for f or for ^ .
There is a world w' where is true at and
-f holds with respect to (w,i^) and (w',i^), i.e,
in the sphere (w,w'}. So, [[~j|(Q-;
~y/ Jl^_^
3
=l. holds
at (WM
3 )
and at (wM^) is flise. since
there are no worlds closer to w than w' where holds,
then [[ ^ = Q
,
This counterexample shows that
the non-partitivity of KAUSE is consistent with the
additivity and partitivity of ^ and
^
: AT(I^,w) we have
i>, f and , so
^
kauSE f . Atd^.w) we have
fl, V' and -)('], so KAUSE
'/'I. So KAUSE is not
partitive in this model.
The following two examples illustrate why partitivity
fails to hold. Causative VP's with bare plural objects are
processes and this is why sentence (115) may appear with a
durative time adverb;
(115) For two weeJcs the workers built cabins.
If the workers build different cabins at different
subintervals of the interval specified by the time adverb,
e.g if they build a different one each day, then the workers
cabins is partitive at the two week interval, since it
IS true at its appropriate large subintervals. But in a
model where all the workers finished building all the cabins
at the same time, i.e at the end of the two weeks, then the
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workers built cabins is not partitive at the interval of two
since it is not true at any of its subintervals. So
in a model where the workers finished building all the
cabins at the same time, i.e by the end of the two weeks,
"orkers built cabin, is not partitive at the
interval of two weeks duration, since it is not true at any
of its subintervals. Thus, causatives which take bare
plurals are process verbs (as the for-adverb linguistic test
indicates) and partitivity doesn't hold for process
sentences which contain causative verbs. There are quite
plausible situation for which The workers built cabins is
partitive at the interval with respect to which it is true,
and there are equally plausible situations for which this is
not so.
There is another example which illustrates the same
point. Consider sentence (116):
(116) John rolled the drum down the street.
Imagine John pushed the drum for ten minutes from 1 o'clock
to ten minutes past 1 o'clock and also that the drum rolled
down the street during that period. (116) is a CPV-sentence
for which partitivity holds: if John rolled the drum down
the street is true at the interval [1°°, 1^°], then it is
true for its subintervals. But in a model where John pushed
the drum for two minutes (his pushing is a process) and then
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stopped and the drum kept rolling round the street for
another 8 minutes, (116) is not partitive. m such a model
(116) is true at the interval [l^^ i^O] but not at [l^^,
1^°], [l°^ l^O]^ etc.
We have given two examples of process sentences which
involve causative verbs and for which partitivity does not
hold. These examples agree with the results we arrived at
by using logic. My discussion of additivity, partitivity
and process sentences shows that the interaction of these
notions is more complicated than has been assumed in the
literature. We did not provide a complete theory about
their relationship- this is a topic for further research and
we hope that the issues and examples mentioned here will
open up a new perspective for dealing with process verbs.
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FOOTNOTES
amblgioufSeiween thfeK?erLT"/^\^ verbs which is(^vhnhH+-.-^r, xt rnal/intentional readings -Theex ibition was in New York for three days .
sequence f " there is a finitea^^ a^ such that;
(1) For all l<i<n, R(a^,a^^^)
(2) a =x and a =y.
1 n
chapter III
ISSUES IN THE SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRESSIVE
Z-he Traditional Approach to the Progressive
^ntague's Definition and the Continuum Failnr^
The purpose of this chapter is to compare two main
analyses suggested for the progressive, which I will refer
:^aditional approach vs. the non-topoloqical
one. To illustrate the different problems involved in the
analysis of the progressive I will review the history of the
argumentation given by philosophers and linguists in favour
of one analysis or another and outline the objections which
might be raised in each case.
I find such an historical survey important due to the
volume of literature on this topic, which I think ought to
be related and compared. I will point to the differences
among the treatments of the progressive within two main
streams. These treatments were often suggested as responses
and improvements over previous ones. After discussing in
detail the various theoretical issues involved and pointing
to problems which were left unresolved in the treatments of
the progressive in the two main streams, I will offer my own
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analysis
.
Montague (1970) suggested a treatment for the
progressive stated as follows in Bennett and Partee
'
s
(1978)
(1 John IS walking is true at time p iff there
suc^^h^^
interval of moments of time, say l,
in ? Tnhn ^ it i and for all time t^ I Jo walks is true at t.
In the above definition the truth of the tensed sentence
Prog[j^] at a moment of time is dependent on the truth of the
constituent sentence
^
at other moments. The progressive
—
hn is walking is true at a moment of time t just in case
John walk is true at all moments of some open interval which
contains t.
Definition (1) is too strong. The two objections to be
raised differ slightly, although the same criticism, which I
will refer to as the 'continuum failure' is involved in
presenting them. The first objection can be illustrated by
an example of process verbs like walk and read . One can
spend an hour at walking or reading without being literally
involved in that activity at every moment within that hour,
as required in the above definition.^
The second objection is a more crucial one and involves
accomplishment/achievement verbs. The above definition of
the progressive works only for process verbs and is not
general enough to include other aspectual types of verbs.
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With aocomplishment/achievement verbs the truth of the
tensed sentence seems not to require the truth of its
constituent sentence (s) at all moments within that
- house at r does not mean that
the simple tense sentence John build a house „as true at all
moments in an interval surrounding t. On the contrary, it
was not true at any moment of the open interval.
Vlach (1981) provides a nice example which illustrates
a comparable problem with an achievement verb: If Mary
starts a race at 3.10 and wins at 3.16, then there is a
third instant f between 3.10 and 3.16 such that she pulls
ahead at f and stays ahead until 3.16. Mary is winning is
true at every instant between f and 3.16, but Mary win is
only true at 3.16. Thus, it is false that Prog[J^] is true
only at instants contained in an interval at moments of
which f is true. it seems that a better definition for the
progressive is required.
2* Bennett and Partee and Interval Semantics
To account for the continuum failure discussed above,
Bennett and Partee (1978) take the notion of truth at an
interval as basic. According to their suggestion sentences
in the simple tense can be true at an interval which is not
a moment. Their intention is that a sentence in the simple
tense be true at an interval I if l has an initial and a
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final point such that the event described by it starts at
the initial point and stops at the final point. Here is the
definition they give for the progressive:
building a house is true at I iff i is
Lr and K ^ endpointtor I
, John builds a house is true at I •
.
We see that Bennett and Partee avoid the continuum failure
(which arises by defining the truth of the progressive at a
moment t in terms of the truth of the simple tense at
moments of time) by defining the truth of the simple tense
with respect to an interval rather than a moment. in this
sense they avoid referring to moments when defining the
truth of a simple tense sentence, and consequently avoid
referring to moments when defining the truth of the
progressive. in their definition of the progressive given
above, the verb which appears is an accomplishment, build ;
by what they have said, the simple tense sentence which
contains it should be evaluated with respect to an
interval. We will see later that Dowty's semantics for
verbs of change (accomplishments and achievements) employs
Bennett and Partee ' s basic idea about the truth of the
simple tense sentence with accomplishment and achievement
verbs
.
As in Montague's analysis the progressive is defined in
terms of the simple tense, and in this sense both approaches
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are said to be compositional-the meaning of the whole, which
in our case is the progressive sentence, is defined in terms
of the meaning of its parts, in this case the simple tense
sentence
.
This analysis like the former calls for further
revisions. The next section deals with it.
Modal-Tempora l Treatment of The Procrressivp
Doyty's suggestion
. The failure of inference
from the progressive to the simple tense was recognized a
long time ago and recently was labeled with the name "the
imperfective paradox" by Dowty (1979). The imperfective
paradox is common to accomplishments and certain
achievements which take the progressive. In the following
sentence the process verb in the progressive entails the
simple tense but the accomplishment and achievement verbs
may fail to make such an entailment;
(3) That John was pushing a cart entails that John
pushed a cart.
( 4 ) That John was crossing the road does not
entails John crossed the road.
( 5 ) That John was falling asleep does not
entail that John fell asleep.
Bennett and Partee ' s definition of the progressive (as well
as Montague's) fail to distinguish between the different
entailments in (3)-(5). According to Bennett and Partee '
s
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John is crossing th. str.ot is true at a moment I just in
John cross the street is true at some interval I
containing I, which require that John completes the crossing
of the street. However, this must not always be the case
since a car could have hit John and prevented him from
reaching the other side of the pavement. The analysis of
the progressive given in 1.1. and 1.2. predicts that the
sentence
(6) John was crossing the street when he was hit bv
can never be true since there is no interval at which John
cross the street is true. However, there is nothing strange
in the utterance of sentence ( 6 )
.
Dowty offered an analysis to account for the
imperfective paradox in the framework of his aspect
calculus. He claimed that the Become-operator which denotes
a change of state is what accomplishments and achievements
share in their logical structure and concludes from it that
the solution to the analysis of the progressive lies in a
correct formulation of truth conditions for Prog[^] and
Become[y]. In his treatment of Become[^] he accounts for
what I have referred to as the 'continuum failure' and in
his analysis of the progressive he gives an account for the
imperfective paradox.
In Dowty 's definition of Become [j/] a solution to the
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•continuum failure* is offered. He adopts the definition of
the interval and related notions from Bennett and Partee and
uses them in his truth conditions for Become[^]. The
semantics for Become [j^] captures the intuition that a
sentence can be true at an interval without being true at
all times within the interval. The general idea is to
define the truth of Become at an interval with reference to
the truth of ^ at the ends of the interval:
(7) [Become is true at I iff (i) there is aninterval j containing the initial bound of Tsuch that is true at J (2) there is aninterval K containing the final bound of Isuch that 0 IS true at K, and (3) there is nonon empty interval I ' such that I ' c i and
conditions (1) and (2) hold for I* as well as I
As I noted above, Bennett and Partee
' s definition was
motivated by accomplishment sentences which in Dowty
'
s
aspect calculus are represented with a Become-operator
.
Dowty was influenced by Von Wright's (1963) logic of change,
which regarded events in general as transformations of
state. Accomplishments and achievements in Dowty (which are
events in Von Wright) are represented by a Become-operator
which has a stative predicate (or adjective) as an
argument. Thus, the intransitive verb open is represented
by ^x[Become open'(x)] where open' is an adjective
translation and Become is defined as above.
The truth of a sentence in the progressive with an
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accomplishment verb is evaluated with respect to an index
consisting of an interval and a world. By considering only
ndpoints of the interval, the "continuum failure" which
arose in the case of accomplishment verbs is accounted for.
The second component, i.e the world, has to do with the
imperfective paradox.
To account for the imperfective paradox Dowty suggests
treating the progressive as a modal-temporal operator. He
assigns truth conditions to a progressive sentence relative
to an index of an interval I and a possible world. From the
:Z2hn was drawing a circle one can conclude that the
existence of a circle was a possible outcome of John's
activity. This line of thought suggests that the truth
value of the progressive at indices consisting of an
interval I and a world w depends on the truth of j at
indices <I',w'>, where I' contains I and w' is exactly like
w at all time preceding and including I.
In his final definition of the progressive Dowty adds a
primitive function "Inr" which assigns to each index
consisting of a world and an interval of time, a set of
worlds which he calls inertia worlds
. Inertia worlds are
worlds which are exactly like the given world up to the time
in question and in which the future course of events after
this time develops in ways most compatible with the past
course of events
;
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( 8 ) [ Prog
^
]
IS true at <I,w>
I' such that I Cl'
subinterval of l
'
W 6 Inr(<l,w>)
, ^
and
f and
is true
iff for some interval
I is not a final
for all w* such that
at <!' ,w'>
We see that the truth condition for Prog[^] requires not
only the truth of
^ at some possible world like the actual
one up to a certain time, but its truth in all of such
worlds that meet certain conditions. This is to take care
of cases of a coin which is being flipped but has not yet
landed and of begining to draw a picture without yet
deciding whether it is to be a painting of a horse or a
unicorn. in the case of the flipped coin the coin is coming
^ heads or Uie coin is coming up tails both can not be true
since the relevant set of worlds would include both worlds
in which it comes up heads and in which it comes up tails.
Stump (1981) provided examples of present participle
adjuncts which exhibit the imperfective paradox:
(9) Crossing the street, John was hit by a car.
He observed several differences between present participle
adjuncts and the progressive. Some predicates may occur as
present participle adjuncts but not with the progressive:
(10) a. Being a sailor, John smokes a pipe,
b. *John is being a sailor.
Also, a VP in the perfect may occur as a present participle
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adjunct but never as a progressive:
(11) a. Having finished his work, John went to bed.
b. *John is having finished his work.
stump also observed that present participle adjuncts
deriving from VP's in the perfect may themselves contain a
progressive
:
anlweL!^®"
reading the book, John knew the
In order to decide which part of the meaning of the present
participle in free adjuncts constructions derives from the
meaning of the present participle phrase and which from the
meaning of the free adjunct, he checked free adjuncts with
other constructions like past participle phrase, adjective
phrase, prepositional phrase etc. In all these cases the
imperfective reading of the free adjunct is not possible- as
for example, in the case of a past participle:
(13)
Beaten, the Phillies left the field,(perfective reading)
Furthermore, he has shown that the present participle in
other constructions may be understood imperfectively
;
(14)
Mary found the dying man .
(15)
John sat reciting the Iliad .
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All this shows, claims Stump, that the progressive semantic
aspect does not have an independent status in English. He
offers a semantics for the present participle phrase by
defining an intensional logical expression of type
<<s,t>,t>:
(17) Where / denotes a proposition p, lnq{d) is true
some inte?vSi " such
i' f
^ subinterval for
, and or all w' Inr(<w,i>), p ( ( <w
'
,
i
' > ) =i
.
Stump, as we see, identifies the problem of the imperfective
paradox with the semantics of the present participle which
may appear in different constructions, and the semantics he
gives to is basically Dowty
'
s
treatment of the
progressive. The progressive is for Stump a predicative
construction consisting of a copula ^ and the present
participle phrase. Therefore the objections which may be
raised against Dowty
'
s
modal-temporal treatment of the
progressive hold also for Stump's analysis.
Some objections
. Dowty does not provide us
with a characterization of the relation which holds between
inertia worlds and the actual one. For him the inertia
function is a primitive notion. He rejects Lewis'
similarity relation which was used in his counterfactual
analysis and which requires that the actual world be at
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least as similar to itself as to any other world. This of
course would lead him back to the imperfactive paradox. He
also rejects the notion of probability by which 'natural
course of events' may be defined. We can say by looking at
the past that a certain accomplishment or achievement was
occurring at the time, even though the probability of its
completion was very small.
At a certain point Dowty mentions that the beliefs of
the agent (in the case where the logical subject can be
thought of as an agent) may be involved in deciding what
worlds count as inertia worlds. However, he finally rejects
the Idea that the meaning of progressive sentences should be
a function of the speakers' or hearers' beliefs.
Some attempts were made to introduce the intentions of
the agent of a progressive sentence to bring about an
accomplishment as determining what worlds count as inertia
worlds. However, it is easy to show that such an intention
is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the
truth of all sentences in the progressive. Consider the
example suggested to me by Partee;
(18) John is building a perpetual motion machine.
Sentence (18) can not be true, although John has the
intention to build a perpetual motion machine. This shows
that the agent's intentions are not a sufficient condition
for the truth of progressive sentences. It also should be
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possible for the agent to fulfill his intentions. Given the
natural laws, there are no inertia worlds at which there
exists a perpetual motion machine. if the agent's
intentions were a sufficient condition for the truth of
progressive sentences, then John is building a could
be true even before he became physically involved in the
process associated with building houses, i.e when he merely
planned in his mind to build a house sometime in the
future. We do not want to accept such a consequence
especially since the case may be extended further by
allowing intentions to be random, or even subconscious. All
this suggests that the agent's intention is not a sufficient
condition for the truth of all sentences in the
progressive
.
The agent s intentions are also not a necessary
condition for the truth of all sentences in the
progressive. In
(19) The stone was rolling down the hill when
it exploded.
there are inertia worlds where the stone reached the bottom
of the hill although no intention is involved here. A
®^^ilar example involving a human agent was given by
Hinrichs (1983 ) ;
(20) The old composer was writing a symphony even
though he knew he would not finish it.
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Sentence (20) can be true although due to his imminent death
the composer might have no intention of finishing the
symphony. He can still be in the process of writing the
first movement, making (20) true.
There is another problem with the definition of the
progressive which reveals itself in when-clauses
. Consider
the following sentence:
(21) John was watching T.V when Bill entered the room.
If w^ is interpreted as suggested in Bennett and Partee
(there, p.31) as "at the time that" or "during the time
that" then sentence (21) entails that the time of John
watching T.V actually extended at least a few moments beyond
the time that Bill entered the room. This is so since the
time at which the truth of the progressive is evaluated, let
call It t, IS identical with the time of Bill's entering the
room, and since the progressive is evaluated with respect to
a bigger interval where John watched T.V is to be true.
According to Bennett and Partee ' s definition of the
progressive, sentence (22):
(22) John was watching T.V when he fell asleep.
entails that the period of John's watching T.V extended
beyond the time of his falling asleep. This was noticed by
Dowty and avoided by him in his analysis of the progressive,
where he only required that it was possible for John's
activity to continue beyond the time specified by the
when
-clause
.
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A genuine
of when
-clause
R
sentence
;
difficulty for Dowty which arises in the case
IS the following. Consider again the
ft?uck! street when he was hit by
If the w^-clause event and the main-clause event occur at
the same time, then the event of John being hit by a truck
falls within the interval I in Dowty 's definition at which
the progressive operator is to be interpreted for the
main-clause. Since inertia worlds are identical to the
actual world up to the point of evaluation, then every
inertia world defined at I will contain the fact that John
is hit by a truck at I . it follows from this that there are
no inertia worlds where
^
is true. We want to fix the point
of evaluation in a way that would not include the moment he
was hit by a truck.
To conclude, there are two puzzles still left
unresolved in the temporal-modal treatment of the
progressive: the first concerns the nature of the inertia
function (or the accessibility relation) so crucial in the
solution of the imperfective paradox and the second concerns
fixing the time of evaluation of the progressive in
when-clauses
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a2"-r°P°l°qical Truth ConHi. jons for th.
^ ^ * Vlach
' s Suggestion
Vlach (1981) claims that any correct truth condition
for the progressive operator applied to accomplishment and
achievement sentences must be non-topological
. By this he
means that the set of instants at which Prog[/] is true can
not be a function of the set of instants and intervals at
which f is true. The definitions of Montague, Bennett and
Partee are topological in this sense. Dowty's definition is
not purely topological because of his introduction of
possible worlds, but in the cases where j in Prog[j<] is true
in the actual world, it is topological as well.
Vlach introduces a counterexample which applies to all
the previous definitions of the progressive. Consider the
following sentences:
(a) Max dies.
(b) Max's life ends.
(c) Max is dying.
(d) Max's life is ending.
Furthermore, suppose that a bus is about to hit Max. In that
case we say that (d) is true and (c) is false. However,
according to the topologically specified truth conditions
for the progressive, since both achievements die and ends
one's life have the same extension, and Prog[/] at t or I is
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defined in terms of / at some interval containing t or I
sentence (c) and (d) can not have different truth
conditions
.
Vlach suggests that John's life can be in the process
Of ending without John being in the process of dying. The
idea is that the process of dying is specifically
biological, while the process of ending one's life is more
general. Thus, while (a) and (b) are true at the same
moments, (d) can be true in circumstances where (c) is
false, e.g. in the case where the truck is approaching
John, but has not yet hit him.
What Vlach is pointing out is that the truth of Prog[
for achievements and accomplishments is not exclusively
depended on the truth of i but on the process that must be
going on in order to make the progressive of a sentence
true
.
The process that must be going on to make the
progressive of a sentence
^
true is always a process that is
connected with the truth of jz(. if jzf is a process sentence,
then the process that goes on when the progressive of ^ is
true is the same one that goes on when
^
is true. If
^
is
an accomplishment or achievement sentence, then the process
that goes on when the progressive of
^
is true, is the one
that will lead, if continued, to the truth of .
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^•2* Bennett's Suggestion
Bennett (1981) distinguishes between closed and open
intervals. Occurences of processes (activities) are
represented by Bennett by open intervals and occurences of
accomplishments (performances in his terms) lilce John builds
a_house are represented by a union of closed intervals.
Sentences can be evaluated with respect to unions of
intervals, not just intervals. The closed intervals in (24)
represent period of worlc and the gaps represent rest. John
starts building a house at t^ and finishes it at t^. At t
he is building a house but not at t^.
(24)
^1 ^2 I3
[_ 4._]
^1 ^2 ^3 ^4
However, John build a house is not true merely with respect
to I2.^l2^^3* sentence is not true at any other closed
point sets. However, it is true at the open subintervals of
^l'^2'^3' analysis retains an open subinterval
condition on accomplishment sentences. If an accomplishment
sentence is true at a union of closed intervals, then it is
true at every open, connected subinterval of that union.
Bennett defines the truth of a progressive sentence in
the following way;
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(25) Prog /is true at a union of intervals A
1 moment of time, and there existsa union of intervals A' such that « is oconnected interval, A S.A', and / is true at
IS an pen,
A'
.
In this way, John is building a house is true at t^ because
there are open intervals A' (for instance the interior of
I
2 ) at which John build a house is true. The fact that John
build a house is true at the open subintervals of
does not affect the truth of non-progressive sentences,
since in the recursive truth definition, these are always
evaluated with respect to closed point sets.
Bennett exploits the distinction between closed and
open sets to solve the imperfective paradox. The truth of a
sentence in the progressive depends on the tenseless
sentence being true at an open interval. The truth of a
simple tense sentence on the tenseless sentence being true
at a closed interval. This allows Bennett to represent an
incomplete building of a house in the following way:
(26)
I
1
[
I
2 I 3
)
As before we stipulate that the tenseless sentence John
build a house is true at every open subinterval of
However, in this case there is no closed union of intervals
at which John build a house is true.
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Bennett s definition of the progressive is
compositional like that of Montague's, Bennett and Partee's
and Dowry's. In a certain sense his analysis is similar to
Vlach's. There is a single basic notion of truth with
respect to an interval, but there are two kinds of
intervals- open ones and closed ones, viach did not
distinguish between two kinds of intervals but had two
components in the lexical meaning of the verb- an event and
a process part. According to viach the process part of the
meaning of the verb can be true at an interval although the
event part of the meaning is false for that interval. For
Bennett, a basic sentence would be true with respect to the
open interval and false with respect to the closed one.
Thus, although Bennett's analysis is compositional it shares
some features with Vlach's and hence is exposed to the same
objection. The basic lexical meaning of a verb encodes the
same information in the two proposals.
^ ^ * Some Difficulties with Non-Topoloqical Truth
Conditions for the Progressive
As we have said, under Vlach's approach the lexical
meaning of the verb has two components- an event and a
process, and the progressive is defined in terms of the
process component of the lexical meaning. In the
traditional approach the lexical entry of the verb does not
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have two components and that is why the progressive of a
sentence with an accomplishment is defined in terms of the
truth of the event sentence.
Neither Vlach nor Bennett specifies or formalizes the
link between the meaning of the accomplishment/achievement
verb and the meaning of the activity (process) corresponding
to them- a link which has been incorporated into their
analysis of the progressive. Consider the following
sentence suggested by Dowty:
(27) John was making Bill a millionaire.
There are many ways in which John can accomplish making Bill
a millionaire. John might be about to die leaving his
millions to Bill, he might be gambling, he might be stealing
money or looking for an hidden treasure- all these
activities have no necessary link to the accomplishment of
making someone a millionaire. Each of these activities
viewed independently of the context in which (27) is uttered
and of the meaning of the accomplishment VP make one a
does not guarantee John's possession at some
point in time of millions of dollars.
The meaning of the above accomplishment (in addition to
the context) tells us what the possible associated
activities are which may lead to its fulfillment. There is
no single activity connected with the meaning of the
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accomplishment, viach's definition of the progressive can
not explain how speakers have learned the meaning of (27).
1 find another difficulty with the non-topological
approach. Consider the following sentence:
(28) John is polishing every boot.
Sentence (28) is ambiguous. When the universal quantifier
has a wide scope over the progressive, sentence (28) says
that John is polishing every boot at the same instant. To
get the possibly sequential reading the quantifier every
boot must be in the scope of the progressive operator.
We can establish the truth value of John loves every
— know the extension of love
, which is a
relation. Consider now the sequential reading of Prog
(
John
polish every boot ). it is not apparent that the process
part of the meaning of polish every boot can be derived from
the basic lexical meaning of polish (even if we include the
process part of the basic lexical meaning). it seems that
Vlach's theory handles cases of the progressive of atomic
formulas, but not of complex ones. One way to circumvent
this problem is to say that the process part of the verb is
intensional in the object position. If we apply the process
part of the meaning of polish to the generalized quantifier
which is the meaning of every boot
,
then we get the process
part of the meaning of polish every boot
,
as desired. But
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then we will have to say that the process version of any
accomplishment and achievement verb is intensional. m PTQ
all verbs are treated as intensional in the grammar and
extensional transitive verbs are governed by meaning
postulates, it seems perfectly possible to limit the
extensionality meaning postulates to the event part of the
meaning of a verb. Thus my objection to Vlach's proposal
may not be insurmaountable
.
Another example which may be raised is that mentioned
by Parsons (1983) as a possible objection to his analysis.
If Mary is building a house then her building event has an
object which is a house and so there is a house that she is
building. Let us suppose Mary dies when the house is only
one fifth finished. Some might claim there is no house
since an unfinished house is not a house. The
question is: how much of a house needs to be built before
the agent's activity is described as one of building a
house? In other words
^ when do we say that a certain
activity which goes on is an activity of a certain kind if
it is not the output of the process which determines this?
(This is of course problematic only for the progressive of
accomplishments and some achievements )
.
o
Aqvist's example mentioned by Parsons (1983) raises a
similar point, consider:
(29) Mary is drawing a circle.
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If Mary ia interrupted, then no circle gets completed. Many
wrll insist that an incomplete circle is no circle at all
but an arc with constant curvature. There is a present
object of Marys activity, but it is not clear which object
exactly it is. There is no single way to describe the
activity she is involved in: is it the drawing of a circle
or the drawing of an arc? Such cases lead us to agree that
the progressive is dependent on the meaning of the atomic
sentence
.
3 . A New Proposal
3 • 1 • The Vagueness of the Progressive
Angelika Kratzer (1977) offered an analysis of mu^ and
within the framework of possible world semantics. A
similar idea to that which she employed in her analysis of
modal verbs may be employed in the treatment of the
progressive. My suggestion is in line with that of Dowty's
i.e, treating the progressive as a modal-temporal operator,
but abandons the notion that there is a single primitive
inertia function, which I have shown in 1.3.2. to be
unsatisfactory
.
Kratzer claimed that different notions of must and can
are involved in sentences in which these words are uttered.
She gives the following example to demonstrate it;
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(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
All Maori children must learn the
ancestors
.
name of their
">“st havefrom Tahiti.
If you must sneeze, at least use yourhandkerchief. ^
arrived
said
.Rakaipaka must be the chief. ^
The mu^ in sentence (30) is a deontic one which refers to a
duty, the mu^ in sentence (31) is an epistemic one, that in
sentence (32) a dispositional one and the must involved in
(33) IS what IS often called a preferential must which
refers to wishes and preferences. Kratzer paraphrases
(30)-(33) to illustrate what is meant by must in the
utterances of these sentences
:
(30') In view of what their tribal duties are,
the Maoris children must learn the names of
their ancestors.
(31') In view of what is known, the ancestors of
the Maoris must have arrived from Tahiti.
(32') If In view of what your dispositions are-
you must sneeze, at least use your handkerchief.
(33 ) When Kahukura—nui died, the people of Kahunguru
said : In view of what is good for us Rakaipaka
must be our chief.
The suggestion is to treat must as a relative modal phrase
must in view of which has two arguments; a phrase like "what
is known" and a sentence. The first argument which is
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provided by phrases liKe "what is known" or "what is good
for us IS very often missing in our use of English, as can
be seen from the examples (30)- (33). it is the context of
utterance which provides a deontic argument when uttering
(30), an epistemic argument when uttering (31), etc. It
follows from this that it is not must which has different
meanings but the missing argument whose presence was felt in
all the occurences of the verb must.
After making these observations Kratzer describes how
and can should be treated within a framework of
possible world semantics. The meaning of the phrase "what
IS known" is that function from the set of possible worlds
into the set of all propositions which assigns to each
possible world the set of propositions which are known in
that world. in general, the first argument of the modal
will be a function f from worlds to sets of propositions.
The meaning of must in view of (lets call it Must ) is a
function which assigns a proposition to a pair consisting of
a function like f and a proposition p. Must assigns to the
pair consisting of f and p that proposition which is true in
exactly these possible worlds w where p follows logically
from the set of propositions which f assigns to w.
To make it more clear, I state her suggestion by using
lambda-operators. Where w is a set of worlds, f a function
from a set of possible worlds to the set of sets of
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propositions, then must In view of ( Must ) is defined as
follows
:
(34)
Must(f,p)= ;^„[p follows from f(w)l
(which is a characteristic function of a set of worlds,
i.e. a proposition). Let us illustrate the definition for
sentence (31). where f is as before (a function from a set
possible worlds to the set of sets of propositions which
assigns to each possible world the set of propositions which
— *^hat world.) and p is the proposition [ The
ancestors of the Maoris arrived from Tahiti I-. (The latter
abbreviates the denotation of The ancestors of the Manr)s
arrived from Tahiti
. Known' is a relation between
propositions and worlds and Known' (q,w) means that q is
known in w)
(35) Must [iv ^q[ Known
' (q,v) ] , [ Ancestors of the
Maoris have arrived from Tahiti )
' ]
=
^ ^ [[ Ancestors of the Maoris have arrived
from Tahiti ]
' follows from
( V ^q [Known ' (q,v) ] (w))]
and by ^-conversion:
(36) ^w [[ Ancestors of the Maoris have arrived from
Tahiti ] ' follows from ^ q[Known ' (q/w) ]|
The same idea can be developed in our analysis of the
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progressive
.
. Let's repeat Dowty's definition:
t <I,w> iff for some interval
and I is not a final
f and for all w' such that
The inertia function in Dowty's definition is a constant
one, a primitive function. Dowty did not characterize the
nature of that function (or in Lewis' terms the
"accessibility relation") which selects the inertia worlds.
In 1.3.2. I introduced different notions which seem to be
involved in determining inertia worlds which are like the
actual one up to a certain time, and differ afterwards. l
mentioned the possibilities where the selected inertia
worlds are determined by the agent's intention, the
similarity relation, physical laws etc, and have claimed
that no single one of these is satisfactory or can be
regarded as a necessary or sufficient condition for the
truth of progressive sentences. The difficulty arose
because we wanted to pick up one of these notions in order
to describe the nature of the inertia function taken as a
constant, and none of them was satisfactory when taken in
isolation. However, it seems that all these notions (and
maybe others) are involved in the truth conditions for the
progressive and the following examples demonstrate it;
(38) Given his intentions, John was going to Boston
when he was hit by the truck.
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(39) Given the laws of motion, John's
ending when God rescued him.
life was
(40) Given the legal practices in the countrv Tnhn
In (38) It IS John's intentions which determine the inertia
worlds where the progressive is evaluated. in these worlds
John went to Boston although in the actual world he was hit
by a truck. in the case of sentence (39), assume it is
uttered in the case where a truck is about to hit John when
God's hand appears out of the darkness and snatches him
away. m this case the inertia worlds which are picked up
are determined solely by physical laws (we assume God stays
outside physics) and in these worlds John dies although in
the actual world God rescues him. For example (40), let
John be Rockefeller's son. A certain organization is
interested in sullying John's name by accusing him with the
murder of a communist. His enemies supply the court with
convincing false evidence by which the law should have found
him guilty. The inertia worlds selected here are these in
which the courts operate in the way they usually do and John
is framed for murder. in the real world his rich father.
Rockefeller, bribes the judge and saves him.^
The fact that we can utter sentences like (38)-(40) and
many others with Given x
, and the progressive and these
sentences can have an imperfective reading, suggests that in
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the meaning of the progressive there is a free variable over
sets Of worlds which is determined by the context. m Dowty
the function from indices (worlds and times) to propositions
is a constant; we want it to be a free variable over worlds
Which receives a value by a context. Sometimes the context
selects the inertia worlds which are the agent's intentions,
sometimes the inertia worlds are determined by physical laws
etc. Kratzer argued that the first argument of Mu^ i.e,
the function f, is often misssing in must - sentences and is
determined by the context, and the same is true in the use
of progressive sentences where the phrase Given x is often
missing and is covered by context. The notion of necessity
is involved in both Kratzer 's and my suggestion. This
suggests that the appeal to a contextually specified notion
of inertia world may not be unprincipled: the contextual
delimitation of the domain of the quantification over worlds
induced by a natural language expression of necessity may be
a general phenomenon."^
Ed Gettier has suggested (personal communication)
another argument which can be used against Dowty 's idea of a
single primitive inertia function in his definition of the
progressive, and which supports my own theory of the
vagueness of the progressive. The VPs cross the street and
walk to one 's own death are both accomplishments. Let us
assume John was hit by a car at 12 o'clock. The sentences
(41) John was crossing the street.
(42) John was walking to his death.
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are both true at 11:59. This can not be the case if „e have
a single inertia function since in all inertia worlds at
which John died he did not cross the street and in all
inertia worlds at which he crossed the street he did not
die. Since at 11:59 both sentences (41) and (42) are true,
a modal treatment of the progressive which employs the
notion of a single inertia function malces the wrong
prediction in this case. However, under my own treatment of
the progressive both (41) and (42) can be true at the same
time since the corresponding simple tense sentences are
evaluated with respect to different classes of inertia
worlds. The inertia worlds relevant for the truth of ( 41 )
are those in which John's intentions are fulfilled and those
relevant for the truth of (42) are those where physical laws
hold.
Gettier has also suggested that in my analysis of the
progressive a problem may arise when trying to account for
the truth of sentences like (19) repeated below;
(19) The stone was rolling down the hill when
it exploded.
Since the stone does not have intentions it is not clear
what are the inertia worlds which account for the truth of
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(19). The laws of nature are those which enable the stone to
reach the bottom of the hill and those which enable it to
explode. So, we can not pick the laws of nature as those
Which determine the inertia worlds at which the stone
reached the bottom of the hill. One way to avoid this
difficulty is by restricting the set of natural laws to
subsets like the laws of motion, law of genetics,
hydrostatics, chemistry, etc. it is the inertia worlds at
which the laws of motion hold but not chemistry, which are
responsible for the truth of (19). But consider the
following example
(43) The wheel was rolling across the road when it
was knocked over by the falling rock.
The rolling of the wheel and the falling of the rock are
both governed by the laws of motion, so we can not pick a
notion of inertia that contains one but not the other.
Michael Jubien has suggested (personal communication)
an example in which the progressive is used to report that
somebody is engaged in a certain activity and has nothing to
do with modality. Someone can describe a section of a
baseball game he has been watching as follows:
(44) Smith was pitching a no hitter, when John
tripled to left.
It is not Smith's intentions or physical laws which are
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relevant for the truth of (44) but a sequence of structured
activities which constitute pitching a no hitter in a
baseball game. One may object to this example by claiming
that pitch a no hitter is a process verb rather than an
accomplishment, so (44) can not be taken as a case that the
modal treatment of the progressive can not handle. But if
Eitch a no hitter is a process verb like run, then we could
have used (46) as well as (45) to report;
(45) I saw Smith run yesterday.
(46) I saw Smith pitch a no hitter yesterday.
but (46) is not true in a case where Smith did not finish
pitching a no hitter. So this example raises a difficulty
for my treatment of the progressive as well as for Dowty's.
3*2. When-Clauses and the Imperfective Paradox
One of the objections raised in section 1.3.2. against
Dowty's definition of the progressive was the claim that if
the interval at which the main—clause sentence is evaluated
is the same as that at which the sentence in the when-clause
iS/ then the event of John being hit by a truck described in
sentence ( 23 )
:
(23) John was crossing the street when he was hit
by a truck.
falls within the interval I at which the progressive main
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sentence is evaluated, and therefore in every inertia world
hich IS exactly like the actual world up to and including
I) John was hit by a truck, it follows from this that there
are no inertia worlds where John crossed the street is true
and therefore, contrary to our intuition, sentence (23) is
false
.
Hinrichs (1981) suggested a treatment of tenses,
adverbs and temporal anaphora in sentences with before
and af^-clauses which was pursued in the framework of
Kamp's discourse representation structures. Hinrichs
focused on temporal structures of past tense narrative
discourse and like Kamp (1981b) and Bach (1980; 1981) took
events, processes and states (which Bach gave the generic
term "eventualities") and the relations of precedence and
overlap between them as primitive, rather than moments or
intervals of times. in the heart of his treatment of
temporal anaphora lies Reichenbach
' s notion of reference
time, which Hinrichs extended into a formal semantics
framework. Partee has pointed out (1984) that the theory of
discourse representation which has provided a unified
treatment of pronouns and the approach which takes
eventualities rather than times as basic together with the
notion of reference time can explain to a greater extent the
analogies between nominal and temporal anaphora noticed by
her in an earlier paper (1973). In that paper Partee
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observed that tenses (which involve several categories of
expressions like tenses. adverbials and adverbial clauses).
like pronouns, are anaphoric and can have either a
inguistic or a non-linguistic antecedent. The tense
morpheme was treated by her in that paper as a pronoun-lihe
variable over time. Partee later observed (1984) that this
can be carried out more elegantly by using reference times
which do not correspond to any constituent in the sentence
but are part of a necessary context for interpreting tensed
sentences. In the same paper she presents the general
approach taken by Hinrichs in his treatment of temporal
structures for a fragment of English and further extends
it. We will summarize below the main features of Hinrichs'
and of Partee 's treatments in order to pursue the issue of
temporal reference in when
-clauses like (23).
In Kamp's theory (1981a), discourse representation
structures are descriptions of partial models and are true
with respect to a complete model if they are embeddable in
it (embeddability plays in his theory the same role that
satisfaction does in predicate logic). in Kamp's account of
nominal reference each occurence of a proper name or an
indefinite noun phraze introduces a new element into the
discourse representation, while pronouns refer to elements
already introduced. Discourse representations can be used
in a similar way to describe temporal reference as suggested
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by Kamp (1981b) and Hinriohs (1981). m the following little
narrative taJcen from Hinriohs and given in Partee (1984 ),
(47) Jameson entered the room, shut the door carefully
1
and switched off the light
It was pitch dark around him,
because the Venetian blinds were closed
the clauses labled e^^-e
3
describe events (e^ is the event of
Jameson entering the room) while s^-s^ describe states. It
was observed that an event sentence moves the action
forwards in time while a state sentence describes how things
are at the time of the last mentioned event. Partee
represents the discourse representation (47) in the box
given below by using "<" for the relation of complete
precedence, "0" for overlapping, "9." for the relation of
temporal inclusion, and r^ for the speech time. There is a
past reference time which is specified at the begining of
the discourse and is moved forwards with the introduction of
each new event-sentence. Each new past tense event occurs
within the then-current reference time and causes the
reference time to be shifted to a new reference time which
follows the just introduced event (In Partee ' s discourse
representation structures given below r^ is the past
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reference time, the present reference time and r^, r^, r
3are the “updated" reference times introduced between and
r^). States and processes include the current reference
time but need not overlap the event that led to the
introduction of that reference time.
Partee represents (47) in a discourse representation
box following Kamp (ms. 1981b)
(47 '
In the discourse representation (47') e^ is the event-toJcen
of the event type given in the box following it. As a
consequence of the ordering specifications s^ and s^ must
both overlap some time "just after" e^ (this is Partee 's
term, and will be explicated later) and may but need not
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overlap itself.
To conclude, a single sentence is interpreted with
respect to a reference time, if it is a state or a process
sentence the state or process must hold or go on at the
current reference time; when it is an event sentence, the
event occurs within the then-occuring reference time while a
new reference time following it is introduced.
Hinrichs assigns different roles to the main and
subordinate clauses with respect to the dynamic of reference
time. Suppose we interpret a simple past tense narrative
where the past reference time is r^ and the next sentence
begins with a wh^-clause. The when-olause introduces a new
reference time r^ which follows r^ and the main-clause is
interpreted with respect to r^. To demonstrate how
reference time is triggered in when-clauses under Hinrichs'
treatment Partee suggested the following little discourse:
( 48 ) Mary turned the corner. When John saw her.
she crossed the street,
e..
and extracts from it the following temporal conditions of
discourse representation structures (where circles represent
inclusion i.e e^or^, S2Cr2, e3cr2)
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(48') r j.©^ * < /^< '3 <»»
Hinriohs does not impose any relative ordering on the events
in the when and main-clauses and gives examples in which the
event in the main-clause does not follow that in the
w^-clause. In example (49) both events can happen at the
same time and in (50) the event in the when-clause follows
that in the main-clause (both examples are Hinrichs',
adjusted by Partee to keep the surface order of the clauses
constant )
;
(49) When John wrecked the Pinto, he broke his arm.
(50) When the Smith threw a party, they invited alltheir friends.
Partee distinguishes between the temporal relation "just
after" represented by "^" and the relation of precedence
represented by The reference time introduced by an
event sentence is located "just after" the event (According
to Partee a newly introduced reference time is definite if
it is "just after" some uniquely specified event, and
indefinite when it is after, before, or within some given
event or "just after" an event not specified uniquely).
only requires that the reference time be put within
or surrounding the when-clause in stative or eventive
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sentences. The "just after" relation introduced by Partee
represented in the temporal condition (48'') of the
discourse representation structure of ( 48 );
(48 " )
now
The main difference between her treatment of when-clauses
and Hinrichs' is in how the when
-clause characterizes the
new reference time introduced by it. Partee says that the
primary function of a v^-clause in simple linear narrative
IS to provide a new reference time for the main-clause, and
the event described in the when-clause does not have to
occur within the then-current reference time. This is
consistent with the temporal condition conveyed in (48'')
where introduces the new reference time r^, but does not
occur within it, nor within r^^. She provides the following
example to account for the role when
-clauses play in linear
discourse in the introduction of a new reference time;
(51) People began to leave. The room was empty.
0-1 S1
The janitor came in.
^2
(^2) People began to leave. When the room was empty,
o T e1 2
the janitor came in.
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Discourse ( 51 ) is anomalous
of the room being empty
after people began to leave
because the state described by
is not expected to hold just
t and since s^^ can not move the
action forwards, The janitor ca.. in can not be interpreted
with respect to a time after people began to leave, and just
after the room was empty. Such a problem does not arise in
the case of discourse (52) since the when-clause (which is
an inchoative and not a stative sentence) introduces a later
reference time (and the event it describes is not within any
previous reference time). So the janitor is understood to
come in after people began to leave and just after the room
was empty.
Partee has also provided examples with before and after
which show that as with when
-clauses the subordinate clause
IS always processed before the main-clause and interpreted
with respect to the main clause introduced by it.
So far examples have been given of the three possible
temporal conditions which govern discourse representation
structures of narratives with when
-clauses
. These three
possibilities are listed in cases (a)-(c):
(a) The when
-event and the main-clause event
can occur at the same time, as is the case in
example (49).
(b) The event in the main-clause is just after the
event in the when-clause as in example (48)
(The "just after" relation may also distinguish
between the ordering of events in when and
after-clauses )
.
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(c) The event in the when-clause is just after the
Case (b) is the only one handled by Partee and case (c) is
disallowed by her scheme. Sentences (53)- (54) are examples
of case (a) where the events in the two clauses occurred at
the same time
:
(53) When John became chairman of the board, Marybecame president.
(54) When the pressure of the gas rose, the
temperature increased.
The same temporal relations hold when the main-clause comes
before the when-clause in the linear order of the discourse:
(55) John broke his arm, when he wrecked his Pinto.
(56) Mary became president, when John became
chairman of the board.
(57) The temperature increaesed, when the
pressure of the gas rose.
At the begining of this section we have said that if the
temporal relation between the two clauses are as stated in
case (a), then Dowty's analysis of the progressive, an
extended version of which was adopted by us, is
Problematic. In evaluating the truth of sentence (23) every
inertia world includes the fact that John was hit by a
truck, so it is not true in any of them that he crossed the
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street and thus, contrary to our Intuition, sentence (23)
should be false.
Simple past tense discourse in which the ordering of
events is as described in case (b), i.e the event in the
main-clause comes just after that of the when-clause, is the
most common one among the three possible temporal relations
among events described in (a)-(c). As we have already
mentioned, Partee handled only case (b). However this
relation can not hold between a when
-clause in the
progressive and a main-clause in sentences like (23) which
demonstrate the imperfective paradox. This is so since it
implies that first John was hit by the truck and only just
after that event occurred was he crossing the street. A
progressive sentence is stative. We said before that a
state described by a stative sentence must overlap some time
just after the event in the when
-clause and may but need not
overlap that event. In sentences involving the imperfective
paradox we must require that the state described by the
progressive main-clause should never overlap the event in
the v^en
-clause. As we said before, in the case of sentence
(23) it can not follow that event.
Partee does not discuss cases where in the linear order
of the discourse the main-clause precedes the when
-clause
and how this affects the dynamic of reference time and the
relative ordering of the events described in them. In
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sentences (23) the
the linear order,
the when
-clause doe
events. The same i
wh^-clause follows the main clause in
In examples (55)-(57) the postposing of
s not affect the relative ordering of the
s true of examples (59) and (61).
(58) When the room emptied, the janitor came in.
(59) The janitor came in, when the room emptied.
(60) When the janitor came in, the room emptied.
(61) The room emptied, when the janitor came in.
In (58)- (59) the janitor came in just after the room was
empty and in (60)-(61) just after the janitor came in the
room emptied (the later event must occur in a very short
time). Sentences (58) and (59) are paraphrases and so are
(60) and (61). in the same way the when
-clause can be
preposed in sentence (23) to yield (62), which is its
paraphrase
:
(62)
When John was hit by a truck, he was
crossing the street.
If the linear order of processing when
-clauses does not
affect the ordering of the events in the two clauses as is
the case in (55)-(57) and (58)-(59), and if Partee '
s
description of the ordering of events in when
-clauses (case
(b)) and the way reference time is triggered is correct, one
wonders how sentence (23) can be true given the modal
definition of the progressive.
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Examples of temporal relations as in case (c) where the
when-clause event follows the main-clause are quite rare.
However, this is exactly the event ordering which we want to
hold in example (23). John was crossing the street i, true
at an interval I iff m all worlds exactly like the actual
one up to and including 1 and in which the future course of
ents is that in which John's intentions are fulfilled,
John crossed the street is true. Since he was hit by a
truck some time after he was crossing the street, inertia
worlds need not include the fact that a truck prevented him
from completing his crossing.
The temporal relation described in (b) is the most
common in the progression of simple past when-clauses but is
the least plausible one to hold between a main-progressive
clause and a ^en-clause in sentences which demonstrate the
imperfective paradox. On the other hand the least common
ordering of events in simple past when
-clauses
. which was
described in (c), is the one which must hold in sentences
involving the imperfective paradox. We can not explain this
mystery but only point out that the theory provided for the
organization of time in when
-clauses in past simple tense
makes the wrong prediction for progressive sentences like
(23), which exhibit the imperfective paradox.
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FOOTNOTES
Montague's remark suggests idue to Dana Scott. that this analysis might be
Where ^
the case of process and inchoative process verbs!
world
'!rwh!ch"!oh!"s'!n!ent!on! arffuUi?f
^o^sibir^or To,:rp s iDie f John to be in Boston, i.e there nr.
!he!™ich f°'^'=^^rhich make it'imposs^w! !o! hL to be
me!t!^ned bef!r!?"johrL"b!!ld"''"" sentence (18),
intentions such as in examples ( 39 ) and ( 40 ).
^
^More work is required to determine what sorts offunctions can be specified by the context in the case of the
functions are good fordifferent operators like Must, Can, etc
CHAPTER IV
aspectual verbs and morphology- evidence from HEBREW
^pectual Verbs and Lexical Rules
^ ^ * Lexical vs. Syntactic Rules
In various places in the literature (Jackendoff 1975,
Aronoff 1976, Dowty 1978, 1979, and Bresnan 1978) it is
argued that the regularities among sets of morphologically
related words should be described by a set of rules distinct
from syntactic ones called "lexical rules". Lexical rules
are responsible for derivational morphology, zero
derivation, compound formation, etc. In the process of
derivational morphology, a word is prefixed or suffixed with
a new phonological component which does not constitute an
independent word, as in red-redden
. The process of zero
derivation changes a word's grammatical class and meaning,
but not Its form, as in the formation of the verb warm from
the adjective warm. In compound formation, two words are
concatenated to form a third word, as in pocket-money
.
Various facts concerning word formation have led
linguists to distinguish lexical rules from syntactic.
Certain linguistic phenomena which in traditional grammar
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were explained by word formation appear to be less
systematic than those which traditionally were treated
within the domain of syntax. Not all potential derived
words of a certain morphological pattern of a language are
actual words in that language. Consider for example
—-—den vs. bro^-*bro^ and beauty-beautif
y
vs.
ugl^-*uglify
, where * indicates a potential but not an
actual word of a language. A word marked by * must be
distinguished from an impossible derived word which does not
correspond to any existing morphological pattern, for
instance, r^-redm^. Unlike syntactic transformations, for
example wh-movement, the lexical rule which adds the
derivational affix ^ to an adjective is only partially
productive. Lexical rules are also not always
compositional- the meaning of a derived word can not always
be predicted from the meaning of its parts. This was
pointed out earlier in Chomsky's paper on nominalizations
(Chomsky, 1970). Dowty mentions the example of the suffix
a^: where V is a transitive verb, v-able usually means
'capable of being V-ed ' . Examples are washable
, bearable and
lovable. But changeable means 'capable of changing' rather
than 'capable of being changed' and readable means 'capable
of being read without undue effort' rather that 'capable of
being read'
.
This shows that besides being partially
productive, lexical rules are also not always regular in
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their semantics.
Dowty claims that partial productivity and semantic
unpredictability are the properties which distinguish
lexical from syntactic rules. He suggests that
morphological and syntactic operations should be regarded as
distinct classes, although they have the same form in the
grammar. m the context of this proposal he mentions
Partee's suggestion (1979) of reducing the number of
syntactic operations and replacing them with a set of
primitive operations such as concatenation, substitution for
a variable, etc. The composite syntactic operation of each
particular syntactic rule must be built up recursively from
the set of the primitive operations. Both morphological and
syntactic rules employ primitive operations. Unlike
syntactic operations, morphological ones always give a fixed
linear order of elements. Syntactic operations may
interrupt and rearrange constituents formed by other
syntactic operations but not by morphological ones.
Partial productivity and semantic unpredictability are
the criteria which distinguish lexical from syntactic rules,
but each of these two features may characterize a
morphological or a syntactic operation. Dowty gives the
formation of a verb adjective construction ( hammer flat ) as
an example of a lexical rule which employs a syntactic
operation. The verb-adjective construction is a
197
discontinuous constituent and as such is subject to a
syntactic operation, but since many verb-adjective
combinations are ruled out in English, this construction
must be derived by a lexical rule. The converse case is of
a syntactic rule which uses a morphological operation.
Inflectional morphology, which is highly productive and
semantically regular, provides such examples, as for
instance English past tense formation in which the suffix ed
is added to the verb.
From the viewpoint of semantic decomposition,
accomplishments, achievements and statives are related;
accomplishments contain a meaning component present in the
logical representation of achievements and the latter have a
meaning component present in the logical representation of
statives. This raises the question whether the semantic
relationships between these classes of verbs are reflected
in a different level of the language. Word-formation is the
domain which deals with the relationships between various
verbs and, as was mentioned before, morphological operations
can be used by either syntactic or lexical rules. if there
exist morphological operations which relate aspectual
classes of verbs, we will inquire to what degree they are
productive and semantically regular. And if lexical rather
than syntactic rules are responsible for the derivation of
diffsisrit aspectual classes of verbs, then their inclusion
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in a Montague Gra.^ar-like framework violates the notion of
a rule defined by such a framework whose rules are
compositional and productive.
Dowty derives different classes of aspectual verbs by
lexical rules which take the same form as syntactic ones.
His introduction of lexical rules to derive English
aspectual verbs suggests that their morphological
relationships are unsystematic and semantically irregular.
Adjectives are basic expressions from which inchoatives are
derived by adding the suffix en. Two lexical rules are
introduced to derive causatives (in addition to two rules
which derive factitives ) . The first lexical causative rule
IS a zero derivation of a causative-TV from an IV of the
same pattern, as in cool^^-cool^^ and red^^^-red^^^. The
second rule derives a causative from an adjective by
suffixing it with as in the pairs random-randomize and
real -realize
.
Morphology plays a marginal role in the formation of
English aspectual verbs. Most English causatives are basic
lexical items and the derived causatives constitute only a
small subset of the class of English causatives. (The rule
which derives English causatives from adjectives by
them with ize is much more productive than the one
which forms causatives by zero derivation.) Inchoatives
derived from adjectives by adding the suffix en are few in
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comparison to the number of English achievements. English
process verbs, «hich were analyzed in Dowry's aspectual
calculus as semantically complex, do not bear any
morphological relations to other words or other aspectual
verbs. These facts suggest that English morphology reflects
aspectual properties of verbs only to a limited extent.
The Hebrew system of morphological verb patterns called
"binyanim” interacts with aspectual properties of verbs in
an indirect way which may support Dowty's construction of
his aspectual calculus, discussed in chapters I and II. The
analysis of the interaction of Hebrew verb-pattern and
aspect will be postponed to section 2, after discussing the
issue of the status of lexical rules in a Montague
Grammar
-like framework.
Dowty presents a theory of lexical rules which have the
particular properties assigned to them by linguists and
which may exist within the framework of UG. A lexical
component W of a language L is formally defined as a
language independent of L (here a "language" is used in the
sense of the grammar and not the generated sentences),
although it has certain parts in common with L. W has its
own set of lexical rules and a set of basic expressions, the
same as that of L. Since not all possible derived words in W
are actual words in L, Dowty defines various kinds of
lexical extensions of L, relative to some lexical component
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w of L, which adds to it a new basic expression which is one
of the possible derived words specified by w. The new basic
expression added to L, which 1 will call E, was formerly a
derived expression in the lexical component W. if e were a
derived expression in L, it might have failed to satisfy the
requirements of compositionality and full productivity which
all rules in OG must satisfy. The introduction of a lexical
component and a lexical extension avoid this consequence.
I repeat Dowty's suggestion below to make it more
clear
:
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Table 6. Lexical Rules in a Montague Graimnar
The Language L
bl : a set of names of
syntactic categories
L2 : the set of basic
expressions of each
syntactic category.
L3 : the set of syntactic
rules
.
L1-L3 recursively determine
L4 which is the set of
well-formed expressions in
each category of L.
A Lexical Component
W of L
Wl: a set of names of
syntactic categories
of W (Wl )=(L1 )
.
W2 : a set of basic
expressions for each
category (W2)=(L2).
W3: a set of lexical
rules (W3 ) ^ (L3 )
.
W1-W3 recursively determine
W4 which is the set of
possible derived words of
L for each syntactic category.
The Interpretation of l
L5: the interpretation
of each basic
expression of L.
L6: an interpretation
rule corresponding
to each syntactic
rule in L3
.
L5-L6 recursively
determine L7 which is
an interpretation for
each of the well-formed
expressions in L4
.
The Interpretation of w
W5 : an interpretation
of each of the basic
expressions
.
W6; an interpretation
rule corresponding to
each lexical rule
in W3
.
W5-W6 recursively
determine W7 which is
the derivationally
predicted interpretation
of possible derived words
in W4
.
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transparent eKten.inn o. r i, ,
lexical extension of L in which (1) the new basic expression
added is one of the possible derived words of L according to
W and (2) the interpretation assigned to this new expression
in L' IS the interpretation given it by w.
^s^^a^tically non- transparent lexical ext^nc-ion
20i is a lexical extension of L meeting conditions (1 ) in
(A) but not condition (2).
Ln°n-derivational lexical extension of r. is ^
lexical extension of L meeting neither condition (1) nor
condition (2) in (A).
^ lexical semantic shift in an interpreted language L
IS an interpreted language L' exactly like L except that the
interpretation of some basic expression in L ' is different
from the interpretation of that expression in L.
A lexical semantic shift explains cases where the
speakers interpret correctly the meaning of a new derived
word through their knowledge of the lexical rule and later
on they learn its idiosyncratic meaning. The effect of this
process, which is a two-step one, is the same as that of a
semantically non-transparent lexical extension.
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Lexical Rules and the Hebrew Riny^.^-
We have said above that Hebrew morphology interacts
indirectly with aspectual properties of verbs in a more
productive way than English morphology does, and promised to
discuss this issue further. We think that this interaction
may be taken as evidence supporting Dowty's construction of
his aspectual calculus discussed in chpater I and Ii, where
it was shown how classes of verbs are derived from others by
means of semantic operators and logical connectives. 1 will
argue in section 2. that the semantic operators responsible
for the derivation of different aspectual classes of verbs
interact with the distribution of Hebrew verbs among the
morphological patterns called "binyanlm”. Since the
regulations which govern the distribution of verbs among the
binyanim have not been discussed yet in detail, we will
present that issue in this section.
We have already discussed the distinction between
lexical and syntactic rules, and between morphological and
syntactic operations. The survey given below of the
regulations characterizing the binyanim system suggests that
the latter are governed by lexical and not syntactic rules
and that the operations employed by the lexical rules are
morphological ones. Dowty's suggestion discussed above with
regard to the incorporation of lexical rules in a Montague
Grammar-like framework may be adopted as well for the Hebrew
204
binyanim system.
There are seven morphological verb patterns of
conjugation (binyanim) in Hebrew. A verbal root can be
realized in one or more of the seven morphological verb
patterns. The root p,M (historically p,<;,l) is used
traditionally as a prototype, where p stands for the first
the second and 1 the third. The stem forms of the seven
binyanim are
:
CaCaC
- pa'al
Ni+CCaC - nif'al
CiCaC
- pi'el
CuCaC
- pu'al
hit+CaCeC - hitpa'el
Hu+CCaC - huf'al
Adjectives and nouns follow other morphological
patterns (miskalim). There are more miskalim than binyanim.
Verbs can only be realized in one or more of the seven
binyanim.
Almost all traditional Hebrew linguists agree thatr to
some extent, the binyanim system predicts semantic and
syntactic relations of the root. The syntactic functions of
the binyanim are quite productive. The active/passive
relationships are very productive in the case of pi'el/pu'al
and hif'il/ huf'al but less so in the case of pa'al/
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nif'al. As far as transitivity is concerned, nifal and
hitpa'el are typically non-transitive: that is, they do not
take et NP is the definite direct object marker). Pi-el
and hifil are typically intransitive and pu'al is neutral
in this respect. The table below lists the independent
syntactic functions attributed to the binyanim in a typical
school of grammar^ (All verbs are represented in the third
person. masc. sing. past tense.)
Table 7. The Hebrew Binyanim (II)
name of Traditional
binyan syntactic function
Examples
pa'al unmarJced base form
nif'al passive of pa'al
pi 'el normally transitive
nislax 'was sent'
passive
of salax
sider 'arranged'
pu'al passive of pi 'el sudar 'was arranged
hitpa'el middle voice, normally hitlabes 'got dressedintransitive counterpart
of pi'el or pa'al.
hifil normally transitive hixtiv 'dictated'
huf ' al passive of hif'il huxtav 'was dictated'
The only significant change in the above traditional list is
the replacement of pa'al by pi'el as the productive unmarked
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form. There are many pi-el verbs which do not have pa'al
counterparts and are not derived from pa-al or any other
binyan. Perhaps the fact that pa-al is neutral with respect
to transitivity is responsible for this, in addition to
pa al s failure to accomodate quadriliterals and
quintiliterals.
Linguists usually agree that, to some extent,
meanings of the binyanim are productive in Hebrew,
following table illustrates the meanings common to
of verbs realized in each binyan. The most common
of each binyan is listed first.
special
The
a group
meaning
Table 8. The Hebrew Benyanim (III)
Name of
binyan
Meaning Example
nif 'al change of state nidlak
vs. dalak
'turn on'
( light . int
)
pi 'el intensified form
of pa'al
siber
' smashed
'
intensified form
of Savar
' break
'
hitpa ' el reflexive
inchoative
reciprocal
hitraxec
hitraxev
hitvakeax
'washed' (oneself'
'widened
'
( int
)
' argued
'
hif 'il causative
inchoative
higdil
hichiv
'enlarged' (tr)
'became yellow'
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Bolozky (1978) constructed tests which show that the
selection of the binyan a root is realized in is influenced
by phonological considerations. A root can not be realized
in a binyan if the resulting verb has an unpronounceable
consonant cluster. m this case the root is realized in the
banyan with the closest meaning in which the verb can be
pronounced. For example, a long noun like torpedo realized
in hif'il yields J^itprid which has an unpronounceable
cluster, so it is shifted to pi 'el to yield tirped
.
Realizations preserving the consonant cluster of original
nouns are preferred to these which "break" them. The verb
derived in productivity tests from the noun snob was
conjugated in hif'il hisnib instead of pi 'el sineb since the
former preserves the consonant cluster /sn/. Also, when a
slot is already occupied by a verb, the semantically closest
binyan is chosen.
Evidence is given below to show that the regularities
of the binyanim can not be captured by syntactic rules, but
at the same time one wants to represent them as part of the
speakers' knowledge of Hebrew.
The main observations that have been made of verb
pattern behaviour in Hebrew can be summarized in the
following six points:
1* P^^^tial productivity- Only a small percentage of
Hebrew roots occur in all seven binyanim. Schwarzwald
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(1975) found that only 2.3% of the roots occur in all seven
binyanim. SpeaJcers learn idiosyncratically which roots are
possible in which binyan.
2. Homonymy- since a number of roots are homonymous,
the realization of a phonological root in one conjugation is
unrelated semantically to the realization of the same
phonological root in another conjugation. 'ibek means
•dusted' and hib'abek means 'wrestled'; 'izen means
balanced' and he ' ezin means 'listened'.
Irregularity- Even among the non-homonymous
roots, one can find semantic irregularities. Many roots do
not receive the expected meaning of the binyan and their
meaning is learned independently. Geres means 'sent away'
and hitgares means 'divorced'. The latter verb takes the
unmarked feature of reciprocality from hitpa'el ('sent each
other away') but is more specific in meaning.
Several meanings- Most binyanim are connected with
several meanings. A verb in hitpa'el may have an
inchoative, reciprocal or reflexive meaning. The speaker
must learn which of these is related to a certain root.
5. Speakers' mistakes - Speakers shift verbs from their
original binyanim to other more 'appropriate' ones. Such
mistakes are ©specially common in language acquisition.
6. Recent innovation and potential words - Bolozky
(1982) has shown that assignment of recent and potential
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innovations to canonical morphological forms In the verb
system is essentially semantic.
The facts presented in (l)-(6) suggest that the
binyanim defy precise systematization, but that there exist
syntactic and semantic regularities among sets of
morphologically related words. These regularities should be
treated by lexical rules. Lexical rules reconcile failure
of productivity (case 1) and failure of semantic
compositionality (case 3) where the meaning of the word is
not determined by the meaning of its parts. On the other
hand, speakers' mistakes (case 5) and recent innovations in
addition to the cases where the meaning of the derived verb
IS predicted (case 6) suggest that to some extent the
binyanim are governed by semantic properties. The operation
employed by the Hebrew lexical rules are morphological and
not syntactic.
2. Aspectual Verbs and the Hebrew Binyanim
2 ^ * Deriving Inchoatives in Hebrew
Bolozky investigated Modern Hebrew verb formation
^t^^tegies and showed that assignment of recent and
potential innovations to the binyanim is essentially
semantic. in an earlier paper (1978), he suggested that the
distribution of verbs among the binyanim is based on the
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division between transitive and intransitive verbs and in a
(1982 ), he replaced this by a more complex system
which includes notions like 'agency,
'causation' and
activity to be discussed later. Bolozky claimed that
non-agentive verbs are normally realized in hitpa'el. m a
canonical pattern like hittCaCeC the root s,p,r 'cut hair'
is inserted to yield histaper 'cut one's hair' and s,m,r to
yield histamer. To support the claim that non-agentive verbs
are realized in hitpa'el he provided a list of recent Hebrew
innovations of verbs whi’r-h _ _ _ , .o nicn are non-agentive. The majority
of his examples repeated below are inchoatives:
(1) hit'azreax
hit
' axzev
hitparxeax
hitmaked
hitxatex
hitmames
hitrakez
hityaded
histavec
hitpancer
'became a citizen'
'became disappointed'
'became a hoodlum'
'became focused'
' became handsome
'
'became a reality'
' concentrated
'
'became friend'
'had a heart attack'
'failed because of mishap'
Bolozky also tested the productivity of formation of new
verbs from existing nouns and adjectives whether borrowed,
native, old or new. The nouns selected in the two tests he
constructed were triconsonantal (to avoid phonological
restrictions on the choice of binyan) and non-native (to
avoid clash with existing forms). In the first test the
subjects were asked to invoke active formation of
denominative verbs. The nouns were read aloud with their
211
paraphrased target meaning and the subjects were asked to
fill in their suggested realizations for corresponding verbs
in short sentences prepared in advance. For example, the
noun
-sheriff was read aloud and then its target
meaning
-he became a sheriff. The same method was used in
test II except that below each of the given sentences there
were a few alternative verbal realizations of the noun. The
noun and its target meanings were read aloud and the
subjects were asked to choose the one that best
characterized the given meaning and to fill it into the
given short sentence. l will list below only the
denominative verbs constructed from the nouns whose target
meaning was that of inchoation. Bolozky reports that the
preference to realize inchoatives in hitpa'el in
productivity tests was 100% :
(2) histaref 'became a sheriff-
hitvasel 'became a vassal'
histalen 'became an armchair revolutionary'
histnobeb 'became snobbish'
hitmarkses 'became a Marxist'
hitsmalcec 'became schmalzy'
Hitpa'el is the only non-passive binyan which is marked
exclusively as syntactic intransitive. Since inchoatives
are always syntactic intransitive, it is very likely that
they will be realized in hitpa'el. Inchoatives in hitp'ael
are derived from adjectives. For example:
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(3) Adjectives Inchoatives
'became cold'
'became warm'
'became wide'
'became red'
'became drunk'
'became short'
Hebrew adjectives follow certain morphological patterns (of
which there are a much greater number than for the verbs).
However, since in Dowry's English aspect calculus, which we
adopt for Hebrew, stative predicates (which adjectives form
most of them) constitute the basic expressions of the
language (i.e, they are not semantically derived), they need
no further consideration.
In chapter I we discussed three kinds of inchoatives-
absolute, vague and comparative inchoatives. Aspectually
there are two kinds of inchoatives in English and Hebrew-
event inchoatives and process ones. Absolute and vague
inchoatives are event type verbs, and process inchoatives,
which were claimed to derive from comparative inchoatives,
are processes. The verbs listed as vague inchoatives also
have the become-ad j-er reading. Both vague and comparative
inchoatives are event type verbs. Examples of absolute,
vague and process inchoatives are provided below (see the
discussion of these distinctions in chapter II, section 2.).
All three kinds of inchoatives are realized in hitpa'el.
Consider the following examples;
kar
' cold
'
hitkarer
xam 'warm hitxamem
raxav 'wide hitraxev
' adorn 'red' hit
' adem
sikor 'is drunk' histker
kacar
' short
'
hitkacer
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( 4 ) ^mple Inchoatives (Absn1in-o^
hitazre
' ax
hitpager
hitroken
a citizen' became
' die
'
'became empty'
( ^ ^ Vague Inchoative*
hitkacer
hit
' adem
hitxamem
hitkarer
hi^taker
hitmoses
' shortened
'
( int
'reddened' (int)
'warmed
' ( int
)
'cooled' (int)
' became drunk
'
'melted' (int)
( ^ ) Process Inchoatives
hitnaven
hitpateax
histaper
hitragel
histaxlel
histalhev
' decayed
'
'developed
'
' improved
'
'got used'
^became technically better andbecame more and more excited
'
better
'
The base form pa'al is neutral with respect to transitivity:
iasav
-set down' is an IV and 'ate' is a TV. Since the
verbs in pa'al are basic and not derived, they may exhibit
the different shades of meanings which govern the binyanim
system. Verbs of all aspectual classes may be found in
pa'al and among them inchoatives. Some examples of
inchoatives in pa'al are given below:
gavah 'became tali'
gadal ' grew
raza 'became thin'
kafa 'froze
'
( int
)
kaha 'darkened
'
( int
)
names 'melted
'
( int
)
xala 'became sick'
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A small class of color inchoatives are assigned to hif'ii;
(8) hichiv
horik
he
' edim
he ' efir
hisxir
hesxim
hivhir
hixxil
hilbin
'became yellow'
'became green'
'became red'
' became grey
'
'became black'
'became brown'
'became bright'
'became blue'
'became white'
Also to be found in hifil are a few human and physical
quality terms, for example:
(9) hifsir
hexmic
hismin
hivri
'
'melted
'
( int
)
'became sour'
'became fat'
'got healthy'
All the above verbs in hifil are ambigious between the
inchoative and causative reading as in the case of the
English verbs cool, etc. There may be a lexical
rule which derives color term inchoatives in hif'ii. This
rule does not derive all possible color inchoatives since
— 'became purple', *hixtim 'become orange', for
example, are not Hebrew words. There are no color term
inchoatives in any of the other binyanim except for hit 'adem
became red' in hitpa'el which has an equivalent hif'ii
counterpart; he 'edim. The question of whether color term
inchoatives are rule-governed or learned idiosyncratically
will be left open.
To conclude, the lexical rule which forms Hebrew
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inchoatives is highly productive. it takes an adjective and
inserts it in hitpa-el. Since lexical rules are not
systematic it is expected that a few inchoatives may be
found in other derived binyanim as is the case with color
inchoatives which come in hif'il.
The verb pattern hittCaCeC has two other meanings
beside that of inchoation: reflexivity and reciprocality.
Hebrew reflexives are formed in two ways- by adding the
reflexive pronoun 'myself, 'yourself, etc to a verb in one
of the transitive active binyanim, or by realizing the root
in hitpa el. Consider (et is the direct object marker and
acmo means "self"):
(10) jraxac et acmo
(hitraxec
Tcava' et acmo
(hictabea
'
Tserek et acmo
(histarek J
T'iper et acmoi
Ihit'aper >
'washed himself
'painted himself
'combed himself
'put on makeup'
The following verbs are examples of reciprocals in hitpa 'el:
(11) hitgarsu
hityadedu
hitpaysu
hitna^ku
histaxsexu
'(they) got divorced'
'(they) befriended'
'(they) made peace with each other'
'(they) kissed each other'
'(they) quarreled'
We see that the verb pattern hit+CaCeC shares several
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meanings- that of reflexivity, reciprocality and
inchoation. The verb hitxamem seems ambiguous between the
reflexive and the inchoative meaning (perhaps only a
vagueness rather than an ambiguity is involved here, and in
this case no difficulty arises). The verb in ha -is hHtvam.,.
—
hatanur "the man warmed himself next to the heater"
has the reflexive reading only since ha 'is ximem et
leyad hatanur "the man warmed himself next to the heater" is
acceptable, but not *ha'is na'asa voter xam leyad hatanur
"the man became warmer next to the heater". Hamarak
hitxamem al hagaz "the soup warmed on the gas" has the
inchoative reading since hamarak na'asa voter xam al haaax
"the soup became warmer on the gas" is acceptable, but not
^amarak ximem et acmo al hagaz "the soup warmed itself on
the gas". Since the translation rules which derive
reflexives and inchoatives are different, we end up with two
different expressions in the intensional logic. The
morphological operation which derives different kinds of
verbs may be the same as is the case with the formation of
Hebrew reflexives and reciprocals as long as their
translations are different.
As we illustrated above, process inchoatives as well as
simple and vague inchoatives are derived in hitpa'el. The
morphological operation takes an adjective and turns it into
a hitpa'el verb. The lexical inchoative rule is:
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<12) L„j^: If then (
=
4 ) g
where ^ conjugated in hitpa'el.
TWO translation rules are needed to derive the vague and
comparative inchoatives discussed in chapter I. The rule
which derives vague inchoatives says that if ,4 is an
adjective with translation o< then inchoative(< ) is a
verb with translation ^ x[become(cool
'
^ (x) ) ] . The rule which
derives comparative inchoatives states that if ^ is an
adjective with translation ' then inchoative «' ) is a verb
with translation ^ x 3c[become (cool
'
(x))].
The comparative translation rule and the vague one give
the same results for absolute (non-vague) adjectives like
fourlegged
. When oC is an absolute adjective then the
contextual parameter in the translation of vague inchoatives
does not affect interpretation. Since fourlegged is
non vague, (^c) (Vc ') [fourlegged '^=fourlegged
.
when an
absolute adjective appears in the translation of comparative
inchoatives we get: ]x 3c[Become ( fourlegged '^(x) ) J . By the
above generalization we can replace c by c' so
7x3c[Become(fourlegged'^,)J. since the existential
quantifier does not bind anything we can eliminate it and
end up with a translation of an absolute inchoative
^ x[become ( fourlegged
'
,{x))].
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^ 2 • Hebrew Causative Verbs
Hebrew derived causatives are formed in hif'il (60%)
and pi'el (40%). A verb in the base form pa'al is
causativized by being inserted in one of the two binyanim
according to certain regularities which will be discussed
below. Katav 'wrote' is causativized in hif'il to yield
hixtrv 'dictated', and lamad 'studied' is causativized in
pi'el to yield IJ^ 'taught'. Many of the pa'al verbs from
which the causatives are derived are no longer used in
Modern Hebrew and not all verbs in pa'al are
causativizable. As to semantic predictability, all derived
transitive verbs in hif'il are causatives except for the
small group of color term inchoatives mentioned before.
There are basic accomplishments in the basic binyan pa'al,
such as harag 'kill' bana 'built', xanak 'strangled', etc.
Some notions interact with causative verbs affecting
their distribution between the two causative binyanim.
Causatives may be divided into three classes:
(a) Causatives whose objects are agentive like hekim
'made stand up', he ' eziv 'made leave' and hitrim
'made contribute'.
(b) Causatives which aspectually are processes (CPV) like
holix 'made walk'
,
hikpic 'bounced' and gi Igel
'made roll '
.
(c) Causatives whose object is a patient which undergoes a
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change of state.
Causative process verbs (CPV) which belong to the second
class were discussed at length in chapter II, section 2.3.
In that chapter we also discussed Bolosky-s distinction
U983) between causative verbs with agentive objects (which
he calls "active verbs") and causatives with objects which
are patient and undergo a change of state ("non-active
verbs"). Tables 3 and 4 showing the distribution of active
and non-active causatives between hifil and pi 'el were
presented in chapter II, section 1.1. Bolozky claimed that
there is no restriction on the distribution of causatives
with patient objects but that there are no causatives with
agentive objects which are conjugated exclusively in pi 'el.
Many causatives with agentive objects are conjugated in
hif'il and some are formed in both binyanim.
Hif il has causative verbs with agentive objects as
well as causatives with patient objects that undergo a
change of state, like hilbin 'made become white', hikpi
'
'froze' (tr) and hikdir
' darkened '( tr ) . Pi 'el has causatives
with patient objects like kicer 'shortened', niven 'made
become decayed' and siper ' improved '( tr )
.
Bolozky (1982) has drawn another distinction between
which are causatives and verbs which are agentive.
Causative verbs are realized in hif'il, and to some extent
in pi 'el, and there exist transitive verbs which are
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agentive but not causative and these are realized in pi. el.
The subject of an agentive verb Initiates some activity with
regard to an entity and this is weaker than causing an
object to act or undergo a change of state. Bolozky does
not supply us with a definition of causation or initiation
which might point to the sense in which causative and
agentive verbs differ. However he offers lists of causative
and agentive verbs and these suggest there is a genuine
difference between the verbs in each category. Some of his
examples are listed below:
(13) Causative Verbs
in hif'il
(recent innovations)
Agentive Verbs
in pi'el
(recent innovations)
hitrim 'cause to
contribute
'
he'eziv 'made leave'
hidhir ' galloped
'
( tr
)
sigea 'made crazy'
gidel 'grew' (tr)
pinker 'cause a
mishap'
ixzev 'disappointed'
mikem 'put in place'
miked ' focused
'
sivek 'marketed
'
tiyek 'filed'
giSer
viset
' bridged
' regulated
'
biyel
kifter
' stamped
'
' buttoned
'
kitleg ' cataloged
The difference between the verbs in the two lists may be
informally stated as follows: the result state or effect of
most activities described by the causatives may exist
independently of the subject or causer of that activity. A
flower may grow by itself (notice you can not say 'the earth
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grew the flower- since it is thought of as growing by
itself; something like Dowty's causal factor is needed
here. See my discussion of this point in chapter II,
section 3.1.) Similarly, a person can be disappointed
without someone forcing him to that state; I may leave the
room without being forced to do so; or 1 may get crazy
without anyone driving me into that state of mind. The
result state of the activity described by an agentive verb
IS intrinsically related to the activity of the subject of
that verb- the result state can not exist independently of
the subject's activity which brings it about. The result
state is always specified in causatives, but not the
activity of their subject. On the other hand an envelope
can not be stamped by itself, a camera can not be focused
without somebody focusing it and documents are not filed by
themselves. Although the distinction I have drawn is stated
rather informally, I believe it captures a genuine
difference which exists between causative and agentive
verbs. Bolozky has shown the difference between them is
reflected in Hebrew morphology, since agentive verbs are
conjugated in pi -el while causatives tend to be conjugated
in hif'il.
The distinction made so far may be summarized as
follows
:
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hif ' il
pi 'el
causatives with agentive objects*
causatives with objects which
undergo a change of state
causative process verbs
agentive verbs
causatives with objects
which undergo a change
of state
( some causative verbs with agentive objects
hif 'il and pi 'el ) .
come in both
^cojnplishments. Causative s and Hebrew Morphology
In chapter ll, section 1.2. we discussed Dowty's
suggestion that accomplishment verbs be presented by a
bi-sentential CAUSE operator whose second clause is usually
a become-sentence. We have already seen that Hebrew
exhibits a highly productive rule for deriving inchoatives
and we shall investigate whether the same is true for
accomplishments. Since the latter are analyzed by a CAUSE
operator, the relationship they bear to causative verbs must
be examined carefully. Hebrew morphology may help us here.
Since it was assumed in traditional Hebrew grammar that
hif'il verbs are causatives (apart from a small group of
color term inchoatives )
,
we can ask whether verbs which
carry the hif il morphological pattern are accomplishments
• English does not have a unigue morphological
pattern to mark most of its causatives, so it is impossible
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to determine this issue in that language.
Pi 'el is the secondary causative binyan in Hebrew, but
since traditional Hebrew grammarians agree that not all of
its verbs are causatives, its morphological pattern alone
can not identify causative verbs for us and we must
establish an additional criterion for sorting "natural
causatives" in that binyan. The criterion established
should also be capable of identifying underived causatives
in the basic binyan pa'al such that we could ask with regard
to them whether they are also accomplishments.
Two issues need to be clarified: (1) Are Hebrew
binyanim sensitive to the aspectual property of being an
accomplishment, and (2) What evidence can Hebrew provide to
support the hypothesis that accomplishments should be
analyzed in terms of CAUSE?.
To answer this we must deal with two questions:
(a) Whether all Hebrew causatives are accomplishments,
and
(b) Whether all Hebrew transitive accomplishments are
causatives
.
The first question has already been answered neqatively
in chapter II, where causative process verbs (CPV) were
discussed. Hebrew CPV are conjugated in the causative
binyan hif 'il and aspectually are process verbs and not
accomplishments. A parallel example exists with process
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inchoative verbs which are formed in hitpa'el along with
simple and vague inchoatives. Although aspeotually those
verbs are processes and not achievements, they are formed in
hrtpa'el which is the main inchoative binyan. It is the
semantic operator Become, denoting change, which is present
in the logical representation of process inchoative verbs,
that determines their formation in hitpa'el, and in the same
way. It IS the semantic operator CAUSE and not the aspectual
property of being an accomplishment which determines the
formation of CPV in hif'il mvn-icrXII n r 11. This does not refute the claim
concerning the relationships between causation and
accomplishments and between change and achievements, but
only shows that Hebrew morphology is sensitive to the
semantic features of change and causation and not to the
aspectual properties connected with being an accomplishment
or an achievement.
Let us turn to the second question. Since traditional
grammarians agree that hifil verbs are causatives, we must
look for transitive accomplishment verbs in pi 'el and pa'al
which are not causatives. in several places we have claimed
that the state described in the result state clause of
causative verbs can exist independently of one of the
assumed unspecified activities in their first clause. A
natural causative of a language" will be defined as a verb
whose resultant" is expressed in that language by an
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adjective or verb morphologically as simple as or simpler
than the causative verb. If a pa'al or pi'el transitive
verb has a result state expressed as an adjective or verb
which is as simple as or simpler than the pi 'el or pa-al
verb, then that verb is a Hebrew causative, ximem 'warmed'
IS a pi 'el causative since its result state is expressed in
Hebrew as a morphologically simpler adjective xam 'warm' and
kicer 'shortened' is also a pi 'el causative since the
adjective kacar 'short' is morphologically simpler than the
verb. Accomplishments, on the other hand, will be defined
as non-subinterval verbs. If it took x n hours to V, where
V is an accomplishment, then it is not true that x V-ed in
any smaller interval than that of n hours duration. We will
look for Hebrew verbs which fail to satisfy the subinterval
condition and which do not have a result state expressed as
an adjective morphologically as simple as or simpler than
the verb.
The problem with the criterion above is that almost all
Hebrew transitive verbs have corresponding adjectives
expressing their result states. There are many
morphological patterns of Hebrew adjectives. Certain
adjectives, which may be considered the result states of
causatives, have the pattern of the passive binyan
corresponding to the active binyan in which the causatives
are conjugated. Biyel 'stamped' in pi 'el has its result
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state expressed in pu'al, (simple present tense) which is
the passive binyan of pi' el to yield mevuyal
-is stamped',
and similarly the result state of tiyek 'filed' is expressed
by metuyak 'is filed'. (The corresponding statives in
English are expressed by the present participle). it
appears that an adjective formed in a passive binyan of the
corresponding causative is morphologically more complicated
than the causative in the active binyan. If this is true,
then verbs with morphologically more complicated adjectives
are not natural causatives. All the verbs in pi 'el listed
in 2.2. which were called "agentive verbs" have result
states expressed as adjectives in their corresponding
passive binyan, and since those adjectives are
morphologically more complicated than the verbs, the latter
are not causatives according to our criterion. The verbs
:y^yek 'filed' and Myel 'stamped' are accomplishments, and
so are the agentive verbs in pi 'el tiyek 'filed', miked
focused', etc. if what we have said above is correct, then
we have examples of accomplishments which are not
causatives. According to our new criterion for defining
causatives, not all hif 'il verbs are causatives since the
result states of some of them are expressed in adjectives
formed in their corresponding passive binyan, for example,
hixtim 'stained'- muxtam 'is stained'; hivris ' brushed '-
muvras 'is brushed'.^
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Are there Hebrew accomplishments which lack
corresponding adjectives to express their possible result
states? The only example I am aware of is the VP laxac
22^ ’shook hands ’.3 laxac yadalm is an accomplishment
whose duration is very short. Also, the verb is formed in
the basic binyan pa'al. A slow motion movie in which a
shaking of hands is filmed consists of different sequential
hand gestures with the last gesture the shaking of
interlocked palms. Not until the last stage has been
reached, can it be said that the shaking of hands has
occurred. m this respect laxac yadalm is an
accomplishment, since it fails to satisfy the subinterval
condition. There is no Hebrew adjective morphologically
related to the accomplishment laxac vadaim- lexuc vadaim 'is
hands shaken' sounds peculiar in Hebrew. The function of the
custom of shaking hands in western society is that of
greeting, making acquaintance, congratulating, etc. You can
not say of someone whose hand you have shaken that he is
mevorax 'is greeted'. There are no Hebrew adjectives
expressing the result state of leaxel 'to congratulate' or
lehitvadea 'to make acquaintance'. Hebrew does not have a
result state adjective morphologically related to laxac
yadaim and there are no adjectives (morphologically
unrelated) which can be used to express the result state of
that accomplishment. So here we have a case of an
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accomplishment verb with no corresponding adjective
expressing its result state.
This IS a case where language and metaphysics
coincide. Why is not there a Hebrew adjective expressing
the state of having had one's hand shaken? There are Hebrew
adjectives expressing the state of being blessed (e.g., by
the pope) (mevorax) or being baptized ( mutbal ) . m the
religious sense, the result state of being baptized or being
blessed by the pope changes the state of the world, while
the result state of having had one's hand shaken does not
change the state of the world in any significant way. This
of course, can not be separated from our conceptual schemes,
beliefs and metaphysics which very often are reflected in
language. it seems to us more appropriate to include in our
ontology the states of being baptized or blessed than the
state of having had one's hand shaken. Perhaps this is why
Hebrew does not have an adjective to express such a state.
The fact that mevorax 'is blessed' and mutbal 'is baptized'
come in the passive binyanim huf'al and pu'al of the
causatives hitbil 'baptized' and berex 'blessed' (i.e are
more complicated morphologically) coincides with our
intuition that those verbs are "less natural causatives"
than he ' edim 'reddened', hirxi
v
'widened' or hismin
fattened
. The result states of the latter are expressed by
hsbrew adjectives simpler than the corresponding verbs
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'red', ra^ 'wide', Given our
conceptual schemes, physical states and human quality states
"exist" in our world. This has probably to do with the fact
that such states are expressed in Hebrew by adjectives which
are morphologically simpler than the related verbs.
Partee has brought to ray attention another interesting
fact. The VP's ^eak windows and shake hands can both be
modified with a by-phrase. Consider:
(14) John broke the window by hitting it with a book.
clasping it and moving
We have argued in chapter II, section 2.3. that what is
inside the phrase modifying a causative verb specifies
the activity of the subject of the causative, i.e the causee
of the result state. However, in sentence (15) the clasping
and moving of Bill's arm are not the causee of Bill's having
his hand shaken; they only constitute part of the
accomplishment of shaking his hand. in contrast, in ( 14 )
the hitting of the window with a book is what caused it to
break. m addition to the lack of an adjective expressing
the result state of the verb laxac yadaim 'shook hands',
what IS inside the scope of the ^-phrase that modifies the
VP is not a causee. laxac yadaim 'shook hands' is an
accomplishment which is not a causative.
What conclusion can be drawn from this discussion? The
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fact that we have found only one example of an Hebrew
transitive accomplishment which does not have an adjective
expressing its result state makes Dowty's analysis of
accomplishments as bi-sentential combined by CAUSE very
appealing. Hebrew accomplishments almost always have
adjectives expressing their result states and those
adjectives are embedded under a Become operator in the
second clause of the CAUSE operator. However, sometimes
those adjectives are morphologically more complicated than
the accomplishments whose result states they express (the
adjectives appear to be derived from the verb and not vice
versa) and in this respect they do not satisfy the
definition of natural causatives we provided. If we stick
to that definition then there are Hebrew accomplishments
which are not causatives and this can be taken as a
counterevidence to Dowty's hypothesis. On the other hand,
we may allow resultant" of causatives to be expressed in
adjectives morphologically more complex than the verbs they
are related to. The states expressed by those adjectives,
although derived from the verbs, are now part of the
ni^tsphysics of the language" and the adjectives express
"genuine" result states.
The Hebrew binyanim system derives causatives and not
accomplishments. But according to the about remarks about
Hebrew accomplishments and their result states, their
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analysis by a bl-sentential CAUSE operator whose second
clause expresses a result state which came into existence
an attractive prposal. This also explains why most
accomplishments are formed in hifil and pi 'el.
is
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FOOTNOTES
paper
The two lists provided are taken from Bolozky's 1978
criterion of defining causatives, so our claim thatmorphology is sensitive to causatives aL notaccomplishments is still valid.
3
Perhaps laxac yadaim is an idiomatic exoressinn Qinr-c.
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In several places in the proof, i use assumptions about
interval semantics, specifically about the interaction of
truth functions and intervals, which may be controversial.
I would like to point out what these assumptions are.
Essentially, l assume that truth functions and intervals do
not interact, i.e., that
ii^ & Y ]]j=[[j<]j^ s II f]]^
(The truth functions on the left are those of the object
language; those on the right those of the metalanguage). in
the proof, the sole relation between [[^]]^ and
where I and I' are different intervals, is provided by the
axioms of additivity and partitivity.
We begin by stating the axioms of partitivity and additivity.
Partitivity Axiom ;
^
^(5,w, [tl,t2] ,g,"^^
Additivity Axiom
^ ^
^(5,w, [tl,t2] ,g~^ ^ ^ ,w, [ t2 ,t3 ] ,g“^ ^
^
^®,w, [tl,t3] ,g"^*
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Proposition
. Let / and f be additive and partitive. Then
KAUSE is additive.
Proof
.
KAUSE 1//] is additive if the following inference is valid:
[ [ ^ KAUSE I/' ] ] [tl,t2 ] ,g
=1
[ KAUSE
,
=1^ ^
'(JrW, [t2,t3 ] ,g
show
: I KAUSE KU ] ]_ ~ ; ^
^ T ^<?,w, [tl,t3]
,g
Below the formulas occuring in this inference have been
expanded, using the defintion of KAUSE. ([fcx^ll
'V,[tl,t2]
abbreviates
®-“/''w,[t2,t3j‘'t'^Hw,[t2,t3j""~)*“^'')^ll„,tt2,t31
show ; —
By additivity and premises A and B we have [[(/]]
/ w, [ tl , t3
]
and [[ ^ ^^w,[tl,t3]’ We still have to show:
[ [-^ O"? 'jf' ] ]^^ |.
^ j
. We will prove a slightly stronger
result, deriving this from the final conjucts in A and B:
A-.
show:
"V'll„,[tl,t3]
When the meaning of Lewis' counterfactual connective Q~> in
premise A' is made explicit. A' amounts to
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w
, [tl,t2 ] =1 \/
<?t
(3se5J
.
P
The counterfactual connective a-i> in premise
conclusion can be expanded in the same way.
premise is a disjunction, we have to show 4
1.
premise A' disjunct
premise B' disjunct
conclusion
2.
premise A' disjunct
premise B' disjunct
conclusion
3.
premise A' disjunct
premise B' disjunct
conclusion
4.
premise A' disjunct
premise B' disjunct
conclusion
In the first case, I will derive disjunct ^
conclusion
.
B ' and the
Since each
cases
;
of the
In the remaining cases, I will derive disjunct
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P of the conclusion.
Case 1.
For case (1) we show:
a. VW [ [^] ] . ,
^ V'
, [tl,t2]
b. Vw' [[i]]
, ,
^W
, [t2,t3]
show;
I [0] ] ! r
'
, [tl,t3]
=1
=1
The conclusion follows from premises (a) and (b) by the
additivity axiom.
Case 2.
For case (2) we have to show:
a. Ose $^)( g„.£ s
show:(3se5^)(3w€S)
t [~/l 1„,
_
j=l i
Let S, w', verify premise (a). Then
^^"^^^w',[tl,t2]"^ premise (a)) and
^ ^^2 , t3
(from premise (b)). We are to show
.
-i i=l.
^w'
,
[tl,t3]
Suppose not. Then [[^]]^, By partitivity
[ [ ] ]^ ,
^ j ^ ^2 ]
• This contradicts the formula derived
from premise (a), as desired.
We still need to show ( \/ w" e S ) [ ^ t3]^^'
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Let w"6 s. From disjunct of premise (b),
^
^w", [t2,t3]"^‘ From disjunct
^
of premise (a),
ft
^ ^
^w", [tl,t2]^^* semantics for-:? and
we have
1
= 1 .
We are to show that li/ 1 1 -i
^ 4-i/ ' ^ w"
, [ tl , t3 ' equivalently
that [[~{^]]^„ r., 1=1 -? [ [-^ O' ] ] , =1w ,[tl,t3] ^^V",[tl,t3]
We show this by conditional proof.
1 .
2 .
3.
4.
5.
/ w
, [tl,t3]"^
", [tl,t3]"^
, [tl,t3]"^
,
[ tl , t2
[tl,t2
6 . [tl,t3]"^
7. p & p
assumption
indirect proof
assumption
by partitivity
by V elimination from 4
and 0
.
by additivity and
instantiation of
premise (b) and 5.
contradiction, 6 and 1
Case 3.
This is symmetric to case 2.
Case 4
.
For this case we assume that conjunct ^ holds
for both intervals, that is, there are spheres and S
2
such that
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a. (^w 6
^ ] 1
„,._
"‘^"'^®2)tt~/Hw',[t2,t31=l‘<^“"*S2)[[~/
Since is a nested family of spheres, either S^c S
2
or
S
2
CS^ (for both). Without loss of generality, we can
assume 3
^
082 ; the other case is symmetric. Since
Si S 2 we have, from the second conjunct of (b),
c. ( \/w" € S, ) (~0 -> ) =11 ^ ' w",[t2,t3] ^
We need first to show the first conjunct of the conclusion,
1.
e.
^ ^ ^ ^
1 ^ f
^
To show this we follow
the procedure of case 2. From (a),
1
- ( 3 w' 6 ) [ [-^] 1
. , =1
2 .
'
3.
4.
5.
6 .
SW:( 3w€ =1 existential
' ' deriviation
‘'~»^^'wMtl,t2]=l
5^=[[~^Hw,[tl,t31=l
"^''W,[tl,t3]=l
tiffn,..,
'w'
,
[tl,t2
]
p & p
=1
assumption, from 1
indirect proof
assumption
by partitivity from 5
7. contradiction 3 and 6
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We
1 .
2 .
3.
4 .
5.
6 .
7.
need still to show ( \/w" 6 ) (~ -v y/
)
w"
, [tl,t3
]
=1
sJi<Jw: ( Vw" 6 S, ) [ [-rf - 1//1 1 -1 , •1 r ' ^ w"
, [ tl , t3 ]
~^ universal
derivation
'w, [tl,t3]"^
^w", [tl,t3]"^
“'^''w”,[t2,t3 1=l
'
8.
9.
"1 [tl,t2]^^ 1
10. ["1*1 1„", [t2,t3j“'l' ^
11.
^ *1^1 Iw", [tl,t2]"*-
12. [[)
^w", [t2,t3]"^
13. [[)
^w", [tl,t3]"^
1
—
f
^
^W", [tl,t3]~°
15. P « p
16.
from
conditional proof
assumption
indirect proof
assumption
indirect proof
assumption
truth definition
for negation
by additivity from
11 and 12
truth definition
for negation
contradiction, 3
and 14
instantiation
second conjunct of (a
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17 .
18.
19
20 .
21 .
22 .
23.
24.
[
[ f
[[f
[[^
[[ y/
[[/]
^
^w"
, [tl,t2
^
^w", [t2,t3]^^
^
^w", [tl,t2]"^
^
^w", [t2,t3]"^
^w", [tl,t2]"^^
and
&
—
>
by partitivity
from (5)
& elimination, 17
semantics of ^
elimination, 16,18
[t2,t3] ^ semantics for ,
V elimination, 6,20
tt2,t3J ^ universalinstansiation
from (c)
n^j
w' [t2,t3] -1 semantics for •—? ,
^
-^elimination, 19,22.
p & ^p semantics for ^ and
contradiction 21,23
i Ahfli^ \4..

